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JOHN ERIC LONEY v. PEOPLE

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case are John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez who hold positions at Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"). Marcopper is engaged in mining activities in the province of Marinduque. In 1994, tailings from Marcopper's operations overflowed from a drainage tunnel into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers, causing extensive pollution and damage. In 1996, the Department of Justice filed charges against the petitioners for violation of various environmental laws. The petitioners filed a motion to quash the Informations on several grounds, including duplicity of charges and lack of personal liability. The Municipal Trial Court initially deferred ruling on the motion but later granted partial reconsideration, dismissing some charges and retaining others. The MTC maintained the charges for violation of the Philippine Mining Act and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, but dismissed the charges for violation of the Water Code and the National Pollution Control Decree. The petitioners were arraigned on the remaining charges, with the petitioners expressing their intention to appeal the MTC's ruling on the charges related to the Philippine Mining Act.

The petitioners were charged with violations of various laws for dumping mine tailings that resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers. Specifically, they were charged with violations of Presidential Decree (PD) 1067, which relates to the Water Code; PD 984, which relates to pollution control; Republic Act (RA) 7942, which relates to mining; and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which relates to imprudence and negligence resulting in damage.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari assailing the consolidation order that maintained the charges for violation of RA 7942. Meanwhile, the public respondent filed an appeal assailing the portion of the consolidation order quashing the charges for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The cases were raffled to different branches but eventually consolidated.

Branch 94 granted the public respondent's appeal and reinstated the charges for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984, while denying the petitioners' petition. The court held that the acts penalized by the different laws are separate and distinct, and each has its own elements. The court also cited the rule that a single act may violate multiple laws without absolving each other.

The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the charges for violation of the different laws stem from a single act of polluting the rivers and that the informants were duplicitous. They further argued that the charges should be consolidated under Article 365 of the RPC.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of Branch 94, stating that duplicity of informants is not a ground for quashing under Rule 117. It also determined that the doctrine in People v. Relova, which dealt with the variance in mens rea for two offenses, did not apply because the informants were for violations of separate and distinct laws. The court agreed that the different laws involved in the case could not absorb each other.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the charges filed against the petitioners except for one should be quashed for duplicity of charges.

  2. Whether the ruling of Branch 94, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes the doctrine laid down in People v. Relova.

  3. Whether the charges filed against the petitioners for violation of multiple laws constitute double jeopardy.

  4. Whether the charge for violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942.

  5. Whether or not the constitutional protection against double jeopardy applies when the prior offense is charged under an ordinance and the subsequent offense is charged under a national statute, but both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.

RULING:

  1. The petition has no merit.

  2. No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case:

  3. Duplicity of charges refers to a single complaint or information charging more than one offense. The Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibit the filing of such information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing their defense. However, in this case, each petitioner is charged with four offenses, with each information charging only one offense. Therefore, the petitioners cannot invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the informations.

  4. The Filing of Several Charges is Proper:

  5. The contention of the petitioners that they should only be charged with one offense, Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property, is without merit. It has been established that a single act or incident may offend against multiple provisions of law, justifying the prosecution for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Therefore, the filing of several charges against the petitioners is proper.

  6. The charges filed against the petitioners for violation of multiple laws do not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy does not apply if one provision of law requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not. In this case, each law on which the petitioners were charged contains one essential element not required by the others.

  7. The charge for violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code does not "absorb" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942. A mala in se felony cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes. The former is a felony based on criminal intent or negligence, while the latter are crimes based on special laws.

  8. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available when the prior offense charged under an ordinance is different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Duplicity of charges refers to a single complaint or information charging more than one offense. It is a ground to quash the information. (Section 3(e), Rule 117, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure)

  • A single act or incident may offend against multiple provisions of law, justifying the prosecution for more than one offense, as long as there is no violation of the Double Jeopardy clause.

  • Different offenses arising from the same act are not considered the same if one provision of law requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not.

  • Mala in se felonies cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes.

  • Double jeopardy does not apply if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

  • Under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III of the Constitution, multiple prosecution for the same offense is prohibited.

  • The second sentence of Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides an exception to the general rule, allowing multiple prosecution when the prior offense charged under an ordinance is different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute, but both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.

  • Double jeopardy protection under the Constitution is not available when the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts.