FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order against Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia and eight other city officials due to an alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt. The contract in question was signed by the petitioner as mayor and F.E. Zuellig, and an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman recommended criminal and administrative cases against the petitioner and other officials. The preventive suspension order was issued on June 25, 1999, and despite the petitioner's motion for reconsideration being denied, he filed a petition challenging the validity of the suspension order with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo, which the respondents sought clarification on, but the Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner's interpretation that the last actual peaceable uncontested state should be the status quo.

The case involves the investigation of acts done by the petitioner before his reelection. The petitioner argues that his reelection renders the administrative case moot and academic, invoking the principle of condonation. However, the respondents argue that the contract in question was signed during the petitioner's previous term but was set to be effective during his current term, making the condonation principle inapplicable. The court must consider the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the administrative investigation under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Law.

The petitioner, an elective local official, is accused of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to conduct an administrative investigation under RA No. 6770. The power of preventive suspension is also provided for by Section 24 of the same law, which can be imposed if the evidence of guilt is strong and the charges involve dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in duty, or if the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case. The preventive suspension shall last until the case is terminated but not exceeding six months, without pay. The power of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend officials under investigation by their office, except those removable by impeachment, members of Congress, and the Judiciary, has been previously interpreted by the court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Deputy Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting the period of preventive suspension at six months.

2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the imposition of preventive suspension against the petitioner.

3. Whether the preventive suspension of the petitioner for a period of six months is excessive and violates his rights.

4. Whether the Local Government Code limits the period of preventive suspension to sixty days for elective local officials.

5. Whether petitioner was given the required 72 hours to answer the charges against him.

6. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman can hold petitioner administratively liable for acts committed during his previous term.

7. Whether or not the petitioner may be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F.E. Zuellig.

8. Whether or not the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in conducting an inquiry on complaints against the petitioner and ordering their investigation.

9. Whether or not the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion concerning the period of preventive suspension imposed on the petitioner.

RULING:

1. The Deputy Ombudsman did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in setting the period of preventive suspension at six months.

2. There is sufficient evidence to justify the imposition of preventive suspension against the petitioner.

3. The Court held that while the preventive suspension of the petitioner had a legitimate purpose, the six-month period of suspension was excessive and longer than necessary. The Court emphasized that the purpose of preventive suspension is to prevent the petitioner from hiding or destroying documents and harassing witnesses. In this case, the documents needed to establish the petitioner's guilt were already obtained during the nearly month-long suspension. Therefore, the maximum six-month period was deemed unnecessary.

4. The Court did not subscribe to the petitioner's claim that the Local Government Code, which limits preventive suspension to sixty days, was violated. The Court acknowledged that administrative complaints under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local Government Code. The shorter period of suspension under the Local Government Code is intended to prevent partisan political considerations. In contrast, the Ombudsman, being a constitutional body, is not likely to be similarly motivated. The Court, however, did not consider this distinction decisive in determining whether there was grave abuse of discretion in the specific case of preventive suspension.

5. Petitioner was not given the required 72 hours to answer the charges against him. However, this does not invalidate the preventive suspension order issued against him as a preventive suspension order may be issued even before the charges are heard.

6. A reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his previous term, unless the misconduct was committed in close proximity to the date of elections and was not made an issue during the election. In this case, the contract entered into by petitioner was signed just four days before the elections and was not made an issue during the election. Therefore, petitioner cannot be held administratively liable for signing the contract.

7. The petitioner may no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F.E. Zuellig. However, this does not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against the petitioner. It is not a total exoneration but limited to the question of administrative liability.

8. The respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion in conducting an inquiry on complaints against the petitioner and ordering their investigation pursuant to their mandate under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Law.

9. The respondents committed grave abuse of discretion concerning the period of preventive suspension imposed on the petitioner. The maximum period for preventive suspension is six months, and in this case, the 24-day suspension was sufficient. The petitioner's preventive suspension should now be lifted immediately.

PRINCIPLES:

• The power to investigate is distinct from the power to suspend preventively an erring public officer.

• The power of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend an official subject to its administrative investigation is provided by specific provision of law.

• The Ombudsman can preventively suspend all officials under investigation by his office, regardless of the branch of government in which they are employed, except those removable by impeachment, members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

• Preventive suspension may be imposed when the evidence of guilt is strong.

• The period of preventive suspension must not exceed six months.

• The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong and the propriety of the length or period of suspension imposed are subject to the discretion of the Ombudsman, within the limits set by law.

• Equitable remedies under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court exist to provide prompt relief where an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Preventive suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation and is not a final determination of guilt.

• The period of preventive suspension should be proportionate and not excessive, based on the legitimate purpose it seeks to achieve.

• Administrative complaints under the Ombudsman Law and the Local Government Code have different procedures and provisions. The shorter period of suspension under the Local Government Code aims to limit suspension motivated by partisan political considerations.

• A preventive suspension order may be issued even before the charges against the official concerned are heard.

• A reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his previous term, unless the misconduct was committed in close proximity to the date of elections and was not made an issue during the election.

• Administrative liability can be separate from other legal actions that may be filed against a person involved in certain actions.

• The Ombudsman has the authority to conduct inquiries and investigations on complaints against public officials and employees.

• The maximum period for preventive suspension is six months.