GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. CA

FACTS:

The case involves a complaint filed by the private respondent against the petitioner for damages based on a breach of promise to marry. The private respondent alleges that the petitioner, an Iranian citizen studying in the Philippines, courted her and proposed marriage. They agreed to get married at the end of the school semester in October. However, before the agreed date, the petitioner forced the private respondent to live with him and later started maltreating her. The petitioner also revealed that he was already married to someone in Bacolod City. The private respondent filed a complaint seeking damages in the amount of P45,000.00. The petitioner denied the allegations and filed a counterclaim. After a pre-trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.

The plaintiff, a young woman, was working at a restaurant where the defendant proposed marriage to her. The owner of the restaurant, as well as the plaintiff's parents, knew about this love affair and proposal. The plaintiff eventually resigned from her job at the restaurant after accepting the defendant's proposal. The defendant, an Iranian Moslem, had a common-law wife in Bacolod City before coming to Dagupan City. Despite this, he pretended to love and promised to marry the plaintiff, a trusting country girl. The plaintiff and her parents believed the defendant's promises, leading them to agree to the plaintiff cohabiting with him in preparation for their supposed marriage. The trial court found that the defendant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love and promise to marry caused the plaintiff to surrender her virtue and womanhood to him. The court held the defendant liable for moral damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The defendant petitioned before the Court raises the issue of whether Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case. The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the petitioner does not possess good moral character.

  2. Whether the petitioner's actions should be excused based on his cultural background.

  3. Whether the breach of promise to marry is actionable.

  4. Whether Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict, is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent.

  5. Whether Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.

  6. Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee's claim for damages based on Article 21 of the Civil Code is valid.

  7. Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee's claim for damages is barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto.

  8. Whether the petitioner violated the Filipino concept of morality and defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.

  9. Whether the pari delicto rule applies in this case.

RULING:

  1. The trial court did not err in ruling that the petitioner does not possess good moral character. The appellate court will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, unless the trial court overlooked facts of substance or value. In this case, the petitioner failed to convince the court that any such facts were overlooked.

  2. The petitioner's cultural background does not excuse his actions. While the petitioner argues that he is not conversant with Filipino customs, traditions, and culture as a foreigner, the court ruled that this is not a valid excuse for his behavior. The court did not give weight to the petitioner's argument that his Muslim upbringing allows a Muslim to take four wives.

  3. A breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. The court ruled that Congress deliberately eliminated provisions in the Civil Code that would have made breach of promise to marry actionable. The court emphasized that such actions are prone to abuse and have been abolished in many American states. However, the court noted that Article 21 of the Civil Code allows for legal remedy for moral wrongs that are impossible to enumerate and punish in statute books.

  4. The Court held that Article 2176 is limited to negligent acts or omissions and does not encompass willful or intentional acts. Quasi-delict, or culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is a common law concept. Torts is broader and includes intentional criminal acts, while culpa aquiliana only covers negligent acts. Thus, intentional and malicious acts are governed by the Revised Penal Code, while negligent acts or omissions are governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

  5. The Court ruled that Article 21 can be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. If a man's promise to marry is the proximate cause of a woman's acceptance of his love and he subsequently deceives her into engaging in a sexual relationship, damages may be awarded under Article 21 for the fraud, deceit, and willful injury to her honor and reputation. However, such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

  6. The Court held that the plaintiff-appellee's claim for damages based on Article 21 of the Civil Code is not valid. It was emphasized that seduction, in the legal sense, requires the woman to be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of deceit, enticement, superior power, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer. It was found that there was no evidence of such seduction in the case at hand. The Court further stated that for a claim of seduction to prosper, there must be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. In this case, it was evident that the sexual relations between the parties were voluntary and based on mutual passion, rather than deceit or inducement.

  7. The Court ruled that the plaintiff-appellee's claim for damages is not barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto. The defendant-appellant argued that both parties were at fault and, therefore, the plaintiff-appellee cannot recover damages. However, the Court rejected this argument, stating that the doctrine of in pari delicto should not be applied in cases where there is fraud or deceit. The Court further emphasized that even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there has been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case, civil liability may still arise if there is a wrongful act and resulting injury.

  8. The petitioner clearly violated the Filipino concept of morality and defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. His actions were primarily driven by lust and he deceived the private respondent into believing that he loved her and would marry her. This violates Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires individuals to act with justice, give everyone their due, and observe honesty and good faith.

  9. The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case. Although the private respondent may not have had the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner not out of lust but because of moral seduction. She had qualms of conscience and left the petitioner as soon as she found out he was not going to marry her. The private respondent is not in pari delicto with the petitioner as she was influenced and deceived by him. The equitable principle applies that relief may be given to the less guilty party when their transgression was brought about by the imposition or undue influence of the other party.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The credibility of witnesses is generally within the purview of the trial court, and appellate courts will not disturb its findings unless there are overlooked facts of substance or value.

  • Cultural background does not excuse actions that are deemed morally wrong.

  • A breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, as Congress deliberately eliminated provisions in the Civil Code that would have made it so. However, Article 21 of the Civil Code provides a legal remedy for untold moral wrongs.

  • Article 2176 of the Civil Code is limited to negligent acts or omissions and does not cover willful or intentional acts.

  • Quasi-delict, or culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept that is narrower than the common law concept of torts.

  • Article 21 of the Civil Code fills the gap between intentional and negligent acts and provides a legal remedy for injurious acts beyond redress.

  • Article 21 applies in cases of breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction, provided that the injury was committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

  • Seduction, in the legal sense, requires deceit, enticement, superior power, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded.

  • For a claim of seduction to prosper, there must be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement.

  • The doctrine of in pari delicto should not be applied in cases where there is fraud or deceit.

  • Even if an act is not punishable under the criminal law and there has been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case, civil liability may still arise if there is a wrongful act and resulting injury.

  • Every person is directed to act with justice, give everyone their due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of rights and performance of obligations (Article 19, Civil Code).

  • The pari delicto rule does not apply when one party is more literate or intelligent than the other (Mangayao vs. Lasud).