FACTS:

The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) shifted from using the Return on Rate Base (RORB) method to the Performance-Based Regulation (PBR) method to determine the rates distribution utilities can charge. Meralco, a distribution utility, applied for a rate increase under the PBR scheme. NASECORE, FOLVA, FOVA, and Engineer Robert F. Mallillin intervened to oppose Meralco's application. In the initial hearing, NASECORE and FOLVA failed to appear, while Meralco, Mallillin, and FOVA appeared. The ERC ruled that NASECORE and FOVA waived their right to cross-examine Meralco's witness due to their absence. In subsequent hearings, NASECORE and FOLVA continued to not appear, leading ERC to declare that NASECORE waived its right. Meralco's application was approved on 14 December 2009, which NASECORE claimed was premature. On 15 December 2009, NASECORE received additional documents from Meralco. Mallillin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari. The petitioners argued that the ERC Decision violated their due process rights. Meralco opposed the petition and argued for its denial or dismissal.

In response to the petitioners' request for a TRO or Status quo order, Meralco stated that there was no urgent necessity as they had voluntarily suspended the implementation of the Decision. The ERC filed a Comment asserting that a Petition for Certiorari was not the appropriate remedy and that there was no denial of due process. The petitioners raised new arguments in their Reply, questioning Meralco's rate increase and the ERC's rate-setting methodology. They claimed that Meralco's income exceeded the mandated percentage and that the ERC dismissed a previous order to consider the COA Audit Report. The Court ruled that these new issues could not be considered as they were raised in the reply and violated Meralco's due process rights. The main issue in this case was whether the ERC violated the petitioners' due process rights by issuing its Order before the given period for the filing of their comment expired. The ERC argued that there was no denial of due process, only an irregularity in the issuance of the Decision, which they sought to remedy.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners' right to due process of law was violated when the ERC issued its order before the expiration of the period granted to petitioners to file their comment.

2. Whether or not the ERC committed grave abuse of discretion when it deprived petitioners of their opportunity to be heard.

3. Whether there was a denial of due process in the proceedings before the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC).

4. Whether the petitioners chose the wrong remedy and the wrong forum in filing a petition for certiorari.

5. Whether there was a concrete, compelling, and valid reason to dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

6. Whether the real motive behind the filing of the petition was to obtain an indefinite temporary restraining order (TRO).

7. Whether or not a temporary restraining order (TRO) should be issued to prevent further injury or damage until the issues can be determined after a hearing on the merits.

8. Whether or not the non-issuance of the requested TRO would result in irreparable injury to the consumers.

RULING:

1. The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether or not petitioners' right to due process of law was violated when the ERC issued its order before the expiration of the period granted to petitioners to file their comment.

2. The ERC did not deprive petitioners of their right to be heard. Although the ERC erred in prematurely issuing its decision, its subsequent act of ordering petitioners to file their comments on Mallillin's motion for reconsideration (MR) cured this defect. The opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or through pleadings, was granted to petitioners. Petitioners voluntarily failed to appear in most of the hearings and were given notice of Mallillin's filing of a MR and the opportunity to file their comments thereto. Thus, the denial of due process cannot be invoked by petitioners as they had the opportunity to be heard on the MR.

3. There was no denial of due process as the ERC allowed the petitioners to file their comment in the case and remedied any irregularity through its order.

4. The petitioners chose the wrong remedy and the wrong forum by directly filing a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, which is a condition sine qua non before filing a certiorari petition.

5. There was no concrete, compelling, and valid reason to dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

6. The real motive behind the filing of the petition was to obtain an indefinite TRO, which the court cannot countenance.

7. The Court held that a TRO may be issued if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by a verified application that great or irreparable injury would be incurred by an applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard. However, the TRO should only be granted to prevent a threatened wrong and to protect the property or rights involved. In this case, the petitioners should have been more vigilant in protecting their rights by participating in the proceedings before the ERC.

8. The Court ruled that the non-issuance of the requested TRO would not result in irreparable injury to the consumers. Had the petitioners participated in the proceedings before the ERC, and if their appeal had merit, the undue increase in electric bills would be refunded to the consumers.

PRINCIPLES:

• Issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

• Denial of due process occurs when a party is not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

• Any defect in the observance of due process requirements is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

• The standard of due process impressed upon administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is ensured.

• Administrative tribunals are allowed a certain degree of latitude in their proceedings as long as fairness is not ignored.

• Filing a motion for reconsideration is generally a condition sine qua non before filing a certiorari petition, except in cases where there is a concrete, compelling, and valid reason to dispense with it.

• The filing of a certiorari petition is not demandable as a matter of right and must comply strictly with the provisions of the law and rules.

• Direct recourse to the Supreme Court is only allowed in exceptional cases dictated by public welfare, the advancement of public policy, broader interest of justice, or when the orders complained of are patent nullities or when the appeal is considered as clearly inappropriate.

• The urgency of the resolution of matters raised does not justify the failure to comply with procedural requirements, especially when rates approved by the ERC are inherently provisional.

• The real motive behind a petition may affect the court's decision to grant relief, especially if it is to obtain an indefinite TRO.

• A TRO may be issued to prevent a threatened wrong and to protect the property or rights involved from further injury until the issues can be determined after a hearing on the merits.

• A TRO may only be granted if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by a verified application that great or irreparable injury would be incurred by an applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.

• The non-issuance of a requested TRO does not necessarily result in irreparable injury, as long as the injury can be repaired through other legal means.

• Factual issues should be raised and resolved before the appropriate administrative agency and not before the court.

• Administrative agencies, despite not being bound by certain procedural requirements, are still bound by law and practice to observe fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them.