FACTS:

SPO2 Cesar Galvez, a member of the Philippine National Police, was found guilty of murder by the regional trial court (RTC). The court sentenced him to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 20 years imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay P50,000 as moral damages and P500 as judicial costs. Additionally, Galvez was stripped of his military ranks and was to be immediately transferred to the National Penitentiary. Galvez appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed his guilt but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Galvez filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied. The case was then forwarded to the Supreme Court.

The accused, Florencio Galvez, was charged with murder for allegedly shooting and killing the victim on the night of July 27, 1991. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found undisputed the fact that Galvez did not shoot the victim on that night and that the firearm used in the killing was owned and possessed by another man, as proven by negative paraffin and ballistic test results. The defense presented two witnesses who corroborated Galvez's alibi. The prosecution argued that the paraffin test and ballistic examination were not conclusive proof that Galvez did not fire a gun during the incident. They also claimed that Galvez was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the armed men who attacked them. The trial court convicted Galvez of murder, but upon reviewing the records, the Supreme Court acquitted him.

The case involves the prosecution of the accused, Galvez, for the murder of Rosalio Enojarda. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the trial court's decision of convicting Galvez based on the positive identification of the prosecution witnesses. The CA gave more weight to the identification of the witnesses over the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests. However, the Supreme Court disagrees with the CA's ruling, stating that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see Galvez shoot the victim. The Court asserts that it cannot ignore the facts and circumstances of real weight that may have been overlooked or misapprehended by the lower courts. The Court cites the testimony of Perez, one of the prosecution witnesses, who stated that they heard shots but couldn't determine where it came from, and their companion, Rosalio Enojarda, was hit.

ISSUES:

1. Whether conspiracy was alleged in the information.

2. Whether Galvez's direct participation in the killing of the victim was proven.

3. Whether the "incriminating circumstances" are sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

4. Whether the presence of three other armed men raises the probability that any one of them inflicted the fatal shot.

5. Whether Galvez's presence minutes after the shooting is sufficient to establish his guilt.

6. Whether there was positive identification of Galvez through circumstantial evidence.

7. Whether motive is important in cases where evidence is purely circumstantial or inconclusive.

8. Whether the facts established by the circumstantial evidence exclude the possibility that another person shot the victim.

9. Whether Galvez's offer to settle the case is a tacit admission of guilt.

10. Whether the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests can be used as circumstantial evidence against the accused to prove his guilt.

11. Whether the accused's alibi and refusal to give a statement can be used as evidence against him to prove his guilt.

12. Whether or not the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

1. Conspiracy was not alleged in the information. Therefore, the prosecution must prove Galvez's direct participation in the killing of the victim.

2. The prosecution failed to prove Galvez's direct participation in the killing of the victim. The prosecution witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot the victim. Their testimonies only established that Galvez was seen firing an armalite rifle in their direction, but not specifically at the victim. The positive identification of the witnesses does not carry more weight than the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests.

3. The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated are not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

4. The presence of three other armed men raises the probability that any one of them inflicted the fatal shot.

5. Galvez's presence minutes after the shooting is not sufficient to establish his guilt.

6. There was no positive identification of Galvez through circumstantial evidence.

7. Motive is important in cases where evidence is purely circumstantial or inconclusive.

8. The facts established by the circumstantial evidence failed to exclude the possibility that another person shot the victim. There were three other armed men, any one of whom could be the culprit. The prosecution has not proven the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.

9. Galvez's offer to settle the case is not a tacit admission of guilt. The alleged offer of compromise was not formally offered and admitted as evidence during the trial. Galvez was not given the opportunity to explain that the offer was for some other reason that would justify a claim that it was not an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid its legal consequences. Since the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not shown that Galvez indeed made such an offer under the consciousness of guilt. The presumption of innocence of Galvez prevails over the alleged implied admission of guilt.

10. The negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests cannot be used as circumstantial evidence against the accused to prove his guilt. The lack of positive identification of the accused, coupled with the negative test results, does not satisfy the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The negative findings do not prove that the accused did not fire a gun, and if anything, they can bolster the accused's claim of innocence. The basic precepts of criminal law presume the accused's innocence, and every circumstance favoring an accused's innocence must be duly taken into account.

11. The accused's alibi and refusal to give a statement cannot be used as evidence against him to prove his guilt. While the accused's alibi may cast doubt on his innocence, it does not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof in criminal cases rests on the prosecution, and the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight. The accused's refusal to give a statement is his prerogative and should not be construed as an admission of guilt.

12. The accused is acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

PRINCIPLES:

• In order to hold a person equally guilty with others in the commission of a crime, conspiracy, or the imputation of criminal liability, is indispensable. Each accused must know from the information whether they face criminal responsibility for their acts and the acts of their co-accused.

• The trustworthiness of witnesses' testimonies should be assessed, but if facts and circumstances of real weight are overlooked or misapprehended, the court has a duty to render the law and apply justice.

• Circumstantial evidence should be approached with caution and must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The series of events pointing to the commission of a felony should support the hypothesis of guilt, exclude every other theory, and convince that the accused was the perpetrator of the offense.

• The prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused.

• Every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused must be duly taken into account.

• All circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent.

• The foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt, which means that the prosecution's evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the accused beyond the point of moral certainty.

• An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will still prosper even though the accused's innocence may be doubted.

• If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty.

• Motive becomes important when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive.

• In criminal cases, the prosecution has the duty to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Both the existence of the crime and the identity of the author must be proved beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of the prosecution's evidence.

• An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. However, there may be instances when an offer of compromise will not amount to an admission of guilt. The accused may show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason that would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

• The presumption of innocence is founded upon the first principles of justice and is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture, a probability that the defendant committed the crime, or the fact that the defendant had the opportunity to do so. The presumption of innocence continues until the defendant's guilt is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so. The proof against the defendant must survive the test of reason, and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.

• Negative findings in paraffin and ballistic tests do not prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, especially in the absence of positive identification.

• The burden of proof in criminal cases rests on the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Every circumstance favoring the accused's innocence must be duly taken into account, as the basic precepts of criminal law presume the accused's innocence.

• The accused has the right to remain silent, and his silence should not be construed as an admission of guilt.

• The prosecution's job is to prove the accused's guilt, and conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not the weakness of the defense.

• The goal of the criminal justice system is to render justice, and the court must entertain reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt.

• The protection provided by the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political persuasion.

• The burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution.

• The accused is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution has not proven.