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JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. OMAR U. AMIN

FACTS:

In this case, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with rebellion complexed with murder in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Another information was also filed against him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information alleged that Enrile unlawfully harbored or concealed Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in order to prevent his arrest.

Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest and to dismiss the case. The motion was denied and a Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently filed by Enrile. The court denied the motion, leading Enrile to file a petition with the Supreme Court, asserting that the information for violation of PD No. 1829 should be quashed and dismissed.

The pivotal issue in this case was whether Enrile could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 despite the rebellion case filed against him. The court referred to the case of People v. Hernandez, which prohibited the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. The court noted that if a person cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion, neither can he be charged separately for offenses that are constitutive or component elements of rebellion.

The prosecution alleged that Enrile entertained and accommodated Honasan in his house, knowing that Honasan was a fugitive from justice, thus preventing his arrest and conviction in violation of PD No. 1829. The rebellion charges against Enrile were based on affidavits stating that Honasan and rebel soldiers attended a gathering at Enrile's house. The prosecution concluded that Enrile and Honasan were co-conspirators in the failed rebellion.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the act of harboring or concealing a fugitive can be charged separately from the crime of rebellion.

  2. Whether crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion, including offenses under special laws, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion.

  3. Whether the crime of illegal possession of firearms can be separately prosecuted when it is already absorbed as a necessary element in a rebellion case.

  4. Whether the crime of illegal possession of firearms can be complexed with rebellion to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

  5. Whether the prosecution can charge the accused with rebellion and violation of P.D. 1829 in separate cases.

RULING:

  1. The act of harboring or concealing a fugitive cannot be charged separately from the crime of rebellion. The alleged act of harboring or concealing in this case was done in furtherance of the crime of rebellion and is therefore a component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. Thus, it cannot form the basis of a separate charge.

  2. Crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion, including offenses under special laws, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, that are mere components or ingredients of rebellion, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be charged separately. This principle applies not only to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws that are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense of rebellion.

  3. The crime of illegal possession of firearms cannot be separately prosecuted when it is already absorbed as a necessary element in a rebellion case. The accused cannot be placed in double jeopardy for the same offense.

  4. The crime of illegal possession of firearms cannot be complexed with rebellion to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. Common crimes perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime.

  5. The prosecution cannot charge the accused with rebellion and violation of P.D. 1829 in separate cases. If there is already a separate prosecution for rebellion, an independent prosecution under P.D. 1829 cannot prosper. The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge the accused with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with other offenses.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The act of harboring or concealing a fugitive can be considered a component or ingredient of the crime of rebellion if done in furtherance of the rebellion.

  • Crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion, whether common crimes or offenses under special laws, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be charged separately.

  • Common crimes perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime. They cannot be punished separately from the principal offense or complexed with the same to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

  • The crime of illegal possession of firearms can be absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in a rebellion case. To separately prosecute the accused for illegal possession of firearms would place him in double jeopardy.

  • If there is already a separate prosecution for rebellion, an independent prosecution for other offenses cannot prosper. The prosecution must make a decision on whether to charge the accused with rebellion alone or drop the rebellion case and charge him with other offenses.