FACTS:

The petitioner, a minor and resident of the Philippines, purchased a round-trip ticket from the private respondent, a foreign corporation with its principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo. However, on the day of his departure, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila and had to be wait-listed. The petitioner then sued the private respondent for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The petitioner then brought the case to the Supreme Court, raising the issues of the constitutionality of Article 28(1) and the jurisdiction of Philippine courts over the case.

The petitioner argues that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is inapplicable due to a fundamental change in the circumstances that served as its basis. He claims that the provisions in the Convention were intended to protect airline companies under conditions that no longer exist. The petitioner invokes the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, which allows non-performance of a treaty obligation if there has been a vital change in the condition of the contracting parties that they could not have foreseen. However, the Court observes that the changes in the airline industry were not entirely unforeseen, and the treaty itself provides for the possibility of improvements through a new international conference. The treaty has not been rejected by the Philippine government, and the act of denunciation is a political act that falls within the jurisdiction of the other branches of government. The petitioner also argues that being required to sue in the United States would deny him the right to access our courts. However, the constitutional guaranty of access to courts only applies to courts with appropriate jurisdiction, which our courts do not have under the Warsaw Convention.

The case involves a flight from the United States to the Philippines and back to the United States, making it an international flight. The contract of carriage between the airline and the passenger states that the transportation will take place within the territories of two High Contracting Parties. Therefore, the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), automatically apply and govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger. The interpretation of Article 28(1) is disputed, with some authorities arguing that it refers to venue, while others argue that it pertains to jurisdiction. The petitioner cites cases supporting the venue interpretation, while the private respondent cites later cases supporting the jurisdiction interpretation. The distinction between jurisdiction and venue is explained, with jurisdiction being non-waivable and fixed by statute, while venue can be changed by consent. The wording of Article 32 and the objective of the Convention to regulate international air transportation uniformly support the characterization of Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction provision. It is also noted that the Convention does not contain any other provisions regarding jurisdiction, indicating that the phrase "rules as to jurisdiction" in Article 32 refers only to Article 28(1). A leading case, Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., is discussed, which explains that jurisdiction, in the international sense, must first be established in accordance with Article 28(1), followed by the establishment of jurisdiction according to domestic law. Only after determining the court with jurisdiction will the issue of venue be addressed. The petitioner argues that the parties are precluded from amending the applicable jurisdiction and venue provisions after the damages have occurred.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is a jurisdictional provision or a venue provision.

2. Whether the proper venue for the case is the Philippines.

3. Whether the place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or the ticket between the passenger and the carrier.

4. Whether Manila should be considered the petitioner's destination.

5. Whether the domicile of the carrier for purposes of determining jurisdiction under the Convention should be interpreted as every place where it has a branch office.

6. Whether the interpretation of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention allows for a third intermediate category of jurisdiction.

7. Whether French law must be applied in interpreting a treaty written in French.

8. Whether the court has jurisdiction over the case under Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.

9. Whether Article 24 of the Civil Code, which provides protection for disadvantaged parties, applies to the present case.

RULING:

1. Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is a jurisdictional provision. The court agrees with the case of Aranas v. United Airlines that Article 28(1) is a jurisdictional provision.

2. The proper venue for the case is not the Philippines. The court upholds the ruling of the lower court that the venue of the action is improperly laid.

3. The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

4. Manila should be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the petitioner's destination. The examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco, despite the fact that the date of the return flight was left open.

5. The domicile of the carrier for purposes of determining jurisdiction under the Convention is customarily regarded as the place where it is incorporated, rather than every place where it has a branch office.

6. The interpretation of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention does not allow for a third intermediate category of jurisdiction. The article specifically states that an action for damages may be brought in the country where the carrier's principal place of business is located or the country where the ticket was bought. The domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where the complaint is allowed to be filed under the article. Therefore, the request to create a new jurisdictional standard for the Convention is denied.

7. French law does not necessarily have to be applied in interpreting a treaty written in French. While French legal usage must be considered in accurately translating the French terms into English, it does not mean that French law should govern the meaning and scope of the terms. The treaty itself does not indicate that French law was intended to govern its interpretation, and other courts have not considered themselves bound to apply French law. Therefore, the application of French law in interpreting the treaty is not required.

8. The court does not have jurisdiction over the case under Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention. The provision states that an action can only be commenced in the courts of four designated places, and the court in the present case is not one of them.

9. Article 24 of the Civil Code does not apply to the present case because it assumes that the court has jurisdiction to rule in favor of the disadvantaged party. Since the jurisdiction is absent in this case, the provision does not come into play.

PRINCIPLES:

• Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is a jurisdictional provision, not a venue provision.

• Waiver of improper venue must be resolved in favor of non-waiver, especially when there are special circumstances justifying this conclusion.

• The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or ticket between the passenger and the carrier.

• An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

• The domicile of the carrier for purposes of determining jurisdiction under the Convention is the place where it is incorporated.

• The interpretation of a treaty should be based on the text and context of the treaty itself, rather than relying solely on the language in which it is written.

• In interpreting a treaty, the intention of the parties should be determined based on the ordinary meaning of the words used, as well as the object and purpose of the treaty.

• The fact that a treaty is written in a particular language does not necessarily mean that the law of that language should govern its interpretation. The intention of the parties and the context of the treaty should be considered.

• Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention restricts the jurisdiction of the courts where an action can be commenced.

• Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention sets the monetary ceiling for the liability of a carrier.

• Article 24 of the Civil Code provides protection for disadvantaged parties in contractual relationships.