View full case

PEOPLE v. RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS

FACTS:

Accused Renato Tac-an was charged with qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition, as well as murder. The illegal possession charge stemmed from an incident on December 14, 1984, wherein Tac-an was found to have been in possession of an unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver, with five spent shells and five live ammunitions. He was also charged with murder for shooting and causing the death of Francis Ernest Escaño III using the same firearm. The murder charge alleged that Tac-an attacked, assaulted, and shot Escaño multiple times, causing fatal gunshot wounds. The trial court consolidated the two cases and eventually convicted Tac-an, sentencing him to death in both cases. Tac-an appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, despite the fact that the case was subject to automatic review by the same court.

The case involves appellant Renato Tac-an and the deceased Francis Ernest Estano III, who were classmates and members of the same gang in high school. Their relationship turned sour when Francis withdrew from the gang, and their animosity escalated when graffiti appeared on the school walls, which Renato attributed to Francis. On December 14, 1984, during their English class, Renato kicked the chair where Francis was sitting, resulting in a brief altercation that was stopped by their teachers. Renato then left the classroom and returned approximately 15 minutes later with a gun. He entered their Math classroom, shut the door, and shouted, "Where is Francis?" Renato fired shots, hitting various objects and finally hitting Francis on the head as the latter was rushing towards the door. Francis fell down, and Renato subsequently re-entered the room and shot Francis in the chest. Renato then left the room, locked it, and told other students and teachers to lock the faculty room.

The case involves an incident wherein Renato shot and killed Francis, his classmate, inside their English III classroom. Prior to the shooting, Francis approached Renato and allegedly made threatening statements, including a promise to harm Renato and his family. Renato claimed self-defense, stating that he shot Francis in response to the perceived threat. However, the trial court found Renato guilty of homicide based on the positive and direct testimonies of witnesses who described the events leading up to the shooting. Renato's defense of self-defense was not accepted by the court, as the alleged statements made by Francis did not constitute unlawful aggression. The court also noted the lack of corroborating evidence for Renato's claims. After conducting ballistic examination, it was established that the gun and bullets used in the shooting belonged to Renato.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the statements allegedly made by Francis can be considered as unlawful aggression for the purpose of self-defense

  2. Whether P.D. No. 1866 is applicable to the appellant's case

  3. Whether the appellant's right against double jeopardy was violated

  4. Whether the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 for murder constitutes double jeopardy.

  5. Whether the use of an unlicensed firearm can be used as a special aggravating circumstance to increase the penalty for murder.

  6. Whether treachery was present in the killing of the victim.

  7. Whether the killing was attended by treachery

  8. Whether evident premeditation was present

  9. Whether the killing was done under the influence of a dangerous drug

  10. Whether the appellant had voluntarily surrendered

  11. Whether Renato's act of surrendering the gun to his brother constitutes voluntary surrender.

  12. Whether the shooting of Francis was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.

RULING:

  1. The statements allegedly made by Francis cannot be considered as unlawful aggression for the purpose of self-defense. Unlawful aggression should consist of an attack that has actually materialized or is clearly imminent, and it cannot consist of oral threats or a merely threatening stance. Since Francis was unarmed and only made verbal threats, there was no well-grounded and reasonable belief that Renato was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm.

  2. P.D. No. 1866 is applicable to the appellant's case. The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm, which is a violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The argument that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable after martial law was lifted has no basis because the law itself does not specify that it was intended to be enforceable only during the martial law period.

  3. The appellant's claim of double jeopardy is unfounded. The constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second prosecution for the same offense. In this case, the second charge of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm is a different offense from the first charge of illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition. Therefore, there is no violation of the appellant's right against double jeopardy.

  4. The subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 for murder does not constitute double jeopardy as it is a different offense from the charge in Criminal Case No. 4007 for unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm.

  5. The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be used as a special aggravating circumstance to increase the penalty for murder as it is not included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. However, it can be considered in increasing the penalty for the offense of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm under PD No. 1866.

  6. Treachery was present in the killing of the victim based on the specific circumstances established by the trial court.

  7. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the killing was attended by treachery, thus constituting murder.

  8. The Court discarded evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance due to the lack of sufficient evidence to establish the time and determination of the offender.

  9. The Court found the evidence presented to be inadequate to support the claim that the killing was done under the influence of a dangerous drug.

  10. The Court did not consider appellant's action of surrendering the gun to be a voluntary surrender.

  11. The Supreme Court held that Renato's surrender cannot be considered as voluntary and spontaneous. Renato was surrounded by Philippine Constabulary soldiers, effectively holding some teachers and students as hostages. Since there was no escape open to him, Renato was not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

  12. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in finding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance of committing the crime in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities. While a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed a person in authority for the purposes of direct assault and resistance and disobedience under the Revised Penal Code, they cannot be regarded as a "public authority" under the provision on special aggravating circumstances. Therefore, the special aggravating circumstance of committing the crime with contempt of or insult to public authorities should be deleted.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Unlawful aggression should consist of an actual or clearly imminent attack, and cannot consist of oral threats or a merely threatening stance.

  • P.D. No. 1866 is applicable to cases involving unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition, regardless of the status of martial law.

  • Double jeopardy only applies when there is a second prosecution for the same offense. If the subsequent charge is for a different offense, even if arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no violation of the right against double jeopardy.

  • The subsequent filing of a different offense does not constitute double jeopardy.

  • The use of an unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code but can be considered in increasing the penalty for unlawful possession of the firearm under PD No. 1866.

  • Treachery is present when the attack is sudden, unexpected, and the victim is defenseless and unaware of the impending assault.

  • Treachery is present when the attack on the victim is carried out in a manner that disables the victim from defending or retaliating, and when the means employed by the offender ensures the victim's death without risk to themselves.

  • In order to establish evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof of the time when the offender formed the intent to commit the crime, an action manifesting the clinging to such intent, and a sufficient interval between the determination and the execution.

  • In the absence of competent medical or direct evidence of ingesting a dangerous drug, courts must be cautious in considering indirect evidence for the influence of a prohibited drug in a crime.

  • Surrendering a weapon does not equate to voluntary surrender of the offender.

  • The surrender of a suspect to a person who is not a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority cannot be considered as voluntary surrender.

  • A teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed a person in authority only for the purposes of direct assault and resistance and disobedience, but not for the provision on special aggravating circumstances.