FACTS:

Consolacion Naval, the private respondent, was separately accused of estafa and falsification in two different criminal cases. Naval sought to quash the falsification charge, arguing that it was the same offense as estafa. The motion to quash was initially denied, but later granted by the Presiding Judge of Branch 21. The People filed a special civil action for certiorari to challenge the judge's perception and the denial of the motion for re-evaluation. The charges against Naval involved the sale and encumbrance of a parcel of land, with Naval subsequently obtaining a title in her name and selling a portion of the land to other individuals.

Justina Naval, another private respondent, was charged with falsification of a public document for allegedly falsifying her Transcript of Records. She filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that falsification was necessary to commit estafa, which should constitute a complex crime. The trial court initially denied the motion but later reversed its decision.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court correctly quashed the information for falsification. The petitioner argues that the trial court erred in considering the argument that falsification was necessary to commit estafa, as this argument was not specifically raised in the initial motion to quash. The petitioner also argues that the theory of a single crime advanced by the private respondent in her motion for reconsideration is not synonymous with "pardon, conviction, acquittal, or jeopardy" and should not have been entertained as a ground for quashing the information.

The petitioner further argues that the alleged scheme of falsification in 1971 to facilitate the commission of estafa in 1973 does not hold water, as the offenses were committed on different dates.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the crimes of falsification and estafa are distinct offenses or one complex crime.

2. Whether the filing of two separate informations for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy.

3. Whether arraignment of the accused in the previous case is a condition sine qua non for double jeopardy to attach

4. Whether a person who has been prosecuted for one offense can be prosecuted subsequently for another offense if the latter offense is lesser or greater than the former offense

5. Whether or not the first jeopardy has validly terminated.

6. Whether or not a prior conviction, acquittal, or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused is required before the first jeopardy can be pleaded to abate a second prosecution.

RULING:

1. The crimes of falsification and estafa are distinct offenses. The recitals in the two informations against the defendant differ, and the two offenses have different elements and contexts. Therefore, they cannot be considered as one complex crime.

2. The filing of two separate informations for the same offense does not constitute double jeopardy. The plea of double jeopardy can only be invoked if the defendant had previously been convicted, acquitted, or in jeopardy of being convicted for the offense charged, and if the previous case had been dismissed or terminated without the defendant's consent by a court of competent jurisdiction. Since the defendant had not yet been arraigned in the previous case for estafa, the plea of double jeopardy is not applicable. The mere filing of two informations for the same offense does not yet afford the accused the right to claim double jeopardy.

3. Arraignment of the accused in the previous case is a condition sine qua non for double jeopardy to attach. Jeopardy only attaches after a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, with a valid plea entered, and the case is dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused.

4. A person who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or identical offense, even if the latter offense is lesser or greater than the former. Double jeopardy can be invoked by a person simply charged with an offense if they are charged again for the same or identical offense, but only if they have already been convicted, acquitted, or had the case dismissed or terminated without their express consent.

5. The court ruled that the first jeopardy has not yet terminated, as the status of the progress of the estafa case is still uncertain. The court also held that a prior conviction, acquittal, or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused is still required before the first jeopardy can be pleaded to abate a second prosecution. Therefore, the Orders of the respondent judge quashing the information for falsification and denying the motion for reconsideration were reversed and set aside, and the information for falsification was reinstated.

PRINCIPLES:

• The crimes of falsification and estafa are distinct offenses, as they have different elements and contexts.

• The plea of double jeopardy can only be invoked if the defendant had previously been convicted, acquitted, or in jeopardy of being convicted for the offense charged, and if the previous case had been dismissed or terminated without the defendant's consent by a court of competent jurisdiction. The mere filing of two informations for the same offense does not constitute double jeopardy.

• Jeopardy attaches from the entry of the accused's plea at the arraignment.

• Double jeopardy requires a court of competent jurisdiction, a valid complaint or information, arraignment, a valid plea, and the defendant being acquitted, convicted, or the case being dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused.

• Jeopardy terminates upon conviction, acquittal, dismissal of the case, or termination without the express consent of the defendant.

• A valid complaint or information filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and a plea by the defendant are required for jeopardy to attach.

• A prior conviction, acquittal, or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused is required before the first jeopardy can be pleaded to abate a second prosecution.