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LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL v. ALEJANDRO S. URRO

FACTS:

This case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the appointments of respondents Urro, de Guzman, and Escueta as NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The petitioner, General, seeks to declare these appointments unconstitutional and to prohibit the enforcement of their oath of office. The petitioner was appointed as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in 2008, replacing Roces who had passed away. However, on the same date, Escueta was also appointed as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman. Later, Urro was appointed to replace General, and de Guzman was appointed to replace Leones.

The petitioner argues that these appointments violate the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. He filed the petition questioning the validity of the appointments on March 22, 2010, after receiving congratulatory letters for the respondents' appointments. Urro and de Guzman took their oath of office on March 25, 2010, and April 27, 2010, respectively.

President Aquino later issued Executive Order No. 2 recalling and revoking appointments made in violation of the constitutional ban on midnight appointments. The petitioner argues that his appointment should be considered "regular" and that he should remain in office until a new qualified commissioner is appointed. He also contends that Escueta's appointment in a temporary capacity violates the law, as it would result in him serving for more than six years. Furthermore, the petitioner states that successive appointments in an acting capacity would violate the law's fixed and staggered term requirement for NAPOLCOM Commissioners.

ISSUES:

  1. What is the nature of the petitioner's appointment as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner?

  2. Does the petitioner have the clear right to be reinstated to his former position and to oust respondent Urro as NAPOLCOM Commissioner?

  3. Whether the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner is prohibited based on the staggering of terms of office.

  4. Whether the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner is valid even if the law fixes the term of office.

  5. Whether or not the President has the power to make acting appointments to the NAPOLCOM.

  6. Whether or not R.A. No. 6975 prohibits the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner to fill vacancies.

  7. Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from claiming that he was permanently appointed.

  8. Whether or not an acting appointee has a cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee.

RULING:

  1. The Court dismisses the petition for lack of merit. The constitutionality of the respondents' appointments is not the lis mota of the case. The petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for quo warranto, making a discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments rendered unnecessary. The petitioner's appointment is an acting appointment, which is not inconsistent with a staggered term of office.

  2. The appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner is not prohibited based on the staggering of terms of office. The law does not have any statutory basis to support this claim.

  3. The appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner is valid even if the law fixes the term of office. Staggered terms of office do not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary appointments granted by the Administrative Code.

  4. Yes, the President has the power to make acting appointments to the NAPOLCOM. The Court ruled that there is no specific limitation on the President's appointing power under R.A. No. 6975. As long as there is no clear repugnancy between the nature of the office and the temporary appointment, the President has the discretion to make acting appointments.

  5. No, R.A. No. 6975 does not prohibit the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner to fill vacancies. The Court held that the provision cited by the petitioner only prevents the new appointee from serving beyond the term of office of the original appointee. It does not prohibit the new appointee from serving less than the unexpired portion of the term. Therefore, the petitioner's appointment as Acting Commissioner is valid.

  6. Yes, the petitioner is estopped from claiming that he was permanently appointed. A person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity, extended and received without any protest or reservation, and who acts by virtue of that appointment for a considerable time, cannot later on be heard to say that the appointment was really a permanent one so that he could not be removed except for cause.

  7. No, an acting appointee does not have a cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee. Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. The person instituting the quo warranto proceedings must show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment, he does not have a clear right to the office and therefore does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The Court can exercise its power of judicial review on questions of constitutional significance if certain requisites are met.

  • The Court must refrain from resolving a constitutional question if the case can be disposed of on some other ground.

  • Lis mota, or the cause of the suit, is the ultimate determinant of whether a constitutional issue should be resolved.

  • The petitioner has the burden of showing that the case cannot be resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined by the Court.

  • Appointments can be classified as permanent or temporary (acting), and regular or ad interim. An acting appointment can be made unless prohibited by the Constitution or by law, or if it is repugnant to the nature of the office.

  • The President has the power to issue acting appointments, as authorized by the Administrative Code of 1987.

  • The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions and does not involve removal from office.

  • The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature and limitations or qualifications on this power are strictly construed.

  • Staggered terms of office do not prohibit the issuance of acting or temporary appointments, as long as the appointing authority has the discretion to make such appointments.

  • Staggered terms of office do not ensure that the appointing authority will not appoint all the members of a body whose members are appointed on a staggered basis.

  • The lack of a provision on the staggering of terms of office in an amendatory law negates the claim that such a provision exists.

  • The President has the power to make acting appointments as long as there is no clear limitation or repugnancy between the nature of the office and the temporary appointment.

  • R.A. No. 6975 does not prohibit the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner to fill vacancies. The provision cited only prevents the new appointee from serving beyond the term of office of the original appointee.

  • A person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity without protest or reservation and acts by virtue of that appointment for a considerable time is estopped from later claiming that the appointment was permanent.

  • Quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the proper party-plaintiff. However, an individual may commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another.

  • The person instituting quo warranto proceedings must show a clear right to the contested office. Failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of action.

  • An acting appointment is temporary and can be revoked at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner seeking reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed.