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NATIONAL PRESS CLUB v. COMELEC

FACTS:

The case involves three consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners, including representatives of the mass media, candidates for office, and taxpayers and voters, argue that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and amount to censorship. They claim that the prohibition on selling or donating space and time for political advertisements curtails media's role in providing public information and opinion, as well as the right of voters to information and opinion.

Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is part of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 and should be read together with Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provide for the allocation of free "Comelec space" and "Comelec time" to candidates. The objective of Section 11 (b) is to equalize the financial advantages of rich and poor candidates by preventing the sale or donation of campaign materials except to the Commission on Elections. This objective is considered legitimate and important in a country characterized by income inequality and poverty.

On the other hand, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 9006 grants the Commission on Elections (Comelec) the power to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information "during the election period." The petitioners argue that this provision violates the freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press guaranteed by the Constitution. The respondent, however, contends that the supervision or regulation of media operations during the election period is necessary to ensure equal opportunity among candidates for political office and to prevent undue advantage based on financial resources.

The petitioners further argue that any supervision or regulation of media operations should be in accordance with the requirements of the police power and should not be used to unconstitutionally repress freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional as an exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.

  2. Whether or not Section 11 (b) has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation and has resulted in the unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

  3. Whether Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 9006 violates the freedom of speech, expression, and of the press.

  4. Whether Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING:

  1. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone beyond the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.

  2. Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. It is limited in its scope of application to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates. Therefore, Section 11 (b) does not constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

  3. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 9006 does not violate the freedom of speech, expression, and of the press. The provision limits paid partisan political advertisements to fora other than modern mass media, and to "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in such mass media. It does not authorize any intervention or control on the content of the normal operations of media or political advertisements of individual candidates. Therefore, there is no censorship disguised or otherwise imposed by the provision. The limitation on the right of free speech and access to mass media of the candidates has a reasonable connection to the constitutional objective of equalizing the situations of candidates with different financial capacities.

  4. The Supreme Court held that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 9006 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. While the provision does not place political candidates on complete and perfect equality in terms of financial capacity, it is not required to do so. The Constitution does not require perfection in governmental regulation, but only that the regulatory measure bear a reasonable nexus to the constitutionally sanctioned objective. The provision seeks to promote equal opportunity and time and space for political candidates to inform the public about themselves. The supervision or regulation of communication and information media, as recognized in the Constitution, is not forbidden or unconstitutional.

PRINCIPLES:

  • A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of proving its unconstitutionality lies with the party asserting it.

  • The exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods is subject to limitations.

  • The limitations to the exercise of supervision or regulation include limitations in duration of applicability and limitations in scope of application.

  • Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is limited in its applicability to election periods and is limited in its scope to the purchase and sale of print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes."

  • The possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of a power or authority, as there is no power or authority that is not susceptible to being abused.

  • The limitation on the right to free speech and access to mass media of candidates must have a clear and reasonable connection with a constitutional objective.

  • A regulatory measure does not need to be comprehensive or completely eradicate the evil sought to be remedied in order to be constitutionally valid. It must only have a reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.

  • The supervision or regulation of communication and information media is not forbidden and is recognized in the Constitution.

  • The requisites of fairness and equal opportunity in political campaigns are designed to benefit the candidates themselves.

  • The nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic media, must be considered in regulating political advertisements to prevent invasions of privacy.

  • The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from intrusions and subliminal effects is as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues.

  • The public should be protected from mind-manipulating political advertisements that are designed to appeal to non-intellective faculties.

  • The general listening and viewing public is considered a "captive audience" in the Philippines.

  • The ruling allows the continued airing of paid political advertisements in electronic media, potentially compromising the right of the public to be free from unwanted intrusions.