PEOPLE v. RODOLFO DELA ROSA Y AVILES

FACTS:

Rodolfo dela Rosa, along with three other accused, were charged with illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Initially pleading not guilty, they later withdrew their plea and substituted it with a plea of guilt. However, they later filed a motion to withdraw their plea of guilt, which was granted. One of the accused, Cresencio Reyes, changed his plea to guilty to a lesser offense and served as a prosecution witness. The trial proceeded against the remaining three accused.

The prosecution established that the accused surrendered and informed Kagawad Valeriano Rigor that they had shot and killed a member of the New People's Army. They had a short shotgun and a bag containing dynamite. Kagawad Rigor reported the presence of the surrenderees to the police, and the report was recorded in the police blotter by Patrolman Gasline Fernandez. Cpl. Crispin Cancino, along with other policemen, went to Kagawad Rigor's house. Inside the house, the accused showed Cpl. Cancino the shotgun and dynamite. The accused were then taken to the Philippine Constabulary Headquarters and later to the municipal building, where their pictures were taken with the mayor and their statements were taken by the police. The following day, one of the accused, Cresencio Reyes, informed the police about firearms buried in another location, leading to the discovery of two shotguns.

On the other hand, the accused claimed that they were coerced by Kumander Tamang to join the New People's Army. They denied knowledge and ownership of the seized firearms and explosives.

During the trial, only Rodolfo dela Rosa appealed, arguing that he did not possess the firearms and explosives in the manner punishable by law.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not the appellant can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms and explosives

  2. Whether the accused possessed the ammunition without animus possidendi.

  3. Whether the accused possessed the ammunition without authority.

  4. Whether the accused possessed the firearms without first obtaining a license or permit from the appropriate authorities.

  5. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient proof to establish the guilt of the accused.

RULING:

  1. No, the appellant cannot be convicted of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. The Court held that in order to convict a person of illegal possession of firearms, it must be proven that the accused possessed a firearm and lacked the authority or license to possess it. Mere possession without criminal intent is sufficient to convict a person, but there must be an intent to possess on the part of the accused. In this case, the appellant denied that he was in possession of the ammunitions and argued that his intention was to turn them over to the authorities. The Court found that there was no evidence to show that the appellant had the intent to possess the firearms and explosives, and thus he cannot be convicted of illegal possession.

  2. The accused did not possess the ammunition without animus possidendi. The intention to possess can be determined based on the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. In this case, the accused had clearly intended to surrender the ammunition and had taken steps to do so. His possession of the ammunition was temporary and incidental for the purpose of surrendering it. Therefore, the required element of animus possidendi was not established.

  3. The prosecution did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the accused possessed the ammunition without authority. The only evidence presented was the preliminary examination of a police officer, wherein the accused admitted to not having a license for the firearms and explosives recovered from his possession. However, this admission alone is not sufficient to establish the lack of authority. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and they failed to present any further evidence, such as a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit, to prove the lack of license. Therefore, the second element of possession without authority was not established.

  4. The Court held that it is incumbent on the Government to prove both elements of the crime under Presidential Decree No. 1866: (a) the accused possessed the firearm, and (b) the accused had not first obtained a license or permit from the appropriate authorities.

  5. The Court found that the prosecution failed to present sufficient proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for the proof required to establish guilt. The quantum of proof was not adequately presented in this case.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Illegal possession of firearms is committed when the accused possesses a firearm and lacks the authority or license to possess it.

  • Intent to possess is necessary to convict a person of illegal possession of firearms, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent.

  • Temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession of firearms is not punishable.

  • Transient possession of a firearm, such as stealing it without the intent to use it, is not sufficient to convict one of illegal possession.

  • The intention to possess can be determined based on the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.

  • Possession, whether physical or constructive, without animus possidendi is not punishable.

  • The burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt the lack of license for possession of firearms or explosives.

  • An extrajudicial admission of the accused alone is not sufficient to prove the lack of authority to possess firearms or explosives.

  • Mere suspicion will not prove the prosecution's case in court.

  • The Government has the burden of proving both elements of the crime under the relevant law.

  • The guilt of an accused must be established beyond reasonable doubt, whether the offense is punishable under the Revised Penal Code or a special law.

  • Speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for the proof required to establish guilt.