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PEOPLE v. YANSON-DUMANCAS

FACTS:

The accused-appellants in this case were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder under two Informations. The first information accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas, Charles Dumancas, Police Col. Nicolas M. Torres, Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto, and several other police officers and civilians of conspiring, confederating, and concurring in a common criminal intent to kidnap and detain Rufino Gargar, Jr. in order to extort money. It was alleged that the accused shot and killed Rufino Gargar, Jr. while he was handcuffed and blindfolded. Cesar Pecha and Edgar Hilado were also accused of secretly burying the corpse to conceal the crime of murder. The second information accused the same individuals of kidnapping and killing Danilo Lumangyao. Similar to the first information, it was alleged that Cesar Pecha and Edgar Hilado buried the corpse to conceal the crime. Both incidents occurred between August 6 and 7, 1992, in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijes, Bacolod City, Philippines.

In this case, the accused were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. After a joint trial, the court acquitted some of the accused, namely Charles Dumancas, Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr., but convicted the rest for the crime charged. The convicted accused were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay various amounts of indemnity for death, actual damages, compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, as well as the costs of the case. Accused Cesar Pecha was also sentenced as an accessory. The acquitted accused were Charles Dumancas, Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday Jr. All ten accused filed appeals before the court. The court adopted the summary of facts by the trial court which revealed that the crime happened after the complainant, Jeanette Yanson Dumancas, was swindled in a fake gold bar transaction. The accused planned to abduct Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar, Jr. because they swindled the Dumancas family.

Colonel Torres ordered the group, which included defendants Geroche and Fernandez, to keep the two victims captive without anyone seeing them. The group took the victims to different motels, including D'Hacienda Motel, Moonlight Inn Motel, and Casamel Lodge Motel, before returning to D'Hacienda Motel. At D'Hacienda Motel, Jeanette and Rose Ines interrogated the victims about the money they had swindled, but the victims said it was already gone. Jeanette ordered Geroche to take care of the victims. The group, excluding the victims, went to Geroche's house to get an armalite rifle and then returned to D'Hacienda Motel. At midnight on August 7, 1992, Fernandez and Lamis blindfolded and handcuffed the victims and brought them to Hda. Pedrosa, where Gargar was shot in the head by Gargallano and Lumangyao was shot in the jaw by Geroche. The bodies were loaded onto a vehicle and buried in Hda. Siason. The group later reported the killings to Colonel Torres. On August 10, 1992, the group was instructed by Colonel Torres to hide because the NBI was investigating. On August 12, 1992, some group members went with Colonel Torres to meet the Yansons and borrow money. On the same day, Geroche gave each member of the group P1,700.00. On August 13, 1992, Nenita Bello sought Col. Torres' help regarding the deaths, but was turned down. The bodies of the victims were exhumed on September 24, 1992, and autopsies were performed, revealing ligature marks and gunshot wounds. As a result of investigations by the NBI and the State Prosecutors, two criminal cases of Kidnapping with Murder were filed against the accused.

The case involves the filing of two criminal cases of Kidnapping with Murder against the accused. After reviewing the factual findings of the trial court and the evidence presented, the court finds itself unable to agree with the convictions of all 10 accused-appellants. The court concurs with the suggestion of the Solicitor General.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove that Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas directly forced or induced the other accused to commit the crime of kidnapping with murder.

  2. Whether the order given by Jeanette to one of the accused constitutes words of command that make her liable as a principal by inducement.

  3. Whether the remark of Jeanette to "take care of the two" constitutes the command required by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement.

  4. Whether the utterance of Jeanette, which supposedly acts as inducement, should precede the commission of the crime itself.

  5. Whether the death of accused-appellant Torres extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability solely based thereon.

  6. Whether the other accused-appellants should be acquitted due to alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness.

  7. Whether the testimony of eyewitness Grandeza should be wholly disregarded due to inconsistencies.

  8. Whether alibi can prevail over positive identification.

  9. Whether Cesar Pecha can be held guilty as an accessory to the crime.

  10. Whether the accused-appellants' liability should be limited to the penalty prescribed for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

  11. Whether the accused-appellants should be held jointly and severally liable for civil damages.

  12. Whether the amount of civil liability awarded is proper.

RULING:

  1. The Supreme Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to prove that Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas directly forced or induced the other accused to commit the crime. The plan to abduct and kill the victims was hatched without her involvement or participation. There is no evidence to show that she used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon the other accused.

