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VICTORINO SALCEDO II v. COMELEC

FACTS:

The case involves a petition for certiorari filed by Victorino Salcedo II challenging the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) which reversed the earlier Resolution issued by its Second Division. Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz on February 18, 1968, and this marriage is evidenced by a certified true copy of the marriage contract. Without dissolving his first marriage, Neptali Salcedo married Ermelita Cacao on September 21, 1986. Two days after, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with Jesus Aguirre. Victorino Salcedo II and Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections. On April 17, 1998, Victorino Salcedo II filed a petition seeking the cancellation of Ermelita Cacao Salcedo's certificate of candidacy on the basis that she falsely represented her surname as "Salcedo." Ermelita Cacao Salcedo was subsequently proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo. In her answer, Ermelita Cacao Salcedo claimed that she was unaware of Neptali Salcedo's first marriage and that Neptali Salcedo had filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court. The Comelec's Second Division ruled in favor of Victorino Salcedo II, concluding that Ermelita Cacao Salcedo's use of the surname "Salcedo" constituted material misrepresentation.

The Commission on Elections (Comelec) initially canceled Ermelita C. Salcedo's certificate of candidacy based on a finding that her use of her husband's surname constituted a material misrepresentation. However, the Comelec later overturned its previous resolution, ruling that under Article 370 of the Civil Code, Salcedo was entitled to use her husband's surname. The Comelec also cited the principle that the filing of a certificate of candidacy is a technicality that should be enforced before the election but can be disregarded after the electorate has chosen. The municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Salcedo as the duly elected mayor of Sara. The Comelec's final resolution granted the motion for reconsideration and affirmed the validity of Salcedo's proclamation as mayor. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the Comelec's ruling was issued in grave abuse of its discretion. The Supreme Court held that the main issue in the case was not whether Salcedo was entitled to use a specific surname, but whether the use of such surname constituted a material misrepresentation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The court held that it did not, as the law requires that the false representation pertains to a material matter in order to justify the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy.

ISSUES:

  1. What constitutes a material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy that would justify the cancellation of the said certificate under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code?

  2. Is a proceeding under Section 78 considered as a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253?

  3. Whether or not the misrepresentation in the use of the surname "Salcedo" in the certificate of candidacy is a material matter.

  4. Whether or not the private respondent intended to deceive the electorate by using the surname "Salcedo."

  5. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in its resolution.

  6. Does the decision promulgated on the day the Chairman took his oath of office as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court give ground to question the Comelec decision?

  7. Should the will of the majority prevail in a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications?

RULING:

  1. In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation pertains to a material matter, meaning it should affect the substantive rights of a candidate. The law does not specifically define what would be considered as a "material representation," but the Court has interpreted this phrase in previous decisions applying Section 78 of the Code.

  2. A proceeding under Section 78 is not considered a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253. The only difference between the two proceedings is that a Section 78 proceeding must be initiated before the elections and the misrepresentation of qualifications for elective office must be in the certificate of candidacy, while a Section 253 petition for quo warranto can be based on ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results.

  3. The misrepresentation in the use of the surname "Salcedo" is not a material matter since it does not pertain to the qualifications for elective office.

  4. There is no showing that the electorate was deceived by the use of the surname "Salcedo" and there is evidence that private respondent has been consistently using the surname since 1986.

  5. The Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in adopting the reasoning of the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Desamito, nor is it infirm for Chairman Pardo and Commissioner Guiani to change their positions in the en banc resolution.

  6. The fact that the decision was promulgated on the day the Chairman took his oath of office as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court does not give ground to question the Comelec decision. The Chairman enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties, which the petitioner failed to rebut. Additionally, the date of promulgation is not necessarily the date of signing.

  7. The will of the majority should prevail in a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications. The Court emphasized that the sanctity of the people's will must be observed to preserve democracy. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications arises, the ineligibility must be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the will of the people would ultimately harm democratic institutions. In this case, since there is no dispute regarding the private respondent's qualifications, the will of the electorate must prevail.

PRINCIPLES:

  • A material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy should affect the substantive rights of a candidate in order to justify its cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

  • A Section 78 proceeding is distinct from a Section 253 quo warranto petition, with the former focusing on qualification misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy before the elections and the latter addressing ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines after the election results are proclaimed.

  • Material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Code pertains to qualifications for elective office.

  • A false representation must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office.

  • The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of Section 78.

  • The burden of proving that the misrepresentation pertains to a material matter lies with the petitioner.

  • The Comelec has the discretion to reconsider its previous rulings and adopt a position contrary to one previously taken.

  • Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

  • The sanctity of the people's will must be observed to preserve democracy.

  • Challenges to winning candidate's qualifications should only be entertained if the ineligibility is so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the will of the people would ultimately harm democratic institutions.

  • All elective offices should be filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election.