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HEIRS OF LATE JESUS FRAN v. BERNARDO LL. SALAS

FACTS:

The case involves the estate of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo. On November 13, 1972, the probate of the decedent's last will and testament was granted by the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VIII. On January 4, 1973, the petitioner, Fran, filed an inventory of the estate and copies were furnished to the private respondents. A Project of Partition was submitted by the executor for court approval, signed by all the devisees and legatees except Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia, and Concepcion M. Espina. The legatees and devisees submitted certifications admitting receipt of the Project of Partition and stating no objections to its approval. A notice of hearing was issued by the Clerk of Court, setting the hearing on the Project of Partition for August 29, 1973. After the hearing, the court issued an order on September 10, 1973, approving the Project of Partition, declaring the parties as the only heirs entitled to the estate, and closing the proceedings. The administrator was ordered to deliver their respective shares. Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Cebu was later converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On October 1, 1979, the private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the probate judgment and the order of partition, alleging that they were not furnished with a copy of the will, asserting it is a forgery, and claiming they were not notified of relevant orders and resolutions. The private respondents also alleged that the project of partition contained no notice of hearing and that the petitioner did not submit an accounting as required by law. Petitioner Fran opposed the Omnibus Motion, stating that the private respondents are estopped from questioning the will and asserting that there was an actual distribution of the estate in accordance with the Project of Partition. Despite the petitioner's objections, the respondent Judge set a hearing for the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Omnibus Motion, but it was denied. As a result, the instant petition was filed, challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court to entertain the Omnibus Motion since the probate judgment and the order approving the Project of Partition had become final and executed.

The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioners, Jesus Fran and other heirs of the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, against respondent Judge Imelda M. Lontok of the Regional Trial Court Branch 3 of Cebu City. The petition seeks to nullify the order of the respondent judge declaring the testamentary dispositions of the will void, finding the signature of the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo to be a forgery, reopening the probate proceeding, and converting it into an intestate proceeding. The petitioners filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, which was initially opposed by the private respondents. However, private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco subsequently withdrew her opposition and participated in the distribution of the estate in accordance with the provisions of the will. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the respondent judge. The order denying the motion for reconsideration became final and executory after the petitioners failed to appeal within the prescribed period. Subsequently, the respondent judge proceeded with the hearing of the omnibus motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondents. Testimonies were received, including that of an alleged handwriting expert who claimed that the signature on the will was a forgery. The respondent judge issued an order stating that unless a restraining order was received from the higher court within 20 days, the probate proceeding would be reopened. The petitioners filed a supplemental petition asking the higher court to restrain the respondent judge from reopening the case. In their comments and opposition, the private respondents raised several issues, including the jurisdiction of the probate court, their alleged deprivation of the opportunity to examine the original will, the validity of the proceedings before the Clerk of Court, and claims of fraud and undervaluation of the estate by the petitioner Jesus Fran. Before the restraining order was served on the respondent judge, he issued an order declaring the testamentary dispositions of the will void, finding the signature of the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo to be a forgery, and reopening the probate proceeding as an intestate proceeding. The petitioners filed a second supplemental petition asking the court to declare the order null and void. The case was subsequently referred to the parties for the filing of memoranda, which they complied with. The petitioners filed a manifestation informing the court of the death of petitioner Jesus Fran and the substitution of heirs. Private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco filed an affidavit stating that she did not remember executing the affidavit previously submitted, while the other private respondents claimed that she was confined in the hospital and could not recall the execution.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco's withdrawal of her participation in the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to the case is valid.

  2. Whether or not the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the probate judgment, declaring the subject will a forgery, nullifying the testamentary dispositions, and ordering the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.

  3. Whether or not private respondents' prior actual knowledge of the decision and their acts of signing the Project of Partition and expressing conformity through a certification amount to their deemed notice of the decision.

  4. Whether or not a court can authorize its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant.

  5. Whether or not the proceedings before the clerk of court and the resulting judgment prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved party.

  6. Whether or not the reception of evidence by the clerk of court requires the exercise of judicial discretion.

  7. Whether or not the proceedings before the clerk of court can be considered void for failure to take an oath.

  8. Whether the failure to annex the original will to the petition for probate renders the decision null and void.

  9. Whether the non-fulfillment of a promise constitutes fraud that justifies a motion for reconsideration or a petition for relief from judgment.

