FACTS:

The Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against VM Realty Corporation for two parcels of land. The complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project." However, the expropriation suit was dismissed by the trial court because the municipality failed to pass an ordinance authorizing the expropriation, as required by the Local Government Code. Additionally, the trial court also ruled that the cause of action was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, prompting the Municipality of Parañaque to file a petition for review before the Supreme Court. The issues raised in the appeal include whether a resolution can have the same force as an ordinance in an expropriation case and whether res judicata is applicable when public interest is primarily involved.

ISSUES:

1. Whether a resolution approved by the municipal council can validly authorize the local chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.

2. Whether the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous for the purposes of initiating expropriation proceedings.

3. Whether Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules can prevail over Section 19 of RA 7160 in authorizing an LGU to exercise eminent domain

4. Whether the absence of an ordinance authorizing the expropriation constitutes lack of cause of action

5. Whether res judicata can bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property

6. Whether or not the State or its authorized agent can exercise eminent domain over a property, even if a prior final judgment has become the law of the case as to the parties.

7. Whether or not the power of eminent domain will be diminished if the State or its authorized agent cannot subsequently exercise its right to expropriate property.

RULING:

1. An ordinance is required to authorize the local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a specific private property. In this case, since the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain through a resolution, there was no compliance with the requirement for an ordinance. Therefore, the resolution cannot validly authorize the initiation of expropriation proceedings.

2. The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are not synonymous. An ordinance is a law, while a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. Additionally, the two are enacted differently. A third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. Therefore, the terms cannot be used interchangeably.

3. Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules cannot prevail over Section 19 of RA 7160. The clear letter of the law, as stated in RA 7160, prevails over administrative rules issued for its implementation. The power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is inferior domain and must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation.

4. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the expropriation constitutes lack of cause of action. The Complaint for expropriation, which was based on a mere resolution, cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the expropriation suit.

5. Res judicata does not bar the right of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain. The principle of res judicata applies to specific issues decided in a previous case, but it does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain. The State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.

6. The State or its authorized agent can still exercise eminent domain over a property, even if a prior final judgment has become the law of the case as to the parties.

7. The power of eminent domain will not be diminished if the State or its authorized agent cannot subsequently exercise its right to expropriate property.

PRINCIPLES:

• The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government and may be delegated to LGUs, subject to the control and restraints imposed by Congress through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.

• An LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain when authorized by Congress and subject to the parameters laid down in the law delegating that power.

• The requisites for an LGU to exercise the power of eminent domain are: (1) enactment of an ordinance authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power; (2) exercise of the power for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and landless; (3) payment of just compensation; and (4) a valid and definite offer made to the property owner, but not accepted.

• Legislative intent is primarily determined from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is only resorted to when a literal interpretation would be impossible, absurd, or unjust.

• The power of eminent domain involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people, and therefore, any change in the legislative language regarding the exercise of this power must be strictly construed.

• The clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.

• An LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and the limitations imposed by law.

• The power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is inferior domain and must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation.

• Res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain. The principle of res judicata applies to specific issues decided in a previous case, but it does not bar the State or its agent from complying with legal requirements and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain.

• The power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties.

• The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with.

• To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.