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CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

This case involves the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6975, which established the Philippine National Police (PNP) under the Department of the Interior and Local Government. The petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975, arguing that it limited the power of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and preserved control with the Department Secretary. The court provides a brief history of the police force in the Philippines and the rationale behind the provision in the Constitution regarding the establishment of one national, civilian police force. The court rejects the petitioner's argument, citing the principle of presidential control and the doctrine of qualified political agency.

The petitioner claims that the reorganization of the NAPOLCOM and the PNP under the Department of the Interior and Local Government infringes on the NAPOLCOM's power of control. The petitioner argues that certain provisions in RA 6975 give power and control to local executives and other entities that should be under the authority of the NAPOLCOM. The respondent argues that the reorganization is an administrative realignment that promotes coordination and cooperation among law enforcement agencies. The respondent states that the Act adequately provides for administration and control at the commission level, as seen in the powers and functions of the NAPOLCOM stated in the Act. The respondent also explains that the Act grants certain powers to local executives and other entities to ensure operational efficiency and effectiveness.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the power given to local executives to choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police is in accordance with the Constitution.

  2. Whether the power of operational supervision and control exercised by local mayors is consistent with the Constitution.

  3. Whether the involvement of the Civil Service Commission in the appointment and examination of PNP officers is constitutional.

  4. Whether granting disciplinary powers to the People's Law Enforcement Boards and city and municipal mayors is a violation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM over the PNP.

  5. Whether Section 12 of the Act constitutes an encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of executive control and commander-in-chief powers.

  6. Whether the creation of a Special Oversight Committee under Section 84 of the Act is an unconstitutional encroachment upon and a diminution of the President's power of control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices.

  7. Whether or not the National Police Commission is an independent office like the Constitutional Commissions and the Commission on Human Rights, and thus not under the control of the President.

RULING:

  1. The power given to local executives to choose the PNP Provincial Director and Chiefs of Police is in accordance with the Constitution. The local executives serve as representatives of the NAPOLCOM, and their acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM.

  2. The power of operational supervision and control exercised by local mayors is consistent with the Constitution because they are acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM.

  3. The involvement of the Civil Service Commission in the appointment and examination of PNP officers is constitutional. This underscores the civilian character of the PNP and professionalizes the police force.

  4. Granting disciplinary powers to the People's Law Enforcement Boards and city and municipal mayors does not violate the power of control of the NAPOLCOM over the PNP. The NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the disciplinary bodies, and it issues implementing guidelines and procedures for their conduct.

  5. The provision in question does not constitute an encroachment upon, interference with, and abdication by the President of executive control and commander-in-chief powers. The provision gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. It provides for a transition period during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. It does not result in the abdication of the President's war powers because he remains a civilian whose duties as Commander-in-Chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him.

  6. The creation of a Special Oversight Committee does not interfere with the President's power of control. The committee is an ad hoc or transitory body, tasked with planning and overseeing the immediate transfer of involved agencies into the Department of the Interior and Local Government. Once this is carried out, the committee's functions and existence cease. Its creation and functions do not encroach upon or diminish the President's power of control, and no executive department, bureau, or office is placed under the control or authority of the committee.

  7. The National Police Commission is not an independent office like the Constitutional Commissions and the Commission on Human Rights. It is under the control of the President, specifically through the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government. Therefore, the National Police Commission may be controlled by the President.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Every presumption should be indulged in favor of constitutionality.

  • Local executives serve as representatives of the NAPOLCOM and are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions.

  • The involvement of the Civil Service Commission in the appointment and examination of PNP officers professionalizes the police force.

  • Granting disciplinary powers to the People's Law Enforcement Boards and city and municipal mayors helps to professionalize the police force.

  • The national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as it is a civilian agency of the government and subject to the President's exercise of executive control.

  • The President's war powers as Commander-in-Chief are only a part of his organic duties and do not abdicate his civilian authority.

  • The creation of an ad hoc or transitory body, such as a Special Oversight Committee, does not encroach upon or diminish the President's power of control, as long as no executive department, bureau, or office is placed under the control or authority of the committee.

  • The Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Audit, Elections) and the Commission on Human Rights are independent of the Executive.

  • The National Police Commission is not in the same category as the independent Constitutional Commissions and the Commission on Human Rights.

  • The National Police Commission is under the control of the President through the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.