FACTS:

The case involves the murder of Fernando Abaoag, who was stabbed to death during a violent altercation between two groups. On the night of October 16, 1991, Fernando Abaoag was attacked by Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon, who attempted to stab him. They were later joined by Felix Sion, Edong Sion, and Miguel Disu, who started throwing stones. Fernando Abaoag tried to intervene but was threatened and insulted by his assailants. At around 9:00 pm, Cesar Abaoag, the brother of Fernando, heard the sound of stone throwing and witnessed Fernando being attacked by Johnny Juguilon and others. Felipe Sion, armed with a double-bladed dagger, fatally stabbed Fernando multiple times. Cesar also tried to help but was also attacked. Fernando was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. The post-mortem examination revealed multiple stab wounds that caused his death due to hemorrhagic shock. The appellants claimed innocence and argued that other individuals were responsible for the victim's death.

The trial court found that Felipe Sion and Federico Disu participated in the killing of Fernando Abaoag based on witness testimonies, the victim's dying declaration, and the medical examination. The court considered the aggravating circumstance of treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance of cruelty but did not appreciate evident premeditation and voluntary surrender. The appellants filed a Notice of Appeal and challenged various aspects of the trial court's decision.

The appellants argued that the identification made by the prosecution witnesses was flawed. They questioned why witness Cesar Abaoag did not immediately inform the victim's wife about appellant Sion stabbing the victim if he witnessed it. They also claimed that the victim's dying declaration was not specific in identifying the assailants. The appellants further alleged that it was impossible for the victim to identify all five accused as the ones who stabbed him. They also disputed the trial court's finding of conspiracy, the counting of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, and the failure to appreciate the presence of voluntary surrender. Appellant Sion asserted that it was other individuals responsible for the victim's death.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of murder

2. Whether the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was properly appreciated by the trial court

3. Whether conspiracy was established in this case

4. Whether the trial court should have appreciated voluntary surrender in favor of appellant Sion

5. Whether the defense of appellant Sion that it was Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who were responsible for the death of the victim should be considered

6. Whether the statements made by the victim to his wife qualify as a dying declaration.

7. Whether the prosecution witnesses were biased.

8. Whether the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses is fatal to the case.

9. Whether the defense of appellant Sion is credible.

10. Whether non-flight can be construed as an indication of innocence.

11. Whether appellant Disu's alibi is a credible defense.

12. Whether there is conspiracy among the appellants and the other accused.

13. Whether treachery can be appreciated in this case

14. Whether cruelty can be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance

15. Whether voluntary surrender can be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance

16. Whether the Punong Barangay is considered a person in authority.

17. Whether the members of the Sangguniang Barangay and Lupong Tagapayapa are considered persons in authority.

RULING:

1. The court found that the identification made by prosecution witnesses, particularly witness Cesar Abaoag, was credible and sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to convict the appellants of murder.

2. The court conceded that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of cruelty. This circumstance was not proven as there was no clear testimony that the first stab wound was fatal and the second and third wounds were unnecessary.

3. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that conspiracy was established based on the fact that all the accused threw stones at the victim before the stabbing.

4. The court did not appreciate voluntary surrender in favor of appellant Sion because his surrender was merely "forced by circumstances" and not voluntary.

5. The court rejected the defense of appellant Sion that it was Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who were responsible for the death of the victim. The court found that the identification made by witnesses and the physical evidence were sufficient to establish appellant Sion's guilt.

6. The statements made by the victim to his wife qualify as a dying declaration. The requisites of a dying declaration under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court are met. The victim was conscious of his impending death, the preliminary facts bringing the declaration within its scope were established, the declaration relates to the facts or circumstances pertaining to the fatal injury or death, and the victim would have been competent to testify had he survived. Dying declarations are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule due to necessity and trustworthiness.

7. The claim that all the prosecution witnesses were biased is unfounded. The fact that some witnesses are related to the victim does not automatically disqualify them as witnesses or render their testimony unworthy of belief. There is no evidence of ulterior motive on the part of the witnesses to fabricate the declarations of the victim.

8. The failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses is not fatal to the case. It is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor to decide who to present as witnesses. The non-presentation of certain witnesses does not invalidate the case, especially if their testimony would only serve to corroborate the testimony of another eyewitness.

9. The defense of appellant Sion is not credible. Appellant Sion's denial of the stabbing and claim that it was his brother and another person who were the perpetrators were rejected by the trial court. Positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony, and appellant Sion's late disclosure of his defense raises serious doubt as to its veracity. Appellant Sion remained silent on the matter despite several opportunities to refute the charges against him, which is inconsistent with ordinary habits of men and does not inspire belief.

10. Non-flight is not an indication of innocence and should not be construed as such. It is simply inaction which may be due to several factors.

11. Appellant Disu's alibi fails because it is a weak defense and cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses. There is no plausible reason for him to be falsely implicated if he was not actually present during the incident.

12. There is conspiracy among the appellants and other accused. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.

13. Treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because the victim was forewarned of the attack by the assailant and the attack was not so sudden or unexpected as to render the victim entirely defenseless. The crime committed is homicide, not murder.

14. Cruelty cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because there is no showing that the appellants caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully or inflicted unnecessary physical and moral pain on him. The mere fact that the victim sustained multiple stab wounds does not necessarily imply cruelty.

15. Voluntary surrender can be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance for appellant Sion. He presented himself to a barangay Kagawad and voluntarily surrendered before any warrant of arrest was issued against him. The subsequent delay in his arrest and custody does not diminish the favorable effect of his voluntary surrender. A barangay Kagawad is considered a person in authority for purposes of the Revised Penal Code.

16. Yes, the Punong Barangay is considered a person in authority as provided in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code.

17. Yes, the members of the Sangguniang Barangay and Lupong Tagapayapa are considered persons in authority.

PRINCIPLES:

• Delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness or destroy its probative value.

• Conspiracy may be established based on the collective acts of the accused before and after the commission of the crime.

• Aggravating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be appreciated by the court.

• Dying declarations are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule due to necessity and trustworthiness.

• Witnesses related to the victim are not automatically disqualified as witnesses, and their testimony may even be more credible as they have an interest in vindicating the crime.

• The decision to present witnesses lies within the discretion of the prosecutor, and the non-presentation of certain witnesses is not a plausible defense.

• Positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.

• Failure to disclose information as soon as one is implicated in a crime, especially when there are opportunities to do so, raises doubt as to its veracity.

• Non-flight does not indicate innocence.

• Alibi is a weak defense and cannot prevail over positive identification.

• Conspiracy can be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from acts of the accused themselves.

• Treachery cannot be appreciated if the victim was forewarned of the attack or if the attack was frontal and not so sudden as to render the victim entirely defenseless.

• Cruelty as an aggravating circumstance requires showing that the offender caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully or inflicted unnecessary physical and moral pain.

• Voluntary surrender can be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance if the offender voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority before any warrant of arrest was issued against him. A barangay Kagawad is considered a person in authority for purposes of the Revised Penal Code.

• The Punong Barangay, as well as the members of the Sangguniang Barangay and Lupong Tagapayapa, are considered persons in authority. (Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code)