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PEOPLE v. ELIAS LOVEDIORO Y CASTRO

FACTS:

Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St. when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear, and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. Lucilo died on the same day from multiple gunshot wounds. The municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock. As a result, accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro was charged with the crime of murder. After trial, the court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua. The appellant argues that he should have been charged with rebellion instead of murder. He claims that the killing should be deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion because it was a means to further subversive ends. The Solicitor General argues that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion. The court agrees with the Solicitor General and states that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion.

The case involves the crime of rebellion, which is an armed public uprising against the government. The crime of rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action. Other acts committed in pursuit of rebellion acquire a political character and are absorbed in the crime itself. Political crimes are directly aimed against the political order, as well as common crimes committed to achieve a political purpose. The intent or motive is the decisive factor in determining whether a crime is rebellion or a common crime. If a common crime, such as homicide, is committed for the purpose of removing allegiance to the government, it becomes stripped of its common complexion and acquires the political character of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense. It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are proven; purpose and overt acts are both essential components of the crime. Even acts committed simultaneously with or in the course of rebellion, such as killing or robbing, would be separately punishable as common crimes if they were done for private purposes or profit without any political motivation. Political motive must be established before a person charged with a common crime alleging rebellion can benefit from the law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the act for which the senator was being charged, violation of P.D. No. 1829, is absorbed in the crime of rebellion.

  2. Whether political motive must be alleged in the information and established by clear and satisfactory evidence in cases of rebellion.

  3. Whether the killing of SPO3 Lucilo was politically motivated.

  4. Whether the appellant's membership in the New People's Army (NPA) is credible.

  5. Whether the trial court correctly convicted the appellant of the crime of murder.

  6. Whether treachery was adequately proved in the trial court.

RULING:

  1. The act for which the senator was being charged, violation of P.D. No. 1829, is absorbed in the crime of rebellion when it is committed with political or social motives in furtherance of the rebellion.

  2. Political motive must be alleged in the information and established by clear and satisfactory evidence in cases of rebellion.

  3. The killing of SPO3 Lucilo was not politically motivated. The appellant's extrajudicial confession did not mention any political purpose for the killing. The information filed against the appellant also did not contain any mention or allusion to the involvement of the NPA in the crime. Prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta, who also did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement, later claimed that he was forced to identify the appellant as an NPA member. The trial court, therefore, did not give weight and credence to this testimony. The evidence on record suggests that the appellant's allegations of NPA membership were conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty. The court noted that crimes in NPA-infested areas are often attributed to political motives as a means of reducing the imposable penalty, even when they are ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals.

  4. The appellant's claim of NPA membership is not credible. The appellant's testimony regarding his NPA membership was general and non-specific, offering no explanation of how the killing would contribute to the NPA's subversive aims. There was no evidence presented to show that SPO3 Lucilo offended the NPA or posed a threat to their activities. The appellant's claims of NPA membership were unsupported and appeared to be a defense strategy to mitigate the penalty.

  5. Yes, the trial court correctly convicted the appellant of the crime of murder. The testimony of a single credible and positive witness, Nestor Armenta, was sufficient to convict the appellant. The lack of political motive and lack of grudges between the appellant and the eyewitness further supported the conviction. Lack of motive does not preclude conviction if there is a reliable eyewitness.

  6. Yes, treachery was adequately proved in the trial court. The attack by the appellant was sudden and without warning, qualifying the crime as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Acts for which an accused is charged under a special law may be absorbed in the crime of rebellion if they are committed with political or social motives in furtherance of the rebellion.

  • Political motive must be alleged in the information and established by clear and satisfactory evidence in cases of rebellion. Mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion is not sufficient to establish political motive.

  • The burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political motive lies on the accused.

  • Allegations of membership in the NPA should be supported by specific and credible evidence to establish a political motive for a crime.

  • Crimes in NPA-infested areas are often attributed to political motives as a means of mitigating the imposable penalty, even when they are ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals.

  • The testimony of one credible and positive witness is sufficient to convict.

  • Lack of motive does not preclude conviction if there is a reliable eyewitness.

  • Treachery is present when the attack is sudden and without warning.