FACTS:

This case involves a petition challenging the validity of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The petitioners argue that this law disadvantages poor candidates by depriving them of an affordable medium to reach voters while more affluent rivals can use other means. However, they have not provided empirical data to support their claim and have not alleged any harm caused by the law. The intervenor supports the law, stating that it reduces the advantages of moneyed politicians. The petitioners seek a reexamination of a previous ruling, but the court affirms that there is no suppression of political ads and that the law only regulates the time and manner of advertising.

In another case, provisions of the Election Code are being challenged for requiring the COMELEC to procure print space and air time in the mass media and allocate them to candidates free of charge during the election period. The objective is to ensure equal opportunity for candidates and prevent rich candidates from dominating media coverage to the detriment of poorer candidates. The provisions do not suppress political ads but prohibit their sale or donation to candidates. The COMELEC takes control of advertising space in newspapers and airtime in radio and TV stations during the election period. The issue is whether these provisions violate the right to freedom of expression and equal protection of candidates.

Lastly, there is a challenge to provisions in R.A. No. 4880 and a COMELEC resolution that regulate election campaigns and partisan activities. R.A. No. 4880 makes it unlawful for anyone to engage in election campaigns or partisan political activities except during specified periods preceding an election. The term "Candidate" is defined broadly, and "Election Campaign" refers to acts promoting a candidate or party. The resolution prohibits citizen groups or associations from entering polling places except to vote, as soliciting votes within the polling place is unlawful. The court has previously upheld similar regulations, emphasizing the need to prevent unlimited political advertising in the mass media from distorting the political process and undermining democracy.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Section 11(b) of RA 9006, which prohibits political advertising on television and radio outside the campaign period, is constitutional.

2. Whether Section 11(b) violates the right to freedom of expression.

3. Does the campaign expenditure limitation in the Philippine election laws violate freedom of speech?

4. Does the campaign expenditure limitation in the Philippine election laws violate the principle of one person, one vote?

5. Is Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 a reasonable means for achieving its purpose?

6. Is the COMELEC Space and COMELEC Time ineffectual?

7. Whether or not the legislative silence on the bills filed for the amendment or repeal of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 should compel the Court to grant what Congress denied.

8. Whether or not Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which mandates media entities to provide Comelec Time, is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication or information.

9. Whether or not R.A. No. 6646, §11(b) is a democracy-enhancing measure.

10. Whether or not the unbridled use of money for campaign propaganda can skew or corrupt the electoral process.

RULING:

1. Yes, Section 11(b) of RA 9006 is constitutional.

2. No, Section 11(b) does not violate the right to freedom of expression.

3. The campaign expenditure limitation does not violate freedom of speech.

4. The campaign expenditure limitation does not violate the principle of one person, one vote.

5. Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a permissible restriction on the freedom of speech, expression, and press.

6. The effectiveness of COMELEC Space and COMELEC Time is not relevant to the validity of the law.

7. The Court held that the legislative silence on the bills filed for the amendment or repeal of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 does not compel the Court to grant what Congress denied. The legislative silence, in this case, bespeaks of more than inaction. Congress, after reconsidering the question, found no reason for amending the statute and therefore did not pass any of the bills filed. Thus, the Court cannot depart from its previous ruling and grant what Congress has denied.

8. The Court held that Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which mandates media entities to provide Comelec Time, is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication or information. The regulation is content-neutral and is unrelated to the suppression of speech. It serves the substantial governmental interest of ensuring equal opportunity, time, and space for political campaigns. Any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no more than what is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality.

9. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and held that R.A. No. 6646, §11(b) is a democracy-enhancing measure. The Court further confirmed that the unbridled use of money for campaign propaganda can indeed skew or corrupt the electoral process.

PRINCIPLES:

• The State can regulate the time and place of election campaign activities to promote fairness and prevent manipulation of the political process.

• The restriction on speech in Section 11(b) is limited both as to time (only during the campaign period) and as to scope (only in relation to political advertising in mass media).

• Section 11(b) aims to promote equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising and does not prohibit candidates from expressing their views through other means.

• The prohibition against paid or sponsored political advertising in Section 11(b) is balanced by the COMELEC's mandate to procure print space and air time to be allocated free of charge to all candidates.

• The Philippine Constitution mandates political equality and equal access to opportunities for public service.

• The regulation of political propaganda is contemplated by the framers of the Constitution.

• The validity of a law does not depend on the faithful compliance of those charged with its enforcement.

• The choice of remedies for a social malady requiring government action belongs to Congress.

• Legislative silence does not compel the Court to grant what Congress has denied.

• Content-neutral restrictions on speech require only a substantial governmental interest to support them.

• The clear-and-present-danger test is not appropriate for determining the constitutional validity of laws that are not concerned with the content of speech.

• Content-based restrictions on speech distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of people's reaction. Content-neutral regulations, on the other hand, serve a different purpose and require a different level of justification.

• The state can be both an enemy and a friend of speech.

• The marketplace of ideas can be a romantic illusion if the electoral process is corrupt.

• The unbridled use of money for campaign propaganda can skew or corrupt the electoral process.