FACTS:

The four consolidated cases involve officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines who are facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d'etat in December 1989. They are charged with violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), AW 94 (Various Crimes), and Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).

In G.R. No. 93177, the petitioners are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel and the creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) to try them in a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners are challenging GCM No. 14 and seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.

In G.R. No. 95020, the respondent judge's orders in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are questioned on certiorari for lacking jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus, raising jurisdictional objections and seeking the release of the private respondents.

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a PTI Panel had been constituted to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a subpoena directing them to appear and submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses. The petitioners challenged the proceedings, filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal, and verbally moved for reconsideration. The PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days to submit their counter-affidavits.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the denial of their motion, and the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel gave them 7 days to reduce their motion to writing. They complied on March 14, 1990. The petitioners claim that there was no pre-trial investigation conducted in violation of Article of War 71, which requires a thorough and impartial investigation before charges can be referred to a general court-martial for trial. They also allege that during the initial hearing, no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. While their motion for summary dismissal was denied, their motion for reconsideration remained unresolved, thus they were not able to submit their counter-affidavits.

During a hearing on May 15, 1990, the petitioners in one of the cases manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of the General Court-Martial (GCM) No. 14. They invoked Article 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 for this purpose. However, GCM No. 14 ruled that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 39.

In another case, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No. 14. Ligot then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, seeking provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. RTC Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion granted the provisional liberty of Ligot. Ligot later filed an urgent motion to enforce his release order and to declare the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail in contempt for disobeying the order. He also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him. The trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot and other intervenors.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered a judgment declaring that the right to bail applies to military men facing court-martial proceedings. The court set aside the orders of GCM No. 14 denying bail and directed the conduct of bail proceedings for the petitioners and other persons facing charges before GCM No. 14. Pending the bail proceedings, the court reiterated its orders for the provisional liberty of Ligot and the intervenors.

On February 18, 1991, private respondents in another case filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming they were being detained without formal charges. The petition was referred to the RTC of Quezon City, which ordered their release after finding that no formal charges had been filed against them after more than a year of arrest.

The Court examined the records and found that the petitioners were given opportunities to present their side during the pre-trial investigation. They failed to submit their counter-affidavits despite warnings, and their motion for reconsideration was effectively denied by the PTI Panel. Therefore, they cannot claim denial of due process.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the pre-trial investigation requirements under Article 70 of the Articles of War are mandatory or directory.

2. Whether the lack of certification in the charge sheets violates the requirements of P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.

3. Whether the lack of signature by Gen. Renato de Villa in General Order No. M-6, which convened the general court-martial (GCM), renders it invalid.

4. Whether the right to peremptory challenge applies in military courts.

5. Whether or not the right to peremptory challenge in military court-martial proceedings was withdrawn by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 39.

6. Whether or not the old rule allowing peremptory challenge under Article 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 was revived after the termination of martial law.

7. Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against courts-martial and other military bodies.

8. Whether the right to bail is available to accused military officers.

9. Whether the denial of bail to military officers violates the equal protection clause.

10. Whether there was a violation of the right to a speedy trial.

11. Whether the petitioner's participation in several coup attempts can be established and if there are enough charges to warrant his confinement.

12. Whether the petitioner's indefinite confinement is justified.

13. Whether the decision in G.R. No. 97454 had become final and executory.

RULING:

1. The pre-trial investigation requirements under Article 70 of the Articles of War are directory and do not affect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. Thus, even if there was no pre-trial investigation, the court-martial still has jurisdiction.

2. The lack of certification in the charge sheets does not invalidate them as substantial compliance with the requirements of law was observed. The charge sheets were signed by a person subject to military law, who conducted an evaluation of the pertinent records and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies.

3. The lack of signature by Gen. Renato de Villa in General Order No. M-6 does not render it invalid. It has been established that he authorized the order and did not disauthorize or revoke it.

4. The right to peremptory challenge is recognized in military courts, with each side entitled to exercise this right. However, the law member of the court cannot be challenged except for cause.

5. The withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in military court-martial proceedings became ineffective when martial law was lifted and the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045. Therefore, the old rule allowing peremptory challenge under Article 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 was revived, and the right to peremptory challenge was restored.

6. The Court emphasized that even if P.D. No. 39 was not withdrawn, it was no longer operative under the new dispensation as it was considered one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime." As a result, the right to peremptory challenge under Article 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 was still revived and allowed.

7. The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies, including courts-martial and the Office of the Chief of Staff.

8. The right to bail is not traditionally recognized and is not available in the military as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.

9. The denial of bail to military officers does not violate the equal protection clause. The guaranty of equal protection requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated, and military officers are substantially different from civilians.

10. There was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. Although there was a delay in the investigation and preparation of charges against the accused officers, it was justified considering the number of individuals involved and the difficulty in conducting the investigation.

11. The participation of the petitioner in several coup attempts cannot be established and there are no enough charges to warrant his confinement.

12. The petitioner's indefinite confinement is not justified as Article 71 of the Articles of War mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and release him.

13. The decision in G.R. No. 97454 had not yet become final and executory at the time the special civil action was filed.

PRINCIPLES:

• The lack of pre-trial investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court-martial but merely affects the regularity of the proceedings.

• Substantial compliance with the requirements of law is sufficient in determining the validity of charge sheets.

• The authorization of a commanding officer, even if not personally signed, can still be valid.

• The right to peremptory challenge applies in military courts, with each side entitled to exercise this right. However, the law member of the court cannot be challenged except for cause.

• When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.

• The reason of the law is its soul. Ratio legis est anima.

• The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. The resolution of issues regarding the wisdom of laws is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not the court.

• Military tribunals, as instruments of martial law, were oppressive and discredited. The invocation of rules from the military tribunals to justify actions against accused officers is questionable.

• The recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited to delay proceedings, but the resolution of this issue lies with the law-makers.

• Courts-martial may commit a grave abuse of discretion that gives rise to a defect in their jurisdiction.

• The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies.

• The right to bail is not available to accused military officers as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.

• The denial of bail to military officers does not violate the equal protection clause.

• There must be substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial, taking into consideration the circumstances and justifications for any delay.

• The court-martial's referral of charges involves the exercise of judgment and discretion.

• A petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.

• The right to peremptory challenge should not be denied.

• Officers responsible for unnecessary delay investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may be punished as a court martial may direct.