FACTS:

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig. The road had to be at least three meters in width for fire trucks, and the residents needed it for water and electrical outlets. The municipality decided to acquire 51 square meters of the property owned by Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco, and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho. On April 19, 1993, an ordinance authorizing expropriation was approved by the Sangguniang Bayan. The municipality notified the property owners, who rejected the offer. In July 1993, the municipality filed a complaint for expropriation. The municipality deposited 15% of the market value of the property with the RTC and obtained a writ of possession. The municipality constructed a cemented road called Damayan Street on the property. The defendants claimed to have sold the property to Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) in February 1993. JILCSFI filed a motion to intervene, which was granted. JILCSFI argued that the expropriation was not for the benefit of the poor and the landless and that the property sought was not the best portion for the road. During the trial, witnesses testified about the need for the access road and the benefits provided by the construction of Damayan Street.

JIL Christian School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI) filed a complaint for expropriation against the Owners and Claimants of Properties fronting E. R. Santos Street in Sto. Tomas Bukid, District IV, Quezon City. JILCSFI sought to expropriate a portion of the defendants' properties to serve as a right-of-way for its school and church building projects. JILCSFI alleged that it made a definite and valid offer to acquire the properties and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to Sto. Tomas Bukid.

During trial, several witnesses testified. A tax mapper testified that JILCSFI became the owner of the property only on January 13, 1994. JILCSFI offered a photocopy of a letter as evidence to prove that it made a valid offer to the co-owners, but the RTC rejected the letter for being a mere photocopy. A property owner across the subject property testified that there are alternative roads leading to E. R. Santos Street and only a few houses of the urban poor are using the new road. Another witness, a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid, stated that there are three streets he could use to reach E. R. Santos Street, but admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. The Chairman of JILCSFI testified that the land was purchased for the construction of a school building and a church.

The intervenor presented documentary evidence showing that the co-owners agreed to sell the property to JILCSFI for a specific amount and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property. The RTC issued an order declaring JILCSFI as having a lawful right to take the property for expropriation purposes.

JILCSFI appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, ruling that there was substantial compliance with the requirements for expropriation and that the expropriated portion is necessary for the public welfare. JILCSFI filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the CA erred in considering a photocopy of a letter as evidence and that no inspection of the property was conducted. The CA denied the motion, stating that the existence of the letter was established by corroborative evidence.

This case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI) questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of the trial court, which allowed the Municipality of Pasig (respondent) to expropriate a portion of JILCSFI's property for road widening purposes.

The respondent filed a complaint for expropriation alleging that it needs to widen Amang Rodriguez Avenue, which entailed the taking of a 10-meter strip from JILCSFI's property covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). The respondent claimed to have sent a letter informing the previous owner, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, about the planned expropriation. However, JILCSFI argued that there was no evidence to show that an offer to purchase the property was made to either the previous owner or JILCSFI as the present owner. JILCSFI also argued that the property was already being used for a public purpose, thus, its expropriation should not be allowed.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent, finding that there was substantial evidence showing that an offer to purchase the property was made. The court also concluded that the property is not already devoted to or intended to be devoted to another public use.

JILCSFI appealed the decision to the CA, which affirmed the trial court's ruling. The CA held that the respondent presented corroborative evidence, such as the testimony of the plaintiff's messenger who served the letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and Municipal Ordinance No. 21 which stated that property owners were already notified of the expropriation proceeding. The CA also noted that JILCSFI failed to provide controverting evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity.

JILCSFI then filed this petition, raising issues including whether the respondent complied with the requirement of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint, whether the property which is already intended for public purposes may still be expropriated, and whether the requisites for an easement for right-of-way may be dispensed with.

The respondent argued that the CA already resolved the issues and the petitioner failed to show valid reasons to reverse the findings. The respondent also contended that the Ching Cuancos were deemed to have admitted that an offer to purchase was made.

The Supreme Court recognized that only questions of law may be raised in such petitions, but could reexamine the evidence on record if it was found that the conclusion was based on speculations or misapprehension of facts.

The Court discussed the nature and scope of the right of eminent domain, emphasizing that it is an attribute of sovereignty and an ultimate power of the government to appropriate any property for a public purpose. The Court also recognized that the exercise of eminent domain should be strictly construed and must be proved by the local government exercising the power.

