FACTS:

Domingo R. Muleta was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan for the complex crime of rape with homicide. The Information charged Muleta with unlawfully having carnal knowledge of Charito Delgado without her consent and subsequently stabbing her to death. Muleta pleaded not guilty to the charge and appealed the decision of the trial court.

According to the prosecution, Charito Delgado left Tondo, Manila on April 29, 1993, to pick up some baggage in Valenzuela. She was last seen alive by her relatives. On April 30, 1993, Charito's lifeless body was found naked in Mojon, Malolos, Bulacan, tied to a post with a pair of pants, and her hands were tied with a bra. Her body had five stab wounds. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) took over the investigation, and NBI Agent Ely Tolentino conducted the initial investigation.

Based on Tolentino's investigation, Muleta was Charito's uncle and worked at Loadstar Shipping Lines in Tondo, Manila, on April 29 and 30, 1993. Muleta's wife confirmed that he left for work on April 29, 1993, but returned only on the morning of April 30, 1993. On September 19, 1993, Tolentino went to Muleta's house in Oriental Mindoro and requested him to go to the NBI in Manila for investigation. Muleta admitted to raping and killing Charito during his custodial investigation with the assistance of counsel.

The defense, on the other hand, claimed that Muleta was not the one who committed the crime and was forced to admit the crime by the NBI. Muleta testified that he was in their rented house in Tondo, Manila, on April 30, 1993. He left the house in the afternoon and went to Charito Delgado's residence.

In this case, the appellant, Emilio Muleta, was accused of raping and killing his niece, Charito Delgado. The appellant's brother-in-law, Rolando Delgado, reported Charito as missing and later her body was found. The appellant was appealing his conviction based on circumstantial evidence. The trial court found the appellant guilty based on several factors: 1) the appellant was familiar with the place where the crime was committed and where the body was found; 2) the appellant left his place of work on the day of the crime and did not go home until the next day; 3) the appellant acted hysterically during the wake of Charito; 4) the appellant admitted uttering statements expressing guilt and regret; 5) the appellant admitted drinking chlorox and was brought to the hospital for treatment; and 6) the appellant's sworn statement contained details of the crime that only he would have known. The trial court rejected the appellant's claim that his confession was obtained through force and without the assistance of counsel, finding that it was voluntary and supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.

The appellant in this case was charged with the crime of murder. The prosecution's evidence included an extrajudicial confession allegedly made by the appellant. The appellant, however, denied having executed the extrajudicial confession and claimed that it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The appellant argued that the confession should be deemed inadmissible based on constitutional requirements.

The appellant's defense was alibi, claiming that he was not at the crime scene at the time of the incident. The trial court convicted the appellant based on the extrajudicial confession and disregarded the defense of alibi.

The appellant filed an appeal, raising several issues for resolution, including the validity and admissibility of the extrajudicial confession, the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, and the defense of alibi.

The Supreme Court found merit in the appeal. It deemed the extrajudicial confession of the appellant inadmissible, as it was obtained in violation of the appellant's rights under custodial investigation. The court also ruled that the remaining circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the appellant was properly informed of his constitutional rights during his custodial investigation.

2. Whether the appellant was provided with the right to counsel during his custodial investigation.

3. Whether the sworn statement made by the appellant without the presence of counsel is admissible as evidence.

4. Whether the waiver of the accused's rights was valid.

5. Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.

6. Whether the circumstantial evidence presented, when taken together with the appellant's confession, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

7. Whether alibi as a defense should be considered in determining the guilt of the accused.

8. Whether the presumption of innocence prevails when the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required.

RULING:

1. The appellant was not properly informed of his constitutional rights during his custodial investigation. The questions propounded to the appellant were "terse and perfunctory statements" that did not satisfy the strict requirements mandated by the Constitution. The mode of "informing" the accused of his constitutional rights did not create an impression of voluntariness or understanding on the part of the accused.

