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MARTIN CENTENO v. VICTORIA VILLALON­-PORNILLOS

FACTS:

The case involves a group of elderly men belonging to the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, a civic organization formed to devote their remaining years to the service of their Creator. They launched a fund drive to renovate the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, solicited a contribution of P1,500 from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a result, they were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. The trial court found Centeno and Yco guilty and imposed a fine of P200.00. On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, but the penalty was increased to imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1,000. Centeno questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for religious purposes and argues that it violates the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution. The main issue is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be interpreted to include a religious purpose.

ISSUES:

  1. Is there a distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose"?

  2. Should the term "charitable" be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes?

  3. Does penal law require strict construction in favor of the accused?

  4. Can solicitations for religious purposes be penalized under the law?

  5. Does the regulation of solicitations for religious purposes constitute an abridgment of the free exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution?

  6. Whether the solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to regulation by the State.

  7. Whether the petitioner can be held criminally liable under Presidential Decree No. 1564.

RULING:

  1. Yes, there is a distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose" unless clearly used synonymously or eliminated by statute.

  2. Yes, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes to favor the accused.

  3. Yes, penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.

  4. It is unclear from the partial digest whether solicitations for religious purposes can be penalized under the law.

  5. The regulation of solicitations for religious purposes may infringe on the free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution.

  6. Yes, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. The State has the authority to protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation and to regulate the time and manner of solicitation in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. The general regulation of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even if the collection is for a religious purpose. Such regulation does not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.

  7. In this case, the solicitation intended for a religious purpose is not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held criminally liable under the said decree.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The term "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose" have distinguishable meanings, unless used synonymously or eliminated by statute.

  • Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.

  • Acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent.

  • The disjunctive "or" in a statute indicates an alternative and should be taken separately for each member of the enumeration.

  • The regulation of solicitations for religious purposes may infringe on the free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution.

  • The constitution embraces both the freedom to believe and the freedom to act. The freedom to act is subject to regulation for the protection of society.

  • The State has the authority to regulate solicitation in order to protect citizens from fraudulent solicitation and to promote public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.

  • A law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religions.

  • Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to regulation by the State in the exercise of police power.

  • Regulations on solicitation should not unduly infringe on the protected freedom of religion. The regulation should have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of the protection and not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds.

  • The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons in solicitation are prejudicial to worthy and proper charities, and regulation of public solicitation is therefore in the public interest.