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FORTUNE EXPRESS v. CAORONG

FACTS:

The case involves a bus company, the petitioner, who was the defendant in a complaint for damages filed by the private respondents, the widow and minor children of a passenger who was killed during an ambush involving one of the petitioner's buses. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds of petitioner's failure to exercise the required diligence in operating its bus. The incident occurred after the bus figured in an accident with a jeepney, resulting in the death of several jeepney passengers. Following the accident, a field agent conducted an investigation and discovered that certain individuals were planning to burn the petitioner's buses in revenge. The agent reported his findings to the petitioner's operations manager, who assured him that necessary precautions would be taken. However, on November 22, 1989, armed individuals seized one of the petitioner's buses and set it on fire. During the incident, the deceased passenger returned to the bus to retrieve something and pleaded with the assailants to spare the driver. Shots were then heard from inside the bus, and the deceased passenger was hit. The trial court held that the petitioner was not negligent in failing to provide security guards in its buses and that the death of the deceased passenger was an unexpected and unforeseen occurrence over which petitioner had no control.

The case involves a bus company, the defendant-appellee, who was alerted about a plan by a group of Maranao hotheads to burn five of the company's buses out of revenge for the deaths of two Maranaos in a previous collision involving one of the defendant's buses. The defendant received a written report about the plan from a member of the Regional Security Unit. However, the defendant failed to take any concrete action to prevent the execution of the threat or to ensure the safety of its passengers. The defendant did not adopt safety measures such as frisking passengers or assigning security personnel to its buses. Consequently, the plan pushed through, resulting in the burning of a bus and the fatal shooting of one of the passengers. The trial court dismissed the complaint against the defendant, stating that the defendant could not be held liable for the acts of the lawless individuals. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant failed to exercise the required degree of diligence as a common carrier and should be held liable for the incident.

ISSUES:

  1. Did the petitioner breach the contract of carriage by failing to exercise the required degree of diligence?

  2. Can the seizure of petitioner's bus be considered a case of force majeure?

  3. Whether the petitioner is liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect passengers from injuries caused by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements.

  4. Whether the petitioner is responsible for the death of a passenger and other damages resulting from a robbery attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.

  5. Whether the deceased passenger was guilty of contributory negligence.

  6. Whether the petitioner is liable to the private respondents for compensation for loss of earning capacity.

  7. Whether the petitioner is liable to the private respondents for death indemnity, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suits.

RULING:

  1. Yes, the petitioner breached the contract of carriage by failing to exercise the required degree of diligence. Despite being warned about the Maranaos' plan to attack its buses and assuring that necessary precautions would be taken, the petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. The employees of the petitioner failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family by not preventing the attack on one of the buses. The court held that simple precautionary measures, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their belongings, could have been employed without violating their constitutional rights.

  2. No, the seizure of petitioner's bus cannot be considered a case of force majeure. For an event to be considered force majeure, it must be independent of human will, unforeseeable or unavoidable, render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill their obligation, and the obligor must be free from participation or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. In this case, despite being warned about the Maranaos' plan to attack its buses, the petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus was foreseeable and therefore not a fortuitous event that would exempt the petitioner from liability.

  3. The petitioner is liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect passengers from injuries caused by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. As a common carrier, the petitioner is bound to carry passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide. The petitioner failed to take the necessary precautions to protect the safety of passengers despite receiving reports and assurances of potential threats.

  4. The petitioner is responsible for the death of a passenger and other damages resulting from a robbery attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. The cases of Pilapil and De Guzman, which held that common carriers are not responsible for unforeseen criminal acts of third parties, do not apply to this case. The second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure, which is unpredictability, is lacking. Despite warnings and assurances, the petitioner did not take adequate measures to ensure the safety of passengers.

  5. The deceased passenger was not guilty of contributory negligence. His actions in returning to the bus to retrieve something and pleading for the life of the bus driver cannot be considered negligent or reckless. He was merely trying to assist and act as a good Samaritan.

  6. Yes, the petitioner is liable to the private respondents for compensation for loss of earning capacity. The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals that the computation of earning capacity should be based on the deceased's life expectancy and projected gross annual income, taking into account necessary living expenses.

  7. Yes, the petitioner is liable to the private respondents for death indemnity, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suits. The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals that awarded these amounts to the private respondents.

PRINCIPLES:

  • A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts of other passengers if the employees of the carrier could have prevented the act by exercising the diligence of a good father of a family.

  • A common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting their belongings.

  • To be considered force majeure, an event must be independent of human will, unforeseeable or unavoidable, render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill their obligation, and the obligor must be free from participation or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.

  • A common carrier is bound to carry passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide. (Art. 1755, Civil Code)

  • Common carriers are not responsible for unforeseen criminal acts of third parties only if the event is attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. (Pilapil and De Guzman cases)

  • Indemnity for death caused by the breach of contract of carriage by a common carrier is provided for in Art. 1764 and may be increased over time. (Art. 2206, Civil Code)

  • Actual damages may be awarded for pecuniary loss suffered and duly proved. (Art. 2199, Civil Code)

  • Spouses, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish resulting from the death of the deceased. (Art. 2206, Civil Code)

  • Exemplary damages may be awarded in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. (Art. 2232, Civil Code)

  • Attorney's fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded. (Art. 2208, Civil Code)

  • Compensation may be awarded for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased. (Art. 1764, Civil Code)

  • Compensation for loss of earning capacity is based on the deceased's life expectancy and projected gross annual income, subject to necessary living expenses.

  • Death indemnity, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suits can be awarded to the heirs of the deceased in cases of wrongful death.