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PEOPLE v. MARIANO UMBRERO

FACTS:

The accused Mariano Umbrero, Jaime (Jimmy) Agluba, and Alfredo Costales alias Pido were charged and found guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of Alfonso Urbi. It was alleged that on November 29, 1980, in the Municipality of Lal-lo, Cagayan, the accused, together with other at-large individuals, armed with guns, conspired and attacked and shot Alfonso Urbi, causing his death. The accused pleaded not guilty, while the other accused, including Eugenio Rigon, Bartolome Tangonan, and Danny Costales, were not yet apprehended.

The prosecution presented witnesses, including Angelina Urbi Ragsac, the daughter of the victim, who testified that she witnessed the armed men shoot her father under their house, and identified Alfredo Costales as one of the shooters. She also mentioned that Danny Costales was the one who shot her father and was chased and killed by the companions of Alfredo Costales. Eugenia Urbi, the surviving spouse, also testified that armed men came to their daughter's house and shot her husband, with Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy Agluba, and Pido Costales among the companions of the shooter. Both witnesses identified the accused in court.

The case involves the murder of Alfonso Urbi on November 29, 1980, in Sta. Teresa, Lallo, Cagayan. The prosecution presented Alfonso's wife, Eugenia Urbi, as a witness. She testified that Danny Costales shot her husband three times. According to her, Danny Costales and his companions suddenly arrived while they were eating, asking for water. When her husband stood up and went to see them, Danny Costales shot him for the first time. Her husband ran outside, followed by Danny Costales who shot him again. Danny Costales and his companions then left. Eugenia could not confirm if Alfredo Costales, Jaime Agluba, and Mariano Umbrero also fired their guns, but she testified that they were holding firearms at their sides. In addition, Martin Pagaduan, a resident of Sta. Teresa, testified that he saw more than ten armed men pass by his ricefield going westward, and shortly after heard gun reports from Alfonso Urbi's house. He saw the armed men surrounding the house, and when they left, he found Alfonso Urbi dead in his yard. He identified Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy Agluba, Pido Costales, Inyong Rigon, Florante Tabunal, and Romy Arellano as part of the group of armed men he saw.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether Mariano Umbrero was denied his right to due process.

  2. Whether there was a conspiracy among the accused.

  3. Whether or not there was conspiracy among the appellants

  4. Whether or not the defense of alibi is valid

  5. Whether the requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have been met in this case.

  6. Whether the aid of armed men should be appreciated in this case.

  7. Whether the fact that the presiding judge did not preside over the entire trial detracts from his appreciation of the prosecution evidence.

RULING:

  1. Mariano Umbrero was not denied his right to due process. Although his name was not included in the criminal complaint filed with the municipal court for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, the municipal judge issued a warrant of arrest and ordered Umbrero to file his counter-affidavit. Umbrero was given the opportunity to answer the charges against him during the preliminary investigation. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case and does not render the information defective. The appellant never requested for a preliminary investigation or called attention to its absence before entering his plea in court, thus waiving his right to such investigation.

  2. The appellants' contention that there was no conspiracy among them is not supported by the evidence on record. The trial court found that the appellants' testimonies were inconsistent and contradictory. The court held that the appellants' presence at the scene of the crime, their association, and their actions before and after the killing of Alfonso Urbi established their conspiracy to commit the crime. The court found their defense of denial and alibi to be weak and unsubstantiated.

  3. There was conspiracy among the appellants. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but can be inferred from the acts of the accused. The appellants' actuations immediately prior to, during, and right after the shooting of the victim indicate their common intention to commit the crime. The appellants were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as among the armed men who arrived at the scene of the crime, shot the victim, and left together after apparently accomplishing their purpose.

  4. The defense of alibi is not valid. The appellants failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that they were at some other place and for such a period of time as to negate their presence at the time and place where the crime was committed. The persons presented to corroborate their alibis were their relatives, which does not provide credible corroboration.

  5. The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have not been met in this case. The prosecution failed to prove that the accused determined to commit the crime, and that there was an act indicative of their determination and a sufficient lapse of time to reflect upon the consequences.

  6. The aid of armed men should not be appreciated in this case since the assailant and the appellants were in conspiracy.

  7. The fact that the presiding judge did not preside over the entire trial does not detract from his appreciation of the prosecution evidence.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case, nor does it render the information defective. If the defendant fails to invoke the right to a preliminary investigation before entering a plea, the right is deemed waived.

  • Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts, conduct, and relationship of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the offense. A conspiracy may be proven through circumstantial evidence, and it is not necessary to establish a formal agreement between the conspirators.

  • Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but can be inferred from the acts of the accused.

  • The act of one conspirator is the act of all.

  • The defense of alibi is weak if mainly established by the accused themselves and their relatives.

  • Identification by prosecution witnesses should be given full credit, absent any showing of improper motives.

  • Treachery is present when the offender employs means that tend directly and specially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to themselves.

  • To establish evident premeditation, the prosecution must prove the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, an act signifying their firm determination, and a sufficient lapse of time for reflection on the consequences of the act.

  • The aid of armed men cannot be appreciated when the assailant and the accused were in conspiracy.

  • The fact that a presiding judge did not oversee the entire trial does not necessarily detract from their appreciation of the prosecution evidence.