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PETER JOHN D. CALDERON v. BARTOLOME CARALE

FACTS:

The controversy in this case relates to the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. This provision grants the President the authority to nominate and appoint various government officials, with some appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

In the case of Sarmiento III vs. Mison, the Supreme Court ruled that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs does not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments since it falls outside the category of appointments that necessitate confirmation. The Court held that the President acted within her constitutional authority in appointing the Commissioner without obtaining confirmation.

The Court affirmed this doctrine in the later case of Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, specifically applying it to the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. The Court emphasized that the Commission on Appointments' confirmation is not needed for the Chairman's appointment since it is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. Instead, the President appointed the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights based on Executive Order No. 163.

However, in the case of Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Constitutional Commissions, et al., the Court upheld the Commission on Appointments' power to confirm the appointments of sectoral representatives in Congress. This is because the Constitution itself allows the President to appoint individuals to fill the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives. Thus, such sectoral representatives fall under the category of officers whose appointments are vested in the President and are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

From these cases, it was established that confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is only required for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII. It also clarified that confirmation is not necessary for the appointment of government officers not covered by the first sentence, provided their appointments are authorized by law.

Moving on to the specific facts of this case, in March 1989, the Herrera-Veloso Law (RA 6715) was enacted, amending the Labor Code. Section 13 of this law mandates that the Chairman, Division Presiding Commissioners, and other Commissioners of the NLRC be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. In line with this, President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representative of various sectors, and they assumed their respective positions. Additionally, the Secretary of Labor and Employment is responsible for recommending the appointment of Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters by the President.

A petition was filed challenging the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments given by the President to the NLRC Chairman and Members. The petitioner argued that these appointments should have been submitted for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments according to the Labor Code. The petitioner distinguished this case from previous Supreme Court rulings, contending that despite the passage of RA 6715, the President issued permanent appointments without submitting them for confirmation.

In response, the Solicitor General argued that RA 6715 violated Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without proper constitutional basis. The Solicitor General relied on previous Supreme Court decisions, particularly Mison and Bautista, which held that confirmation by the Commission on Appointments was only required for specific high-ranking officials listed in the Constitution. The Solicitor General pointed out that the Constitution did not provide for expanding the list of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:

  1. The main issue in this case is whether Congress has the power to require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments for appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation.

  2. Whether or not the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments for the appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), as provided under RA 6715, is unconstitutional.

  3. Whether or not legislation can expand a constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has interpreted it.

  4. Whether or not the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments for the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is constitutional.

RULING:

  1. The Court ruled that Congress does not have the power to require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments for appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. The Court based its ruling on the interpretation of the Constitution in the previous case of Mison v. Guerrero. According to Mison, the appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments are limited to the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. Other officers, such as those falling within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII, do not require confirmation.

  2. The requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments for the appointments of the Chairman and Members of the NLRC, as provided under RA 6715, is unconstitutional. It amends the Constitution by adding appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is beyond the legislative power to do so. It also amends the Constitution by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments that are otherwise exclusively entrusted to the President. The constitutional infirmity of the provision is deemed beyond redemption.

  3. Legislation cannot expand a constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has interpreted it. Supreme Court decisions interpreting or applying the Constitution form part of the legal system of the Philippines. These decisions establish the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law and have the force of law. Once the Supreme Court has interpreted a constitutional provision, the legislature cannot modify or reverse it.

  4. The Supreme Court declared that the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments for the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the NLRC is unconstitutional and has no legal force and effect.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments are limited to the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution.

  • Other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

  • Congress does not have the power to expand the list of officers whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

  • The interpretation placed upon a law by a competent court has the force of law.

  • The legislature cannot pass any declaratory act or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, as it cannot define terms used in a statute outside of its legislative domain.

  • The legislature cannot validate a law that violates a constitutional provision to prevent it from being attacked in court.

  • The legislature is assigned the power to make and enact laws but not to interpret the constitution.

  • Congress must interpret the Constitution and take into account relevant constitutional prohibitions when enacting legislation.

  • The function of the Court is to compare the article of the Constitution invoked with the statute challenged and decide if the latter is consistent with the former.

  • Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution departs from the 1935 Constitution by removing the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments for almost all presidential appointments to prevent abuse of such power.

  • The power of appointment is vested solely in the President, as provided in the Constitution.

  • The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 16, Article VII, limits the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to certain positions and explicitly excludes the Chairman and Members of the NLRC.

  • The Court's duty is to apply the Constitution as it is written, regardless of the preferences of the legislature or the executive.

  • The solution to perceived problems or discrepancies in the Constitution lies in a constitutional convention or Congress sitting as a constituent assembly, rather than through judicial or legislative action.