  2. The order given by Jeanette to one of the accused does not constitute words of command that make her liable as a principal by inducement. To be convicted as a principal by inducement, there must be an intention to procure the commission of the crime, and such inducement must be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor. The order given by Jeanette is not sufficient to establish her guilt as a principal by inducement.

  3. The remark of Jeanette to "take care of the two" does not constitute the command required by law to find her guilty as a principal by inducement. Inducement requires a positive resolution and persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, along with the presentation of a strong temptation to commit the crime. In this case, Jeanette's remark was not a deliberate inducement, but rather a chance word spoken without reflection. Therefore, Jeanette cannot be guilty of the crime.

  4. The utterance, which supposedly acts as inducement, should precede the commission of the crime. In this case, the abduction, an essential element of the crime charged, has already taken place before Jeanette's alleged utterance. Thus, the utterance could not have been the inducement to commit the crime in question.

  5. The death of accused-appellant Torres extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability solely based thereon. The appeal of accused-appellant Torres is dismissed, having the force and effect of an acquittal.

  6. The other accused-appellants are convicted based on the sufficient evidence presented at trial. The trial court's credibility assessment of the eyewitness's testimony is accorded great weight. The alleged inconsistencies between the witness's sworn statements and his testimony in court do not discredit him.

  7. The court held that while there may be inconsistencies in the testimony of eyewitness Grandeza, it cannot be disregarded entirely. The court cited previous rulings that it is reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. The grounds relied upon by the accused do not constitute cogent reasons to discredit the testimony of eyewitness Grandeza in its entirety.

  8. The court held that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. Alibi is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. In this case, there was also a lack of strong and convincing evidence to support the alibi defense.

  9. The court held that accused-appellant Cesar Pecha can be held guilty as an accessory to the crime. It is difficult to believe that he had no knowledge that the victims he was burying were victims of violence, considering their gunshot wounds and being still handcuffed when exhumed. Accused-appellant Pecha is guilty as an accessory under Article 19, Paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.

  10. No, the accused-appellants' liability should not be limited to the penalty prescribed for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The court finds that the evidence established a higher degree of culpability, as shown by the deliberate manner in which the accused-appellants carried out the killings. They used an unlicensed firearm and repeatedly shot the victims, exhibiting clear intent to kill. Hence, the correct penalty is reclusion perpetua.

  11. Yes, the court holds the accused-appellants jointly and severally liable for civil damages. They were found guilty as principals in the crimes and should bear the civil liability resulting from their acts.

  12. The court reduces the civil liability of the accused-appellants to P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of each victim, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each case. The civil liability of accused-appellant Cesar Pecha is maintained at one-tenth of the total amount.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code provides the different ways a person may be considered a principal in the commission of a crime.

  • Directly forcing or inducing others to commit a crime requires the use of irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear.

  • Direct inducement can be established by giving a price, offering a reward or promise, or by using words of command.

  • To be convicted as a principal by inducement, the inducement must be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and it must be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor.

  • To constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation of the strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime. (U.S. vs. Indanan)

  • Chance words spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, or a thoughtless act may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to commit a crime in the mind of one predisposed thereto, without the expectation or intention that the suggestion would be followed. In such cases, the person speaking or performing the act would not be guilty of the crime committed. (U.S. vs. Indanan)

  • The quantum of evidence for conviction is that which produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence is susceptible to two interpretations, one consistent with the accused's innocence and the other consistent with guilt, the accused must be acquitted. (People vs. Manambit)

  • Mere presence at the scene of the crime or companionship is not sufficient to establish conspiracy without proof of a previous agreement. (People vs. Bayotas)

  • The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed. The civil liability survives if it may be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

  • An action for the recovery of civil liability that survives may be pursued by way of filing a separate civil action, subject to certain procedural requirements.

  • The statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case if the private offended party instituted the civil action together with the criminal case, avoiding any possible forfeiture of their right to file a separate civil action by prescription.

  • Findings of fact of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses command great respect, considering that it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while testifying.

  • Discrepancies between a witness's affidavit and their testimony in open court do not necessarily discredit them, as affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations. The failure to mention certain details in an affidavit does not render their testimony in court unworthy of credit.

  • The maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" is not a positive rule of law and is not inflexibly applied. If a part of a witness's testimony is found true, it cannot be disregarded entirely. The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part.

  • Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. Triers of facts are not bound to believe all that any witness has said. They may accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances, to be the truth.

  • Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. Alibi is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.

  • An accessory is someone who, having knowledge of the commission of a crime and without having participated therein, takes part subsequent to its commission, such as by profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime, concealing or destroying the body or effects of the crime, or harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime.