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RODOLFO T. GANZON v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The petitioner, Rodolfo T. Ganzon, filed an urgent motion asking the Court to dissolve a temporary restraining order (TRO) issued against a TRO previously issued by the Court of Appeals in a case entitled Ganzon vs. Santos, et al. Several administrative complaints were filed against Ganzon, the elected City Mayor of Iloilo City, on various charges. Respondent Secretary Santos issued three separate orders of preventive suspension against Ganzon, who challenged the validity of these orders. The Court of Appeals dismissed Ganzon's petitions and he filed separate petitions with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued a TRO against the implementation of the suspension orders.

Before the promulgation of the main decision, respondent Secretary Santos issued another order of preventive suspension against Ganzon. Ganzon questioned the validity of this order and filed a motion with the Court. After the main decision was rendered, respondents claimed that Ganzon's motion was rendered moot and academic. Respondent Santos issued a memorandum stating that the third suspension order against Ganzon shall be deemed in force and effect.

Ganzon filed a mandamus petition with the Court of Appeals and a motion with the Supreme Court stating that he had already fully served the suspension orders. The Court of Appeals issued a TRO against the implementation of the Secretary's order, and the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order to cease and desist the implementation of the Court of Appeals' TRO. Ganzon filed a motion to dissolve the Supreme Court's restraining order.

As of the time of writing, Ganzon remains suspended from office and has been serving the fourth suspension order. Ganzon argues that he should be allowed to re-assume his office starting September 4, 1991, while respondent Secretary contends that he can only return after October 19, 1991. The Court notes that Ganzon has fully served the first and third suspension orders, but there is also a fourth suspension order that has been served.

ISSUES:

  1. When did petitioner start serving the third and fourth orders of suspension?

  2. When will the service of the third suspension order expire?

  3. Whether or not the petitioner should serve the second order of preventive suspension for another 60-day period.

  4. Whether or not the cases involving the validity of the second and fourth preventive suspension orders have become moot and academic.

  5. The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner should be granted an injunction to enjoin his second preventive suspension.

RULING:

  1. Petitioner served the third suspension order from May 4, 1990, to May 18, 1990. He served the fourth suspension order from July 5, 1991, to September 3, 1991.

  2. The service of the third suspension order will expire on September 20, 1991.

  3. The second order of preventive suspension should be considered as fully served. While the main decision affirmed the validity of the three suspension orders, including the second order, the concept of simultaneous service can apply to the second order just like it did for the third order. Therefore, the second order is considered fully served as of the date when the main decision was rendered, which was on August 5, 1991.

  4. The cases involving the validity of the second and fourth preventive suspension orders have become moot and academic. Since the second preventive suspension order has been affirmed and fully served, the case pertaining to its validity filed with the RTC is rendered moot and academic. Likewise, the case filed with the Court of Appeals regarding the validity of the fourth preventive suspension order has also become moot and academic since it has been served. Therefore, the Court of Appeals is directed to dismiss the case, as well as the RTC case on the issue of the second preventive suspension order.

  5. The court resolved to deny the petitioner's prayer for an injunction to enjoin his second preventive suspension. However, the court stated that this resolution is without prejudice to the administrative cases where the first, second, third, and fourth preventive suspension orders were issued and that these cases should proceed on the merits. The court also reiterated that the petitioner may not be made to serve future suspensions for charges committed prior to August 11, 1988.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Service of suspension orders should be interrupted by a temporary restraining order (TRO) issued by a higher court.

  • The remaining days of a suspension order should be served after the expiration of another suspension order.

  • Simultaneous service of suspension orders is allowed if it is in favor of the petitioner.

  • Under the Local Government Code of 1991, a single preventive suspension of a local elective official cannot extend beyond sixty (60) days, and in the event that several administrative cases are filed against the official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.

  • The concept of simultaneous service can apply to preventive suspension orders, allowing an official to serve overlapping suspension periods.

  • Cases involving the validity of preventive suspension orders become moot and academic once the suspension orders have been affirmed and served.

  • The court may deny a petition for injunction, subject to the discretion of the court and the circumstances of the case.

  • Administrative cases should proceed on their merits, uninterrupted by injunction orders, unless there are exceptional circumstances.