  10. Whether an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code can be filed to attack the validity of a final judgment.

  11. Whether the probate judgment is conclusive with respect to the due execution of a will and can only be impugned on the ground of fraud in a separate or independent action.

  12. Whether the failure to distribute the estate is a ground for re-opening the testate proceedings.

RULING:

  1. The withdrawal of private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco's participation in the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to the case is valid and cannot be doubted. However, her withdrawal does not warrant her removal as a private respondent, as the respondent Judge had already issued an order including her as a private respondent in the case.

  2. The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the probate judgment, declaring the subject will a forgery, nullifying the testamentary dispositions, and ordering the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of intestacy. The court finds that there is no basis for such a decision and that it was made without proper justification.

  3. Private respondents' prior actual knowledge of the decision and their acts of signing the Project of Partition and expressing conformity through a certification constitute indubitable proof of their prior knowledge of the decision. Even if they did not receive a formal notice, their actions indicate their awareness and acceptance of the decision. Therefore, the contention that they were not notified of the order authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence is deemed invalid.

  4. No. There is a law or principle of public policy that prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant.

  5. Yes. If the proceedings before the clerk of court and the resulting judgment prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved party, there exists sufficient justification to grant the latter complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court.

  6. Yes. The reception of evidence by the clerk of court does not allow for the exercise of judicial discretion usually required when the other party objects to the questions propounded and the admission of documentary evidence.

  7. No. The clerk of court acted as such when he performed the delegated task of receiving evidence. It was not necessary for him to take an oath for that purpose as he was bound by his oath of office as a Clerk of Court.

  8. The failure to annex the original will to the petition for probate does not render the decision null and void. It is not a jurisdictional requirement. Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a petition for probate by any person interested in the estate, whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. In this case, a copy of the original will and its English translation were attached to the petition as integral parts of the same. The Clerk of Court, upon examining the petition, would not have accepted it for docketing if the annexes were not attached. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty militates against the claim that the original will was not attached. Additionally, the original will was submitted in evidence and marked as Exhibit "F" in the special proceedings, forming part of the records.

  9. The non-fulfillment of a promise does not constitute fraud that justifies a motion for reconsideration or a petition for relief from judgment.

  10. An independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code cannot be filed to attack the validity of a final judgment.

  11. The probate judgment is conclusive with respect to the due execution of a will and can only be impugned on the ground of fraud in a separate or independent action.

  12. The failure to distribute the estate is not a ground for re-opening the testate proceedings.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Irrevocable withdrawal by a party from a motion or opposition in a case does not necessarily result in the removal of the party as a respondent.

  • Grave abuse of discretion by a judge may be a ground for challenging and overturning a court decision.

  • Actual knowledge of a court decision, as evidenced by a party's prior acts and participation in the case, may be deemed as sufficient notice, even if a formal notice was not received.

  • The reception of evidence by a Clerk of Court may be authorized by a court, and such practice is recognized and upheld by the Supreme Court.

  • The duty to render judgment on the merits of the case rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported.

  • When a doctrine of the Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who have relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

  • The competence of the clerk of court to receive evidence and make recommendatory findings of facts may be delegated in certain authorized instances under the Rules of Court.

  • The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court governing the reference of a case to a commissioner do not apply when the court merely directs the clerk of court to take down the testimony of witnesses and mark documentary evidence proffered.

  • The failure to attach a copy of the will and submit it to the court for examination within twenty (20) days after the death of the testatrix does not invalidate the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the petition for probate.

  • The annexing of the original will to the petition for probate is not a jurisdictional requirement, as provided in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

  • The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty militates against claims that the original will was not attached to the petition.

  • Fraud must be extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised during the trial for it to constitute sufficient justification for a motion for reconsideration or a petition for relief from judgment.

  • There are three courses of action open to an aggrieved party to attack the validity of a final judgment: petition for relief, direct action via a special civil action for certiorari or collateral attack, and independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code.

  • The probate judgment is conclusive with respect to the due execution of a will and can only be impugned on the ground of fraud in a separate or independent action.

  • Final judgments are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed for reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time, the interests of litigants, and the peace and order of society.

  • The non-distribution of the estate can be addressed through a motion for execution or a separate action for recovery of the shares.