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PLACIDO L. MAPA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

On January 20, 1987, several individuals, including petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara, were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Their trial began on September 20, 1988. Concurrently, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos were facing charges in New York for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). To secure the conviction of the Marcoses, the prosecution sought the testimonies of witnesses, including petitioners Vergara and Mapa. These witnesses were promised immunity from further criminal prosecution if they testified in the RICO cases. Agreements with the petitioners were formalized in writing on May 16, 1990.

The case involves two separate agreements between the Republic of the Philippines and petitioners Mapa and Vergara. In the agreement with Mapa, the Republic requested his availability as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al." In exchange, the Republic granted Mapa immunity from investigation, prosecution, and punishment for any offense, except for perjury and giving false testimony. The Republic also agreed to dismiss or exclude Mapa as a party defendant or respondent in all PCGG initiated cases and proceedings. The agreement with Vergara followed a similar pattern. In exchange for Vergara's availability as a witness in the same case, the Republic granted him immunity from investigation, prosecution, and punishment, except for perjury and giving false testimony. Additionally, the Republic agreed to dismiss Vergara from Criminal Case No. 11960, where he was a defendant. Both agreements were executed on May 16, 1990, and the petitioners complied by testifying against the Marcoses in New York.

On October 22, 1990, petitioners Mapa and Vergara filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 11960 before the respondent court. The PCGG, through its deputized prosecutors, supported the motion, stating that immunity from criminal liability was granted. However, the respondent court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied. The PCGG later changed its stance, emphasizing that the granted immunity was conditional upon the petitioners' cooperation in providing information and testifying against other defendants. The Supreme Court found merit in the petition and recognized the practice of granting immunity from suit and immunities explicitly granted by the Constitution.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives is immune from suit for his statements made during a privilege speech.

  2. Whether the resolution of the House of Representatives granting immunity to witnesses is valid.

  3. Whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to review the immunity granted by PCGG in favor of the petitioners.

  4. Whether the respondent court has the power to review the grant of immunity made by the PCGG pursuant to Section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended.

  5. What is the scope of the power of the respondent court in reviewing the grant of immunity.

  6. Whether the pieces of information given by the petitioners are covered by the immunity granted by the PCGG under Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended.

  7. Whether the failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York nullifies their immunity.

  8. Whether it was irregular for the PCGG to grant immunity to petitioners while they were already undergoing trial in Criminal Case No. 11960.

  9. Whether or not the right against self-incrimination was violated?

  10. Whether or not the grant of immunity to the petitioners must be construed strictly against them?

RULING:

  1. The Speaker of the House of Representatives is immune from suit for his statements made during a privilege speech. This immunity is provided for in the Constitution and is intended to ensure representation of the constituents of the member of the Congress and enable the legislator to express views bearing upon the public interest without fear of accountability outside the halls of the legislature.

  2. The resolution of the House of Representatives granting immunity to witnesses is valid. Congress has the power to enact laws giving immunity to witnesses to facilitate the solution of crimes with high political, social, and economic impact against the people. The immunity granted to witnesses in the impugned resolution is in line with the statutory grants provided under various laws.

  3. The respondent court has jurisdiction to review the immunity granted by PCGG in favor of the petitioners.

  4. The Court held that the respondent court has the power to review the grant of immunity made by the PCGG. However, this power is limited to ascertaining the procedural regularity of the grant of immunity.

  5. The scope of the power of the respondent court is limited to determining: (a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided information or testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG; (b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information or testimony given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent has acquired or accumulated the property in question; and (c) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent.

  6. The pieces of information given by the petitioners are covered by the immunity granted by the PCGG under Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended. The information provided by the petitioners related to a case that the PCGG can prosecute as mandated by the Constitution and executive orders. The restriction imposed by the respondent court, limiting the informant to be an accused or respondent in the case, is unduly restrictive and contravenes the plain language of Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended.

  7. The failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York does not nullify their immunity. Petitioners satisfied the requirements of the law and the parties' implementing agreements. Their failure to testify was not of their own choosing and was brought about by the decision of the US prosecutors. The PCGG itself initially supported the maintenance of petitioners' immunity, and justice and equity forbid penalizing them for circumstances beyond their control.

  8. It was not irregular for the PCGG to grant immunity to petitioners while they were already undergoing trial in Criminal Case No. 11960. Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended, does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity to persons already charged in court and undergoing trial. As long as the immunity benefits the PCGG in attaining its greater objectives and inures to the benefit of an accused, it can be invoked at any stage of the proceedings. Laws that decriminalize an act or grant amnesty may have retroactive effect and constitute a bar against further prosecution, regardless of the appearance of guilt.

  9. The right against self-incrimination was violated. The petitioner had the right to remain silent and not bear witness against themselves. The court emphasized the importance of the right against self-incrimination in preventing abuses and protecting human rights.

  10. The grant of immunity to the petitioners should not be construed strictly against them. The court emphasized that immunity statutes are not a privilege given by the government, but a compromise that involves the surrender of the right to remain silent. The court also stated that laws that erode the force of the right against self-incrimination should be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Immunity from suit for statements made during a privilege speech is provided for in the Constitution to ensure representation of the constituents and enable legislators to express views bearing upon the public interest.

  • Congress has the power to enact laws granting immunity to witnesses to facilitate the solution of crimes with high political, social, and economic impact against the people.

  • Immunity granted to witnesses can be in the form of transactional immunity or use-and-derivative-use immunity, with transactional immunity providing broader protection.

  • Immunity statutes in the Philippines have American origins.

  • The powers of PCGG are not unlimited and its jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth must be within the parameters stated in Executive Order No. 14.

  • The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan includes the authority to determine whether or not the PCGG exceeded its power to grant immunity.

  • The jurisdiction of the court is not divested when a motion to dismiss is filed, but it continues until the case is finally resolved.

  • The power to grant immunity from prosecution rests exclusively with the PCGG and is an exercise of its discretion. This power is not shared with any other authority and is not subject to the approval or disapproval of another agency of government.

  • The decision to grant immunity is a tactical decision made by the prosecution to forego prosecution of a person for the higher objective of obtaining the conviction of more guilty criminals. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime.

  • The jurisdiction of the respondent court in reviewing the grant of immunity is limited to determining the procedural regularity of the grant. It cannot substitute its judgment for the discretion of the PCGG without involving itself in prosecution and ceasing to be an impartial court.

  • Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended, grants immunity to informants who provide information relating to cases that the PCGG can prosecute.

  • The restriction that the informant must be an accused or respondent in the case is unduly restrictive and contravenes the plain language of Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended.

  • The failure of an informant to testify in a case does not nullify their immunity if they have satisfied the requirements of the law and the implementing agreements.

  • Immunity can be granted to persons already charged in court and undergoing trial as long as it benefits the PCGG in attaining its objectives and inures to the benefit of the accused.

  • Laws that decriminalize an act or grant amnesty may have retroactive effect and constitute a bar against further prosecution, regardless of the appearance of guilt.

  • Right against self-incrimination is ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized countries and is aimed at preventing abuses and protecting human rights.

  • Immunity statutes allow the government to compel a witness to testify despite their plea of the right against self-incrimination.

  • Immunity statutes require a witness to surrender their right to remain silent as a price for the privilege of immunity.

  • Laws that erode the force of the right against self-incrimination must be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual.