FACTS:

This case involves a dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent over a compromise agreement. The Bureau of Import Services (BIS) found a prima facie case against the private respondent concerning certain importations and their potential harm to the local industry. The parties agreed to settle the case amicably and a compromise agreement was prepared. However, the private respondent did not sign the agreement, and it was revised, signed by other individuals, and delivered to the petitioner. The agreement was notarized and submitted for approval. The petitioner later filed a motion to set aside the decision based on fraud during the negotiation of the compromise agreement.

The private respondent claims that he signed a second version of the compromise agreement without reading it, believing it replicated the contents of the first agreement. However, when he received a copy of the decision, he discovered it contained findings from the BIS that he did not agree to. The private respondent suspected fraud and deceit by the petitioner. In response, the petitioner filed a criminal complaint for perjury against the private respondent.

The investigating prosecutor initially found no probable cause for perjury, but the Second Assistant City Prosecutor reversed this decision. The Secretary of Justice eventually dismissed the perjury charge against the private respondent.

The petitioner filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and directed the withdrawal of the perjury information. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed the petition and affirmed the DOJ's resolution. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The main issue in this case is whether there was probable cause for the private respondent's indictment for perjury.

ISSUES:

1. • Whether there was probable cause for the private respondent's indictment for perjury.
2. • Whether the findings of the Secretary of Justice and the Court of Appeals were supported by the evidence.

3. Whether the elements of perjury are present in this case.

4. Whether the statement made by the accused is false.

5. Whether the contradictory sworn statements of the accused are sufficient to establish perjury.

6. Whether the issue of who called for a conference is material.

7. Whether the private respondent can be held liable for perjury for stating in his affidavit that it was the petitioner who prepared the compromise agreement.

8. Whether the petitioner and the private respondent agreed to use the BIS report as the basis for the price policy and structure of HTC.

9. Whether HTC agreed to be bound by the findings of the BIS for the purpose of revising its price policy and structure.

10. Whether the process agreed upon by the petitioner and the private respondent is in accordance with the law.

11. Whether or not the private respondent can be indicted for perjury based on the affidavit of merit he signed.

12. Whether or not the private respondent's failure to object to the compromise agreement during the hearing affects the validity of his claim.

RULING:

1. The Court held that the determination of probable cause for the private respondent's indictment was a factual issue. As a general rule, the Court does not delve into and resolve factual issues unless there are cogent reasons to do so. The Court found no such circumstances present in this case, and therefore, upheld the findings of the Secretary of Justice and the Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that there was probable cause for the private respondent's indictment for perjury.

2. The elements of perjury are present in this case. The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter, made before a competent officer, and intentionally and knowingly asserted a false statement.

3. The statement made by the accused, declaring that it was the petitioner who invited him to a conference, is false. The truth is that it was Gonzales who did so.

4. The contradictory sworn statements of the accused are not sufficient to establish perjury. The prosecution must prove which statement is false and must show the falsity by other evidence.

5. The issue of who called for a conference is not material in this case as it does not affect the merits or credibility of the parties' contentions. The parties agreed to settle the case amicably.

6. The private respondent cannot be held liable for perjury since it was Borgonia, not the petitioner, who prepared the compromise agreement. The petitioner's role as senior vice president and assistant general manager gave him supervision and control over agreements prepared by Borgonia, but it was Borgonia who made the insertions in the agreement. The private respondent's allegation that the petitioner prepared the agreement cannot be considered a deliberate falsehood.

7. The Court is not convinced that the petitioner and the private respondent agreed to use the BIS report as the basis for the price policy and structure of HTC. While they agreed on certain aspects of the case, such as the need to adjust and revise the price policy and structure of HTC, they could not agree on the base price. The petitioner insisted on the amount recommended by the BIS, while the private respondent insisted on a different amount. They reached a compromise to base the determination of the price on the provisions of the relevant law and its implementing rules.

8. The agreement of HTC not to be bound by the findings of the BIS for the revision of its price policy and structure is valid. The findings of the BIS are only prima facie and not conclusive. HTC was given the opportunity to base its price policy and structure on evidence and information other than those in the BIS report. The base value to be used by HTC in revising its price policy would also be scrutinized and resolved by the Commission, the Special Committee, and the Court of Tax Appeals on appeal. Therefore, HTC did not commit any falsehood when it declared that it agreed to use R.A. No. 7843 and its implementing rules to determine the base price for the revision of its price policy and structure.

9. The process agreed upon by the petitioner and the private respondent is practical, fair, and in accordance with the law. The private respondent did not commit any fraud or deceit when he signed the Compromise Agreement. The private respondent stated that he trusted the petitioner and had no reason to believe that any surreptitious insertion would be made in the hard copy of the agreement. His failure to object to the offending phrase for a considerable period of time does not amount to an admission or estoppel. Therefore, the private respondent was not deceived into signing the Compromise Agreement.

10. The private respondent cannot be indicted for perjury. The private respondent tried to contact the petitioner several times before filing the Urgent Motion and signing the Affidavit of Merit. The petitioner's failure to return his calls reinforced the private respondent's suspicion that the insertion of the offending phrase in the compromise agreement was deliberate. Lack of probable cause prevents the private respondent from being charged with perjury.

11. The private respondent's failure to object to the compromise agreement during the hearing does not affect the validity of his claim. The petitioner failed to submit records of the hearing showing that the private respondent did not object to the agreement. Therefore, the Court affirms the Decision of the Court of Appeals and denies the petitioner's petition. Costs are awarded against the petitioner.

PRINCIPLES:

• Probable cause for filing a criminal information requires facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

• The determination of probable cause is within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation, and their findings are accorded high respect.

• Perjury is defined and penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and its perpetration may affect the concerns of the parties before a tribunal.

• Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation on a material matter.

• Perjury requires the elements of a false statement made under oath, before a competent officer, intentionally and knowingly asserting a falsehood, and the statement is required by law or made for a legal purpose.

• Perjury cannot be willful if the oath is made according to belief or conviction as to its truth.

• A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon contradictory sworn statements. The prosecution must provide corroboration of the contradictory testimony.

• The term "material matter" refers to the main fact subject of inquiry or any circumstance that tends to prove or corroborate that fact.

• The issue of who called for a conference may not be material if it does not affect the merits of the parties' contentions and the parties have reached a settlement.

• Only the person who prepared or caused to prepare a document should be charged for perjury.

• Agreements prepared by a subordinate, under the supervision and control of a superior, can be considered as having the imprimatur of the superior.

• Compromise agreements should accurately reflect the agreement reached by the parties and should not contain insertions without the consent of the other party.

• Agreements should be based on the actual agreement reached by the parties and not on third-party reports or recommendations, unless agreed upon by the parties.

• Findings of the BIS are only prima facie and not conclusive.

• Parties can agree to base price policy and structure on evidence other than the BIS report.

• The base value to be used in revising price policy will be scrutinized and resolved by the Commission, the Special Committee, and the Court of Tax Appeals on appeal.

• Agreement to use R.A. No. 7843 and its implementing rules for determining the base price is valid.

• Failure to object to a contract provision does not automatically amount to admission or estoppel.

• Fraud or deceit must involve the deliberate act of deceiving the other party.

• Lack of probable cause prevents indictment for perjury.

• Failure to object to a compromise agreement during a hearing does not necessarily affect the validity of a claim.