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OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN

FACTS:

Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. (Andutan) was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. Andutan resigned from the DOF on July 1, 1998.

On September 1, 1999, Andutan, along with other individuals, was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Andutan, as a government employee, was also administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The charges stemmed from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (Steel Asia) and other illegal acts.

The Ombudsman ordered the respondents to submit their counter-affidavits, and the case was set for a Preliminary Conference. However, the respondents failed to appear, and the Ombudsman deemed the case submitted for resolution. On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found Andutan guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and imposed penalties on him. Andutan filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the administrative complaints should not have been considered because they were filed after one year from the occurrence of the acts complained of and because Andutan had already resigned from his position.

The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC) seeking to reverse the CA's decision. The Ombudsman argued that administrative offenses do not prescribe after one year, and that Andutan's resignation does not render the administrative case moot. The Ombudsman also maintained that its findings were supported by substantial evidence.

The issues presented for the SC's resolution are: (1) Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation a year after the act was committed? (2) Does Andutan's resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him? (3) Assuming the case is not moot, are the Ombudsman's findings supported by substantial evidence?

ISSUES:

  1. Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary.

  2. Whether the Ombudsman can institute an administrative complaint against a government employee who has already resigned.

  3. Whether the resignation of a public official renders moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the resignation.

  4. Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to prosecute an administrative case against a public official who has already resigned.

  5. Whether the administrative case against Andutan is moot and academic.

  6. Whether accessory penalties may still be imposed against Andutan.

  7. Whether or not Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. is still the proper subject of an administrative complaint.

  8. Whether or not the penalties of perpetual disqualification from office and confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest can be imposed on Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr.

RULING:

  1. The provisions of Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 are merely directory. The Ombudsman is not prohibited from conducting an investigation a year after the supposed act was committed. The use of the word "may" in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. Section 20(5) does not refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense. Therefore, the complaint is not barred by prescription.

  2. The Ombudsman is not precluded from conducting the investigation, but it can no longer institute an administrative case against a government employee who has already resigned. The Ombudsman's authority to institute an administrative complaint is based on the commission of an offense while in the public service. Once the government employee has resigned, the Ombudsman's jurisdiction is no longer applicable.

  3. The resignation of a public official does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the resignation. The jurisdiction of the court is not lost by the mere fact that the public official had already ceased from office.

  4. The Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction to prosecute an administrative case against a public official who has already resigned. The provision in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38 refers to cases where the officers or employees were already charged before they were allowed to resign or were separated from service.

  5. The administrative case against Andutan is not moot and may proceed despite the inapplicability of the principal penalty of removal from office.

  6. Accessory penalties may still be imposed against Andutan.

  7. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint.

  8. The penalties of perpetual disqualification from office and confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest cannot be imposed on Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Administrative offenses do not prescribe. The purpose of disciplining public officers and employees is to improve the public service and preserve public faith and confidence in the government.

  • The word "may" in a statute is permissive and confers discretion, while the word "shall" is mandatory and imposes a duty.

  • The provisions of a statute that are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity must be given their literal meaning and applied without interpretation.

  • The Ombudsman's authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government employee is based on the commission of an offense while in the public service. Once the employee has resigned, the Ombudsman's jurisdiction is no longer applicable.

  • Resignation is not a way to evade administrative liability. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable.

  • Cessation from office by resignation or retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against the public official while he was still in service.

  • Jurisdiction of the court is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case.

  • The primary purpose of the law is to improve public service and preserve the public's faith and confidence in the government, not to punish public officials.

  • Resignation does not render an administrative case moot and academic.

  • The availability of accessory penalties does not justify the continuation of an administrative case on its own.

  • The continuation of an administrative case is justified when the resignation is done in bad faith.

  • The state has the duty to prevent the re-entry of unfit individuals to public service.

  • The state must perform this duty within the limits set by law and jurisdiction.

  • The "threefold liability rule" allows for civil, criminal, and administrative liability of public officers.

  • Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a resigned public officer, criminal and civil cases can still be pursued.

  • Public office is a public trust.

  • No precept of administrative law is more basic than the statement that assumption of public office involves the duty to serve the constituents well.

  • The stability of public institutions relies on the ability of civil servants to serve their constituencies well.