PEOPLE v. ARNULFO ASTORGA

FACTS:

Arnulfo Astorga was charged with the kidnapping of Yvonne Traya in 1992. The prosecution alleged that Astorga forcibly dragged Yvonne towards an unknown location, depriving her of her liberty against her will. Witnesses testified that Astorga grabbed Yvonne's hand, covered her mouth, and dragged her towards a school and later towards Tagum. Despite Yvonne's protests and cries, Astorga did not stop. However, a group of men noticed their suspicious behavior and followed them. They eventually caught up with Astorga and Yvonne near a bridge and questioned Astorga about their destination. Astorga claimed they were going towards Binuangan, but the group found it suspicious because it was the opposite direction of Yvonne's home. Yvonne was eventually brought back home while Astorga left.

During the trial, the defense presented the testimony of a witness who claimed to have seen Astorga drinking with others before the alleged incident. On the other hand, Astorga claimed that he and Yvonne went to his house, and when they couldn't find an open store to buy candy, he took her for a walk to sober up. He mistakenly crossed the Lupon-lupon bridge twice, thinking it was the one near the municipal hall. They encountered a group of people who questioned them about their destination. Astorga said they were going to Tagumpay and falsely claimed that the child he was carrying was Yvonne's. The group then guided them to Yvonne's house, where Astorga spoke with the child's aunt but was advised to leave due to the threat of harm from Yvonne's father. Astorga went home after this encounter.

The trial court convicted Astorga based on Yvonne's testimony, who denied smelling liquor on him. The defense argued that Astorga was intoxicated and got lost, but the trial court rejected this defense. Astorga appealed the decision, primarily challenging the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the legal characterization of the acts imputed to him.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are credible despite inconsistencies in their accounts.

  2. Whether the delay in filing the case weakens the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

  3. Whether the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be accorded great respect on appeal.

  4. Whether motive is an element of the crime of kidnapping.

  5. Whether the act of detaining or depriving a person of liberty in the crime of kidnapping must involve locking up.

  6. Whether the prosecution failed to prove the fact of detention or deprivation of liberty in the crime of kidnapping.

  7. Whether the appellant should be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

  8. Whether the appellant should be convicted of grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code.

  9. Whether or not the accused committed the crime of kidnapping.

  10. Whether or not the accused committed the crime of grave coercion.

RULING:

  1. The Court holds that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are credible. Inconsistencies in their testimonies concerning minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance, veracity, or weight of their declarations. These inconsistencies actually reinforce their credibility as different witnesses of startling events usually perceive things differently. The credibility of Glenda Chavez and Yvonne Traya, despite their differing statements on whether the accused was drunk or not, is not affected as they have different experiences and levels of maturity. The discrepancy in the witnesses' estimate of the distance covered by the men who chased the accused also does not render their testimonies incredible; instead, it shows their candor and sincerity.

  2. The Court finds that the one-week delay in filing the case does not weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Delay in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily affect a witness's credibility, especially if the delay is satisfactorily explained. In this case, the one-week delay is reasonable considering the victim's residence was in a different location from where the case was filed.

  3. The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be accorded great respect on appeal.

  4. Motive is not an element of the crime of kidnapping.

  5. The act of detaining or depriving a person of liberty in the crime of kidnapping does not necessarily involve locking up.

  6. The prosecution failed to prove the fact of detention or deprivation of liberty in the crime of kidnapping.

  7. The appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence does not establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping. The appellant's forcible dragging of the victim to a place only he knew does not constitute actual confinement or restriction on the person of the victim.

  8. The appellant should be convicted of grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. Grave coercion has three elements: (a) prevention or compulsion of a person from doing something not prohibited by law or from doing something against their will, (b) the use of violence or intimidation to effect the prevention or compulsion, and (c) lack of authority or legal right to restrain the will and liberty of another. In this case, the appellant forcibly dragged and slapped the victim, preventing her from going home to Binuangan. The appellant had no right to prevent the victim from going home.

  9. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused did not commit the crime of kidnapping. While it was established that the accused held the victim's hand and refused to let go when the victim asked to go to her neighbor, the court considered the brief duration of the act and the presence of other people and security measures in the area. The court held that there was not enough proof to establish that the victim was deprived of her liberty. Thus, the crime of kidnapping was not consummated.

  10. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused committed the crime of grave coercion. The Information filed against the accused contained sufficient allegations and the elements of grave coercion were established by the prosecution. The court applied the principle under Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states that when there is a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved if it is included in or necessarily includes the offense charged. Thus, the accused was convicted of grave coercion.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Inconsistencies in testimonies concerning minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance, veracity, or weight of the declarations of witnesses.

  • Differences in perceptions of witnesses can be expected, especially in the case of startling events.

  • Delay in filing a case does not necessarily weaken the credibility of a witness if the delay is satisfactorily explained.

  • The trial court's assessment of witness credibility is accorded great respect on appeal.

  • Motive is not an element of the crime if there is ample direct evidence sustaining the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

  • The act of detaining or depriving a person of liberty in the crime of kidnapping does not necessarily involve locking up.

  • Actual confinement or restraint is the primary element of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

  • Grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code requires the prevention or compulsion of a person from doing something against their will by the use of violence or intimidation, without any legal right to do so.

  • In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of their liberty needs to be established by indubitable proof.

  • Factual findings of trial courts, especially regarding the appreciation of testimonies of witnesses, are generally accorded great respect, but the Supreme Court may substitute its own findings when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.

  • When there is a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved if it is included in or necessarily includes the offense charged.

  • The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply if the maximum penalty imposable for the offense does not exceed one year.