FACTS:

The case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the denial of a Petition for Annulment of Judgment by the Court of Appeals. The petition seeks to annul a final judgment rendered by Judge Padolina of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, which partitioned the estate of Don Andres Pascual. Don Andres Pascual died intestate in 1973, leaving behind his widow, children, half-siblings, the intestate estate of his brother, and acknowledged natural children of another brother.

The widow filed a petition for letters of administration and appointed Atty. Jesus Santos as her counsel. The case was transferred to the RTC of Pasig and, in 1985, a Compromise Agreement was approved by the court, allocating three-fourths of the estate to the widow and one-fourth to the other heirs. The widow died in 1987, and her will named the petitioner as the sole universal heir. However, the RTC of Pasig denied petitioner's motion to reiterate hereditary rights based on her status as an illegitimate child.

Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 1994, partitioning the estate in accordance with the Compromise Agreement and awarding attorney's fees to Atty. Santos. The decision became final and executory, and Atty. Santos filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution for the payment of his fees. The motion was granted and the petitioner now seeks to annul the judgment.

This case involves a dispute over the award of attorney's fees in the estate of Doña Adela S. Pascual. On January 19, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision awarding attorney's fees to private respondent Atty. Jose I. Santos, which was subsequently entered into the records. On April 19, 1994, the trial court issued a writ of execution in favor of Atty. Santos for the partial amount of P2,000,000.00, to be implemented against the ¾ share of Doña Adela.

A Notice of Garnishment was also issued to the San Francisco Del Monte Rural Bank (SFDM Avenue, Quezon City) to garnish deposits and shares of stocks belonging to the estate of Doña Adela. Petitioner, Olivia Pascual (heir of Doña Adela), moved for the reconsideration and quashal of the writ of execution, which the trial court denied. Private respondent then filed motions to order petitioner to comply with the writ of garnishment and to compel her to appear and explain her failure to comply with the writ. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment filed by petitioner, upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court and ruling that petitioner had been accorded due process. Petitioner filed this petition seeking the inhibition or disqualification of the trial court judge, among other reliefs. Both petitioner and private respondent opposed the grant of the omnibus motion filed by petitioner-in-intervention.

This case stemmed from a petition filed by petitioner, Doña Adela M. Arroyo, seeking the annulment of the portion of the decision of the trial court which awarded attorney's fees to the heirs of Doña Adela. The petitioner argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to make such an award and that the heirs were deprived of due process.

The petitioner further contended that the body of the decision did not state the facts and the law upon which the award was based, rendering it void from the beginning. The petitioner also asserted that she did not lose her right to question the trial court's conclusion on the amount of attorney's fees. Lastly, the petitioner argued that the writ of execution was wrongfully issued.

The resolution of the case revolved around the following issues: (1) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to award attorney's fees, (2) whether the heirs of Doña Adela were deprived of due process, and (3) whether there were sufficient factual and legal bases for the award of attorney's fees. Additionally, the court would address Crisanto S. Cornejo's "Omnibus Motion."

ISSUES:

1. Whether the intestate court had jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, Doña Adela, despite her death.

2. Whether the separate payment of docket fees is necessary for the award of attorney's fees in a claim against the estate of a deceased person.

3. Whether the heirs of Doña Adela were deprived of due process in the award of attorney's fees.

4. Whether the petitioner was deprived of due process in contesting the claim for attorney's fees.

5. Whether the award of attorney's fees contained in the decision is void for failing to state the factual and legal bases.

6. Whether the amount of attorney's fees awarded is reasonable.

7. Whether or not intervention is allowed in this case.

8. Whether or not the motion for intervention has merit.

RULING:

1. The jurisdiction of the intestate court over the person of Doña Adela subsists even after her death. The claim filed by the private respondent against the estate of Don Andres is allowable as an administrative expense of the estate. The death of an appointed administrator does not divest the intestate court of jurisdiction as long as the proper party is the estate of the deceased person.

2. The separate payment of docket fees is not necessary for the award of attorney's fees against the estate. In this case, the private respondent filed a claim for attorney's fees against the estate and not against the individual heirs. Therefore, the payment of separate docket fees is not required.

3. The heirs of Doña Adela were not deprived of due process. The petitioner, as the special administratrix, had a duty to protect the estate from disbursements based on claims not chargeable to the estate. As such, she should have been aware of her duties and responsibilities, including the defense against the claim for attorney's fees. The CA found that the petitioner was given due process and had the opportunity to protect the estate's interest.

4. The Court ruled that the petitioner was not deprived of due process. The claim for attorney's fees was admitted and uncontested by the petitioner, as shown by her silence and acceptance of partial payments on the said claim. The petitioner had ample time to contest the claim and raise any objection, but she chose not to do so. Thus, her right to be heard was not violated.

5. The Court held that the award of attorney's fees is not void. The legal and factual bases of the award were stated in the body of the decision. The services rendered by the private respondent were considered significant in the resolution of the case, and the agreement between attorney and client provided sufficient proof of the legality of the award.

6. The Court found that the amount of attorney's fees awarded is reasonable. It is enforceable as the law between the parties and is within the established standards for fixing attorney's fees. The numerous properties involved and the labor of the private respondent for thirteen years were taken into consideration in upholding the award.

7. Intervention is not allowed in this case. The Omnibus Motion filed by the movants is in reality a disguised motion for intervention. However, the motion was filed beyond the prescribed period under Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The court explains that intervention is allowed "any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court." In this case, the motion was filed after the parties had submitted their memoranda and many years after both the trial court and the Court of Appeals had rendered their decisions.

8. The motion for intervention lacks substance and has no merit. The alleged misconduct or violation of judicial responsibility of Judge Padolina, who is a nominal party in an action for annulment of a final judgment, is not a proper subject of intervention. The motion also does not have any connection with the settlement of the estate of the other decedents involved in the case. Therefore, the motion for intervention has no merit.

PRINCIPLES:

• The failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period renders a decision final and executory, and no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review such decision.

• The grounds for the annulment of a final judgment are limited to those provided by law, specifically for judgments that are void for lack of jurisdiction or obtained through extrinsic fraud.

• The jurisdiction of an intestate court over the person of the deceased administratrix subsists even after her death, as long as the claim is against the estate and not against the individual heirs.

• The payment of separate docket fees is not necessary for the award of attorney's fees against the estate.

• Due process requires that a party be given the opportunity to protect their interests and be heard before a decision or resolution is made against them.

• Due process requires that a person be given the opportunity to be heard. However, if a person chooses not to give his or her side of the case, the right to be heard is not violated.

• The legal and factual bases of an award of attorney's fees may be stated in the body of the decision, and it is not necessary to repeat them in the fallo.

• The reasonableness of attorney's fees is subject to judicial control, but delving into its reasonableness involves going into its merits, which is procedurally impermissible in certain proceedings.

• The reasonableness of attorney's fees is determined based on the services rendered, the complexity of the case, and other factors.

• Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides the guidelines for intervention, allowing a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties to intervene in the action.

• Intervention is allowed at any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial court.

• Intervention is subject to the court's consideration of whether it will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

• A motion for intervention must have merit and substance, and the intervenor must have a legitimate interest or claim in the matter in litigation.