2. The appellant was not provided with the right to counsel during his custodial investigation. While the prosecution claimed that the appellant executed the confession with the assistance and presence of Atty. Deborah Daquiz, the testimony of the investigating NBI agent contradicted this claim. The testimony revealed that Atty. Daquiz was not present during the statement taking and was only called after the appellant expressed his desire for legal assistance.

3. No, the sworn statement made without the presence of counsel is not admissible as evidence. The court held that the appellant's confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. It was established that the appellant started giving his statement on September 19, 1993, and completed it on the same day before the arrival of his NBI-procured counsel on September 20, 1993. The court emphasized that the right to counsel must be present at all times during custodial investigations, and failure to do so renders the confession inadmissible. The court also pointed out that no valid waiver of rights was made by the appellant since he was not assisted by a lawyer at the time.

4. The waiver of the accused's rights was invalid. The waiver did not show the accused's understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and the implications of his waiver. The waiver should have been in a language that clearly manifested his desire to do so. The alleged counsel for the accused made no effort to determine if the accused was treated well or if he understood his rights.

5. There is not sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was controverted by the defense and was not sufficiently established. The prosecution failed to prove that the accused worked at the place where the crime was perpetrated and did not establish his whereabouts during the relevant period. The behavior and statements of the accused during the wake were ambiguous and did not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence presented did not constitute an unbroken chain leading inexorably to the guilt of the accused.

6. The circumstantial evidence presented, when taken together with the appellant's confession, is inadequate to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The confession of the appellant, which is the strongest evidence of the prosecution, was obtained in violation of the appellant's rights and therefore cannot be used as evidence. Without the confession, the other pieces of circumstantial evidence lose their significance, resulting in insufficiency of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.

7. Alibi as a defense, although inherently weak, should not be used to convict the accused based on the weakness of the defense. The prosecution must convict the accused based on the strength of its own case.

8. The presumption of innocence prevails when the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption. The burden lies on the prosecution to present credible and admissible evidence of the accused's guilt. If the prosecution fails to discharge this burden, the accused is entitled to acquittal.

PRINCIPLES:

• The right to be informed of one's constitutional rights during custodial investigation requires effective communication between the investigating officer and the suspected individual, with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights. Mere "informing" is not enough; the person under investigation must be effectively "informed."

• The mode of "informing" the accused of his constitutional rights should not be stereotyped, terse, perfunctory, or superficial. It should demonstrate that the accused understood his rights and made a voluntary and unconstrained decision to give up those rights.

• The right to counsel during custodial investigation requires the presence and assistance of a lawyer, chosen by the accused or provided by the authorities if the accused cannot afford legal representation. The presence and participation of counsel should be genuine and not merely a superficial compliance to the constitutional requirement.

• The right to counsel during custodial investigations is a constitutional right aimed at preventing the use of duress and undue influence in extracting confessions.

• No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it is done in the presence of counsel.

• The failure to present the NBI-procured counsel to testify on the validity of the confession substantiates its constitutionally suspect and invalid nature.

• The right to counsel refers to competent and independent lawyers, preferably chosen by the accused themselves.

• "Invitations" to persons being investigated are considered part of the custodial investigation process, and therefore the right to counsel applies.

• A waiver of rights must show the accused's understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and the implications of his waiver. The waiver must be in a language that clearly manifests the accused's desire to waive his rights.

• When there is no direct proof, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence. However, to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Inadequate and uncorroborated circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction. Suspicion or accusation is not synonymous with guilt.

• Constitutional presumption of innocence prevails when the state's evidence is insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The prosecution must prove the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction.

• The accused is entitled to acquittal if the prosecution fails to meet the burden of proof, regardless of the weakness or absence of the defense.

• The strongest evidence of the prosecution, such as a confession, obtained in violation of the rights of the accused cannot be used as evidence.

• Every circumstance favoring the accused's innocence must be duly taken into account, and the proof against the accused must survive the test of reason.