View full case

RODOLFO T. GANZON v. CA

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case are the Mayor of Iloilo City and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Iloilo City. The case arises from a series of administrative complaints filed against the Mayor by various city officials, alleging abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. The complaints detail various actions and misconduct by the Mayor, such as reassignment of personnel for political reasons, padlocking of offices without justification, withholding of salaries, and physical assault. The cases proceeded to hearing despite attempts by the Mayor to delay the proceedings. The Mayor was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days, and further investigations were conducted.

The petitioner, Mayor Ganzon, was subjected to multiple suspension orders by the respondent Secretary of Local Government. The suspensions were based on various charges against Mayor Ganzon, including arbitrary detention and refusal to join a political party. Mayor Ganzon claimed that the Department of Local Government denied him due process and that the Secretary was biased against him. His request for a change of venue for the hearings was denied. Mayor Ganzon also argued that he had valid grounds for postponements, such as his heart ailment and the hospitalization of a vital witness, but these requests were also denied. He further claimed that the Secretary did not have the authority to suspend and remove local officials. However, the Court found no clear evidence supporting Mayor Ganzon's claims of denial of due process and political motivation, and he failed to substantiate his allegations against the Secretary.

This case involves a petition filed by Mayor Ganzon and Vice-Mayor Gica against the Secretary of Local Government, seeking to declare as unconstitutional the power of the Secretary to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials. The petitioners argue that the 1987 Constitution intended to strip the President, and by extension, the Secretary of Local Government, of such power by deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" in relation to the power of the President to exercise general supervision over local governments. The Secretary, however, asserts that his actions were in accordance with the specific provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provide for the power of preventive suspension. The issue before the court is whether the 1987 Constitution removed the power of the President, and by extension, the Secretary of Local Government, to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials.

ISSUES:

  1. Did the 1987 Constitution intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials?

  2. Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code?

  3. What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?

  4. Whether the power of supervision of the President over local government officials includes the power of investigation when necessary for the public service.

  5. Whether the President has the power to suspend or remove local officials.

  6. Whether the successive suspensions imposed on the Mayor violate due process.

  7. Whether the length of the suspensions is unjust and unreasonable.

  8. Whether or not the Secretary of Interior is exercising his power of suspension oppressively and with grave abuse of discretion.

  9. Whether or not Mayor Ganzon should be made to serve future suspensions on account of the remaining administrative charges pending against him.

RULING:

  1. The Constitution did not intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials. The omission in the constitutional language of the phrase "as may be provided by law" signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, particularly concerning discipline. The Constitution allows Congress to include provisions for removal of local officials in the local government code and delegate its exercise to the President.

  2. The Constitution did not repeal Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code. The existence of provisions in the Code authorizing the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively is not prohibited by the Constitution.

  3. The change in the constitutional language was meant to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control over local government affairs, including the power of local legislation. The deletion of "as may be provided by law" emphasized the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy, but it did not divest the legislature and the President of their authority to provide administrative sanctions against local officials.

  4. The power of supervision of the President over local government officials includes the power of investigation when necessary for the public service.

  5. The President has the power to suspend or remove local officials if provided by law.

  6. The Court finds that the successive suspensions imposed on the Mayor are unreasonable and violate due process. While it is justified to impose a preventive suspension to prevent the accused from interfering with the investigation or influencing witnesses, the length of the suspension should be reasonable. In this case, the Mayor faced the possibility of 600 days of suspension due to multiple administrative charges. This effectively suspends him from office and deprives the people of the services of their elected official. The Court holds that the prolonged suspension is oppressive and denies the Mayor his constitutional right to hold office.

  7. The Court emphasizes that suspension is not a penalty but a temporary measure to ensure the presence of the accused during the trial. The Local Government Code limits the suspension to a maximum of sixty days, and it should be lifted if the purpose of preventing interference with the investigation has been achieved in a shorter period. Imposing a longer suspension, such as 600 days, is deemed unjust, unreasonable, and tantamount to tyranny.

  8. The Secretary of Interior is exercising his power of suspension oppressively and with grave abuse of discretion. The Court is allowing Mayor Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.

  9. Mayor Ganzon should not be made to serve future suspensions on account of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The Constitution allows Congress to include provisions for removal of local officials in the local government code and delegate its exercise to the President.

  • The omission of the phrase "as may be provided by law" in the constitutional language signifies the intent to underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress and break Congress' "control" over local government affairs, particularly concerning discipline.

  • Autonomy in the constitutional sense does not make local government units mini-states, but subject to the guiding star of the legislature.

  • Local autonomy is subject to the passage of specific legislation to realize autonomy at the local level.

  • The Constitution places local governments under the general supervision of the Executive, even with the grant of autonomy.

  • "Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority, as the power of supervision by the President over local government officials includes the power of control.

  • Control refers to the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside the actions of a subordinate officer, while supervision refers to the authority to oversee and ensure that subordinate officers fulfill their duties.

  • Investigating is not inconsistent with overseeing, although it is a lesser power than altering.

  • The President's power to suspend or remove local officials is dependent on the law and does not stem from inherent power.

  • The power of supervision over municipal officials is vested in the provincial governor as provided by law.

  • Autonomy of local government units does not mean complete independence from the central government. Local governments are subject to regulation to enhance self-government.

  • Decentralization can be either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.

  • Decentralization of administration involves delegating administrative powers to local governments, while decentralization of power involves the autonomous government charting its own destiny with minimal intervention from central authorities.

  • Preventive suspension is not a penalty and is similar to preventive imprisonment. The accused enjoys the presumption of innocence unless and until proven guilty.

  • The length of a suspension should be reasonable and not exceed the prescribed maximum period. Prolonged suspensions can be oppressive and a denial of due process.

  • Local autonomy involves a decentralization of administration, not of power, and local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner provided by law.

  • The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism.

  • The change in constitutional language regarding the supervision clause was meant to deny legislative control over local governments but did not exempt them from legislative regulation consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy.

  • Local governments remain accountable to the national authority, which can impose disciplinary action against local officials by law and in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

  • "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms, and an investigation does not signify control.

  • Mayor Ganzon may serve the suspensions ordered so far but cannot be suspended for the offenses he was originally charged with, provided that delays in the investigation due to his fault, neglect, or request shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. If he commits other crimes or abuses after his preventive suspension, he may be preventively suspended again if warranted under the Local Government Code.