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RUPERTO A. AMBIL v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

In this case, a letter was sent to the Office of the Ombudsman, requesting an investigation into the alleged transfer of a mayor from the provincial jail to the residence of the governor. The National Bureau of Investigation recommended filing criminal charges against the governor for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) later informed the Ombudsman that they are no longer interested in pursuing the case. Nonetheless, charges were filed against the governor, the provincial jail warden, and a police officer for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and delivering prisoners from jail. During the trial, witnesses were presented who testified about the justifications for the transfer. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the poor condition of the jail. The Sandiganbayan found the petitioners guilty of violating the law and sentenced them to imprisonment. The present petitions were filed challenging the Sandiganbayan's decision.

The second excerpt states that petitioners Apelado, Jr. and Ambil, Sr. were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was alleged that they transferred the detention of a prisoner without a court order, showing manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross negligence. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. claimed to be following orders, while petitioner Apelado, Sr. invoked immunity from criminal liability. The Court held that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case.

Both excerpts pertain to the same case and involve the prosecution of public officials for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charges stemmed from the transfer of a detention prisoner from the provincial jail to the residence of the governor without a court order. The defendants argued that the transfer was justified for the prisoner's safety, while the prosecution claimed that it constituted undue preference and unwarranted benefits. The Sandiganbayan found the defendants guilty, and they filed petitions questioning the decision.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner Ambil, Jr.

  2. Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner Apelado, Sr.

  3. Whether the petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim.

  4. Whether the power of control or the power of supervision applies to the transfer of detention of prisoners.

  5. Whether or not the provincial governor has the authority to personally take custody of prisoners.

  6. Whether or not the provincial governor, in taking custody of a prisoner, violated the provision of the Rules of Court and acted beyond the scope of his powers.

  7. Whether or not the provincial governor's actions in taking custody of the prisoner constituted giving unwarranted benefits and advantage in the discharge of his official functions.

  8. Whether or not Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is applicable to petitioner Ambil, Jr.

  9. Whether or not the fact that Mayor Adalim was a public officer makes petitioners' case beyond the ambit of R.A. No. 3019.

  10. Whether or not petitioner Ambil, Jr. can invoke the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office.

  11. Whether or not petitioner Apelado, Sr. can invoke the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose.

RULING:

  1. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner Ambil, Jr. because he is charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., who occupies a position that falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

  2. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over petitioner Apelado, Sr. even though his position is classified as Salary Grade 22. As a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the Sandiganbayan.

  3. Petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s house. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. cannot claim authority to transfer the detention of prisoners based on his position as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.

  4. The power of control applies to the transfer of detention of prisoners. The power of control allows an officer to alter or modify the actions of a subordinate officer, while the power of supervision only ensures that subordinate officers perform their duties.

  5. The provincial governor does not have the authority to personally take custody of prisoners. The duty of the provincial governor as a jail keeper is confined to the administration of the jail and the procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners. The governor can only enforce the law but not supplant it.

  6. Taking custody of a prisoner without a court order or bail is in violation of the provision of the Rules of Court. The power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government or the governor.

  7. The act of the provincial governor in taking custody of the prisoner constituted giving unwarranted benefits and advantage in the discharge of his official functions. The governor's actions, driven by bias and bad faith, showed a clear intention to accommodate a former political party mate, which is a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

  8. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is applicable to petitioner Ambil, Jr. regardless of whether or not he is a government officer or employee charged with the grant of licenses, permits, or other concessions.

  9. The fact that Mayor Adalim was a public officer does not take petitioners' case beyond the scope of R.A. No. 3019 because the term "private party" in the law includes a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.

  10. The first requisite for the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office to apply is that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. In this case, it was determined that petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Thus, the resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his office. Therefore, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cannot invoke the justifying circumstance.

  11. The requisites for the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose are that an order has been issued by a superior, such order must be for some lawful purpose, and the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful. In this case, although the order for Adalim's transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. Therefore, petitioner Apelado, Sr. cannot invoke the justifying circumstance.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases involving violations of anti-graft and corrupt practices laws and other offenses by government officials occupying specific positions.

  • Elements of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and its definition of "partiality," "bad faith," and "gross negligence."

  • Limits on the power of local chief executives over police and jail management personnel within their jurisdiction.

  • Difference between the power of control and the power of supervision.

  • The provincial governor's authority over provincial jails is limited to the administration of the jail and the procurement of food and clothing for prisoners.

  • The power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government or the governor.

  • The act of giving unwarranted benefits and advantage in the discharge of official functions constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

  • A prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

  • The term "party" in the context of "private party" in R.A. No. 3019 refers to a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.

  • To be found guilty under the second mode of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, it is sufficient that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative, or judicial functions.

  • The terms "unwarranted," "advantage," and "preference" in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 have specific meanings: lacking adequate or official support; a more favorable or improved position or condition; and priority or higher evaluation or desirability, respectively.

  • The fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or of office is a justifying circumstance, but in this case, it does not apply because petitioners failed to establish the existence of any risk to Mayor Adalim's safety that would justify transferring him out of the provincial jail.

  • The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code requires the accused to (1) act in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) cause injury or commit the offense as a necessary consequence of such performance or exercise.

  • The justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code requires the (1) issuance of an order by a superior; (2) such order to be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used to carry out the order to be lawful.

  • Conspiracy can be established when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another in order to complete it. The acts, although apparently independent, are in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.

  • Section 9(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from public office for violations of Section 3 of the same law. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides for the imposition of an indeterminate sentence when the offense is punished by a special law, with the maximum term not exceeding the maximum fixed by the special law and the minimum term not less than the minimum term prescribed by the same law.