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PILIPINAS BANK v. JUSTICE SOCORRO TIRONA-LIWAG

FACTS:

Pilipinas Bank filed an administrative complaint against retired Associate Justice Socorro Tirona-Liwag, alleging gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious misconduct, and knowingly rendering unjust orders and/or decisions in relation to Civil Case No. 5260. The case involved a complaint for damages with injunction filed by Rustica Tan against Pilipinas Bank to stop the extra-judicial foreclosure of a lot. Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo denied Pilipinas Bank's motion to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to declare the defendant in default, which was granted by Judge Aguinaldo. On November 15, 1985, Atty. Godofredo Bernardino filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs and presented additional evidence on March 6 and 14, 1986. Pilipinas Bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the default order, which was set aside by Judge Aguinaldo. However, Judge Liwag, who took over the case after Judge Aguinaldo's retirement, issued an order directing the defendant's counsel to furnish the plaintiffs' counsel a copy of the answer within five days. The defendant's counsel failed to do so, as stated in another order issued by Judge Liwag.

In another case, Judge Liwag rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the City of Baguio, nullifying a water supply contract and awarding damages. The plaintiffs filed a motion for execution pending appeal, which was granted by Judge Liwag. The defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. Judge Liwag issued a writ of execution, but it was not enforced due to a restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted Pilipinas Bank's petition for certiorari, setting aside Judge Liwag's decision and ordering a trial on the merits. The Tan spouses then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was denied. Pilipinas Bank filed a disciplinary petition against Judge Liwag, alleging partiality, serious misconduct, and unjust orders, particularly the declaration of the bank in default. Judge Liwag argues that she properly declared the bank in default and that the default order was only set aside due to a misrepresentation by the bank's counsel.

ISSUES:

  1. Did the former Judge commit any reversible error in the judgment by default and the award of damages?

  2. Did the former Judge show partiality, serious misconduct, and rendering of unjust orders?

  3. Should the res ipsa loquitur doctrine be applied in this case?

  4. Whether the principle of res ipsa loquitur should be applicable in disciplining Judge Liwag.

  5. Whether Judge Liwag issued the orders and decision in Civil Case No. 5260 with improper motive and malice.

  6. Whether the award of more than the amount prayed for in the complaint is allowed.

  7. Whether or not the respondent judge's interpretation of Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court was correct.

    • Whether there was an error of judgment committed by the respondent judge in declaring the bank in default and making an award of damages based on previously presented evidence.
    • Whether the respondent judge should be held administratively liable for the alleged error of judgment.

RULING:

  1. The former Judge did commit an error in awarding damages that exceeded the amount prayed for in the complaint. Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court states that a judgment against the party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for in the complaint.

  2. The former Judge did not commit any reversible error in the judgment by default. The bank failed to comply with the requirement of filing the answer on time and properly furnishing the plaintiffs' counsel with a copy. However, there was no basis for imposing disciplinary measures for this alone.

  3. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine should not be applied in this case as there is no clear indication that the orders and decision of the former Judge speak for themselves in the light of the surrounding circumstances.

  4. The principle of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in disciplining Judge Liwag.

  5. Judge Liwag did not issue the orders and decision in Civil Case No. 5260 with improper motive and malice.

  6. The award of more than the amount prayed for in the complaint is allowed.

  7. The Court finds the complaint against the respondent judge unsubstantiated and without sufficient basis. The Court dismisses the complaint and clears the former appellate justice of the charges filed against her. However, the Court also notes that the respondent judge should have acted in a more professionally competent manner to avoid the appearance or suspicion of misconduct in the issuance of orders awarding huge sums of money against defaulting or recalcitrant parties. If she were still on the bench, she would have been reprimanded and warned to be more careful in observing the rules. Since she has retired, the Court's observations suffice.

  8. The court ruled that there was no error of judgment on the part of the respondent judge in declaring the bank in default and making an award of damages based on previously presented evidence. The default judgment was based on the bank's failure to serve a copy of its Answer to the adverse party, which was a valid ground for declaring default. It was also found that the decision was rendered in good faith, and a judge cannot be held administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Default judgment should not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for in the complaint. (Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court)

  • A judgment against the party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for.

  • The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of evil intent is based.

  • Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives, or improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer from being held accountable for errors of judgment.

  • A judge cannot be held administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.

  • Failure to serve a copy of an Answer to the adverse party may be a valid ground for declaring default.