FACTS:
Bernadette L. Adasa filed an appeal to nullify the Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding the finding of probable cause against her for estafa. The complaints were filed by Cecille S. Abalos, who accused Adasa of deceitfully receiving and encashing two checks issued in her name without consent and failing to pay the proceeds despite demands. Adasa initially admitted to receiving and encashing the checks but later recanted, claiming that another person had done so. The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause and filed two criminal cases. The trial court ordered a reinvestigation, and the Office of the City Prosecutor affirmed the finding of probable cause. Adasa filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ, which reversed the findings and directed the withdrawal of the information for estafa. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw information and dismissed one of the criminal cases. The Court of Appeals granted Abalos' Petition for Certiorari, reversing the Resolutions of the DOJ.
Adasa, after being arraigned, filed a petition for review with the DOJ to reverse the Assistant City Prosecutor's resolution finding probable cause for estafa. The DOJ granted the petition and dismissed the criminal case. However, the trial court, upon the prosecutor's motion to dismiss based on the DOJ resolution, dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's dismissal solely based on the DOJ resolution violated the rule that the court should assess the evidence presented and should not solely rely on the prosecutor's recommendation. Adasa filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals affirmed its original decision. Dissatisfied, Adasa filed a petition with the Supreme Court, reiterating her argument that the DOJ can entertain an appeal even after the accused has been arraigned.
The petitioner argues that the arraignment of an accused before the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the DOJ is irrelevant, as the DOJ can still take cognizance of the appeal. The petitioner cites the Supreme Court ruling in Crespo v. Mogul, which states that the court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecutor. The petitioner also relies on Roberts v. Court of Appeals, which clarifies that Crespo v. Mogul does not prohibit the DOJ from taking cognizance of the appeal.
ISSUES:
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Whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) can take cognizance of an appeal or petition for review filed after the arraignment of the accused.
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Whether the Court's ruling in Crespo v. Mogul supports the petitioner's contention.
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Whether the Court's ruling in Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals supports the petitioner's contention.
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Whether the interpretation of the provisions of DOJ Circular No. 70 by the Court of Appeals violated statutory construction principles.
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Whether Section 7 and Section 12 of Department of Justice Circular No. 70-94 are contradictory or irreconcilable.
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Whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) is mandated to dismiss an appeal or petition for review if the accused has already been arraigned.
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Whether the word "shall" in Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 is mandatory or directory
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Whether the DOJ Secretary has the discretion to entertain a petition for review despite it being outrightly dismissible
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Whether the arraignment of the accused constitutes a waiver of the right to preliminary investigation or reinvestigation
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Whether the Court can make its own determination of probable cause in this case
RULING:
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No. The Court held that the DOJ cannot take cognizance of an appeal or petition for review filed after the arraignment of the accused. Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 clearly and categorically directs the dismissal of an appeal or petition for review filed after arraignment. The provision does not require interpretation as it is clear and unambiguous.
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No. The Court ruled that the Crespo v. Mogul ruling does not concern the issue of an appeal or petition for review before the DOJ after arraignment. The emphasized portion in the Crespo ruling refers to the discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a motion to dismiss, regardless of whether it is filed before or after arraignment. The Crespo case involved an appeal or petition for review filed before the DOJ prior to arraignment.
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No. The Court ruled that neither Roberts v. Court of Appeals nor Marcelo v. Court of Appeals considered the timing of the appeal or petition for review filed before the DOJ. Both cases involved appeals filed before arraignment.
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No. The Court held that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the provisions of DOJ Circular No. 70 did not violate statutory construction principles. The provision in question does not need interpretation as it is clear and unambiguous. The principle that the last provision in the order of position in a rule or regulation must prevail does not apply because there is no irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of the circular.
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Section 7 and Section 12 of Department of Justice Circular No. 70-94 are not contradictory or irreconcilable. Section 7 pertains to the action the DOJ must take when confronted with an appeal or petition for review that is clearly without merit, manifestly intended to delay, or filed after an accused has already been arraigned. On the other hand, Section 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of an appeal, including the dismissal of a petition for review or appeal on certain grounds. These provisions serve different purposes and can be harmonized without nullifying one in favor of the other.
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When an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ is mandated to dismiss the appeal or petition for review. Section 12 of the circular explicitly states that the accused having been arraigned is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. Therefore, the DOJ, in such instances, must not give due course to the appeal or petition for review and must dismiss the same.
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The word "shall" in Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 is mandatory.
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The DOJ Secretary does not have the discretion to entertain a petition for review if it is outrightly dismissible.
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The arraignment of the accused constitutes a waiver of the right to preliminary investigation or reinvestigation.
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The Court cannot make its own determination of probable cause in this case.
PRINCIPLES:
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Once a complaint or information is filed in court, the disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the court. The prosecution's motion to dismiss should be addressed to the court, which has the option to grant or deny it. (Crespo v. Mogul)
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The DOJ should refrain from entertaining an appeal or petition for review from the action of the fiscal when the complaint or information has already been filed in court. (Crespo v. Mogul)
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The Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases, but is enjoined to refrain from entertaining an appeal or petition for review from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. (Marcelo v. Court of Appeals)
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When a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation is unnecessary. (DOJ Circular No. 70)
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One part of a statute cannot be reconciled or harmonized with another part without nullifying one in favor of the other.
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The DOJ is mandated to dismiss an appeal or petition for review if the accused has already been arraigned, as stated in Section 12 of Department of Justice Circular No. 70-94.
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The word "shall" in a provision is mandatory unless there are specific provisos/conditions that indicate otherwise.
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The DOJ's power to entertain a petition for review is not discretionary when the case is outrightly dismissible.
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A void judgment is a complete nullity and without legal effect.
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When the law does not distinguish, the court must not distinguish.
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By pleading to the charge, the accused waives the right to preliminary investigation or reinvestigation and the right to question any irregularities surrounding it.
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The Court cannot review the evidence adduced by the parties before the prosecutor on the issue of probable cause in a petition for review on certiorari.