ARMITA B. RUFINO v. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA

FACTS:

This case involves a controversy regarding the constitutionality of a provision in Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) on vacant positions in the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) Board of Trustees. PD 15 established the CCP and mandated the Board to govern the CCP and hold its properties in trust for the benefit of the Filipino people. The Rufino group and the Endriga group claim to be the rightful trustees of the CCP Board. The Rufino group argues that vacancies should be filled by presidential appointment, while the Endriga group argues that vacancies should be filled by election among the remaining trustees. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Rufino group, declaring them lawfully entitled to hold office and ousting the Endriga group. The Endriga group filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Another trustee, Angara, filed a petition-in-intervention adopting the arguments of the Rufino group. The Rufino group raised several issues, including the constitutionality of the provision and the legal right of the Endriga group to hold office. The Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. In another issue raised, the Endriga group argues that they were not validly elected under PD 15, and even if they were, their terms as trustees expired. They also question the decision not to dismiss the quo warranto petition as moot. Finally, the issue raised in G.R. No. 139565 is whether a writ of quo warranto involving a public office should be immediately executory.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the Endriga group's quo warranto suit should have been dismissed for being moot.

  2. Whether the constitutional question regarding the validity of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 should be resolved.

  3. The issue in this case is whether the power to appoint the trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) Board belongs to the President of the Philippines or to the remaining trustees of the CCP Board.

  4. Whether Congress has the authority to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

  5. Whether the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards can delegate their power to appoint lower-ranked officers to other officers within their respective offices.

  6. Whether or not the Chairman of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) Board is considered a "head" of office within the meaning of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

  7. Whether or not the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP can be vested in the Chairman of its Board.

  8. Whether Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

  9. Whether Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 violates the President's power to appoint.

  10. Whether the President has control over the CCP.

  11. Whether or not an office in the Executive branch can be outside the control of the President.

  12. Whether or not Section 6(b) and (c) of Presidential Decree No. 15, as amended, is constitutional.

RULING:

  1. The Court held that the quo warranto suit should not be dismissed for being moot. While some of the issues raised may have become stale, the constitutional question regarding the validity of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 will continue to create controversy in the future. The Court cannot refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of these provisions in order to prevent a repeat of this controversy and protect the CCP from being periodically affected by internecine politics.

  2. The Court deemed it necessary to interpret and determine the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 in order to prevent future conflicts between the President's power to appoint CCP trustees and the CCP trustees' power to elect fellow trustees. The Court held that it has the authority to take cognizance of constitutional issues due to their paramount importance and to ensure compliance with the constitutional limitations embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

  3. The Supreme Court held that the power to fill vacancies in the CCP Board belongs to the remaining trustees, and in the absence of any remaining trustees, the power belongs to the President. The President's power to appoint is derived from the Constitution, while the power to appoint lower-ranked officers may be vested by Congress in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

  4. Yes, Congress has the authority to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states that Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

  5. No, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards cannot delegate their power to appoint lower-ranked officers to other officers within their respective offices. The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant or withhold this power from the heads of these offices. If Congress grants the power, it may impose certain conditions for its exercise, such as requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of other members of the commission or board.

  6. Yes, the Chairman of the CCP Board is considered a "head" of office within the meaning of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

  7. Yes, the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP can be vested in the Chairman of its Board.

  8. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is considered unconstitutional as it is irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

  9. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 violates the President's power to appoint as it allows the CCP trustees to elect their co-trustees, which has no constitutional basis.

  10. The President has control over the CCP as it falls under the Executive branch.

  11. An office in the Executive branch cannot be outside the control of the President. The power of control granted to the President under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is unconstitutional and without any legal basis.

  12. Section 6(b) and (c) of Presidential Decree No. 15, as amended, which authorizes the trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) Board to fill vacancies in the Board, is unconstitutional. It runs afoul with the President's power of control and makes the CCP virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The Court must exercise its power of adjudication in cases that involve a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution and must not be based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by courts of justice.

  • A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale or when there is no more actual controversy for the Court to decide.

  • The Court must pass on the merits of a case if the controversy is of such character that to prevent its recurrence and assure respect for constitutional limitations, and to protect constitutional limitations, it is necessary to do so.

  • The Court has the authority to brush aside procedural barriers and take cognizance of constitutional issues due to their paramount importance.

  • It is the Court's duty to apply the Constitution in accordance with its language and not according to the desires of the legislative or executive branches.

  • The Court has the final word on what the law means and must ensure respect for the constitutional limitations embodied in the Constitution.

  • The power to appoint is vested in the President, except in instances when the Constitution provides otherwise.

  • The power to fill vacancies in the CCP Board belongs to the remaining trustees, and in the absence of any remaining trustees, the power belongs to the President.

  • The power to appoint lower-ranked officers may be vested by Congress in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

  • Congress has the authority to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

  • The heads of agencies, commissions, or boards cannot delegate their power to appoint lower-ranked officers to other officers within their respective offices.

  • The word "heads" in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution refers to the chief executives or heads of commissions or boards.

  • The grant of the appointment power in the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions consistently refers to "heads" of offices, and the inclusion of "agencies, commissions, or boards" in the enumeration in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution includes them as heads of offices.

  • The Chairman of the CCP Board is recognized as the head of the CCP and is empowered, under PD 15 and its various amendments, to appoint all officers, staff, and personnel of the Center.

  • The Constitution establishes three branches of government - the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial - as well as independent constitutional bodies and quasi-judicial agencies.

  • Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under one of these branches or bodies, or be a local government unit, to have a legal and constitutional basis for its existence.

  • The President has control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, including the CCP, as stated in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

  • The President's power of control applies to all executive officers, whether appointed by the President or heads of departments.

  • The President's power of control is self-executing and does not require implementing legislation. Congress cannot limit or curtail this power.

  • The President's power of control includes the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of subordinate officers in the Executive branch.

  • The Executive branch is unitary and the President exercises control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices.

  • The Legislature cannot enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the control of the President.

  • The President's power of control does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies and local government units.

  • Autonomy of policy and operation granted to an office does not free it from the President's control.