The Court ruled that JILCSFI's petition is meritorious.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Supreme Court can reexamine the evidence on record despite the finality of findings of fact by the Court of Appeals.

2. Whether the respondent has complied with the requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

3. Whether a valid and definite offer has been made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated.

4. Whether the respondent complied with the mandatory requirement of making a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing the complaint.

5. Whether the letter submitted by the respondent is sufficient evidence of compliance with the requirement.

6. Whether the demand letter sent by the respondent constitutes a valid and definite offer to purchase the property for a price certain.

7. Whether the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the petitioner's title is a substantial compliance with the required offer.

8. Whether the declaration in the ordinance that the property owners were notified of the intent to purchase is a substantial compliance with the required offer.

9. Whether the failure to specifically deny the allegation of an offer in the answer constitutes an implied admission.

10. Whether the petitioner's property can no longer be expropriated due to its intended use for religious worship and a school for its members.

11. Whether or not the respondent is mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code.

12. Whether or not the respondent has shown the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere.

13. Whether or not the trial court deprived the petitioner of its right to due process by conducting an ocular inspection without notifying the petitioner.

RULING:

1. The Supreme Court can reexamine the evidence on record if the conclusion is based on speculations, surmises, or conjectures, or if the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.

2. The petition is meritorious.

3. The respondent, as the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation.

4. The respondent bears the burden of proving compliance with the mandatory requirement of making a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing the complaint. Failure to prove compliance will result in the dismissal of the complaint.

5. The letter submitted by the respondent is not sufficient evidence of compliance as it was only offered to prove the respondent's desire or intent to acquire the property, not a definite and valid offer. Moreover, the letter was rejected by the trial court as the original copy was not adduced in evidence, and there was no evidence that copies of the letter were sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property.

6. The demand letter does not constitute a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is only an invitation for one of the co-owners to discuss the project and price.

7. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens is not a substantial compliance with the required offer.

8. The declaration in the ordinance is not a substantial compliance with the required offer.

9. The failure to specifically deny the allegation of an offer does not constitute an admission.

10. The intended use of the petitioner's property for religious worship and a school does not exempt it from expropriation, as long as the purpose of the taking is for public use and welfare.

11. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. The grantee of the power of eminent domain has the authority to determine the location and route of the land to be taken, unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified as long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of a public character. The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing the road, which justifies the expropriation of the subject property.

12. The respondent has failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere. Although there is evidence to establish the genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area, the respondent did not provide a preponderance of evidence to prove that the portion of the petitioner's lot is the shortest and most suitable access road. The respondent's claims have insufficient support.

13. The trial court deprived the petitioner of its right to due process by conducting an ocular inspection without notifying the petitioner. The petitioner should have been notified and given the opportunity to be present during the ocular inspection. As a result, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection is rejected and has no probative weight.

PRINCIPLES:

• The right of eminent domain is an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. It is an attribute of sovereignty and an indispensable duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. The exercise of the power is limited by the provisions of modern constitutions and additional safeguards such as due process and equal protection.

• When the sovereign delegates the power of eminent domain to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the power. The authority to condemn is strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor.

• The respondent, as the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. The burden of proof rests on the condemnor to establish compliance with all the requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

• The requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit include the enactment of an ordinance authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power, the exercise of the power for public use, purpose, or welfare, the payment of just compensation, and a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated.

• An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. It must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract.

• The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes. It gives the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and inconvenience of litigation.

• The expropriating authority is burdened to make a definite and valid offer to all registered owners of the property. It may rely on what appears on the certificate of title covering the land.

• A demand letter must be a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific property for a price certain.

• A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world of the pendency of an action involving the title or possession of real property.

• A notice of lis pendens is not a substantial compliance with the required offer for expropriation.

• The declaration in an ordinance that property owners were notified is not a substantial compliance with the required offer for expropriation.

• Failure to specifically deny an allegation in an answer does not constitute an admission.

• The intended use of property, even for religious purposes, does not exempt it from expropriation if it is for public use and welfare.

• The grantee of the power of eminent domain has the authority to determine the location and route of the land to be taken, unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious.

• Expropriation is justified if it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of a public character.

• In expropriation cases, absolute necessity is not required, only a reasonable and practical necessity is sufficient.

• The right to due process includes the right to be notified of and present during an ocular inspection that forms part of the trial proceedings.