FACTS:

Petitioner Judith Yu filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from further proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Judith Yu, et al." The facts of the case are as follows:

Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. The RTC convicted the petitioner as charged in a May 26, 2005 decision and imposed a penalty on her. Fourteen days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial, alleging the discovery of new and material evidence that would exculpate her. The motion was denied by respondent Judge in an October 17, 2005 order.

On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, claiming a "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, to file a notice of appeal. On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of the case Neypes for guidance.

The prosecution then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that it was filed ten days late. On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision. On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered both motions, and on January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecution's motions.

The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction over the case when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in the case Neypes.

The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a manifestation stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions as the intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided in the Rules. The Spouses Casaclang, in their comment, argue that the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case and did not mention the period to appeal in criminal cases. The issue in this case is whether the "fresh period rule" applies to appeals in criminal cases.

ISSUES:

1. Does the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes apply to appeals in criminal cases?

RULING:

The Supreme Court finds merit in the petition, holding that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to appeals in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from the receipt of the notice denying her motion for a new trial. The respondent Judge is directed to cease and desist from further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecution's motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision and to give due course to the petitioner's appeal, elevating the records to the Court of Appeals for review on the merits.

PRINCIPLES:

1. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege and is available only if and as provided by statute.

2. The "fresh period rule" in Neypes establishes a standardized appeal period of 15 days from the denial of a motion for reconsideration.

3. Section 39 of BP 129 and related provisions make no distinction between civil and criminal cases regarding appeal periods, thus the "fresh period rule" applies equally to both.

4. Differentiating appeal periods for civil versus criminal cases would result in unjust discrimination against accused-appellants, which is contrary to the principles of reason and justice.

5. Appeals in criminal cases can rely on the "fresh period rule" for timely and uniform filing procedures aimed at ensuring fair opportunity for review.