FACTS:

Respondent Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing, Inc. insured its buildings and supplies against fire with several insurance companies. A fire occurred on August 1, 1998, resulting in claims being made against the insurance policies. Lavine was initially represented by Harish C. Ramnani, but his authority was withdrawn and Chandru C. Ramnani was appointed in his stead. The insurance companies required Lavine to sign a Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss and Subrogation Agreement, but only Harish signed the document while the other directors refused. Certain insurance companies released the proceeds directly to Equitable Bank, prompting Chandru to file a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. Intervention was later granted to Harish, Jose F. Manacop, Chandru P. Pessumal, Maureen M. Ramnani, and Salvador Cortez, who asserted that they were Lavine's incumbent directors and that Harish was the authorized representative. The insurance companies filed their respective answers, with Rizal Surety willing to pay the insurance proceeds to the rightful claimant and Equitable Bank claiming entitlement to the proceeds as the beneficiary of the insurance policies. First Lepanto alleged that it withheld payment of the balance of its share in the proceeds until the rightful claimant was determined. PhilFire admitted liability but withheld payment until the rightful claimant was determined. TICO did not file an answer and was declared in default. The case also involved allegations of Lavine's liabilities to Equitable Bank, the release of real estate mortgages, and the role of Harish and Maureen Ramnani as sureties.

In January 22, 2001, Lavine filed a complaint against various insurance companies and Equitable Bank for non-payment of insurance proceeds and indemnity bonds. The intervenors, Harish and Maureen Ramnani, also filed an Answer-in-Intervention claiming that Lavine acquired further loans from the bank for the years 1998 and 1999.

In April 2, 2002, the trial court dismissed Lavine's complaint but ordered the defendant banks and insurance companies to pay Lavine the unpaid insurance proceeds with interest. The trial court also issued a writ of execution pending appeal, which was implemented on May 21, 2002. First Lepanto and PhilFire separately filed petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court's order granting execution pending appeal and the writ of execution.

Rizal Surety pursued an ordinary appeal from the trial court's decision, but the trial court later directed the implementation of the writ of execution against QBE Insurance, the transferee of Rizal Surety's operations. The petitions for certiorari were consolidated before the Court of Appeals' Tenth Division, which granted Lavine's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the writ of execution.

Equitable Bank filed an Amended and/or Supplemental Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, arguing that the trial court's order and the writ of execution should be set aside. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Equitable Bank, set aside the trial court's decision, and declared the Special Order and Writ of Execution null and void. The case was remanded to the lower court for a pre-trial conference on the Second Amended Answer-in-Intervention and subsequent pleadings. The appellate court also ordered that if Lavine is entitled to the insurance policy proceeds, payment should be withheld pending the resolution of the dispute on the rightful members of the Board of Directors, which is pending before the intra-corporate court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petitions for certiorari filed by Equitable Bank and Lavine.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in voiding the trial court's decision for lack of pre-trial on the petitioners' amended answer-in-intervention.

3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petitioners, who are the rightful members of the board of directors, cannot intervene in the action filed by Lavine.

4. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court's decision and frustrating its findings on Equitable Bank's entitlement to claim the insurance proceeds.

5. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in voiding the writ of execution pending appeal.

6. Whether the remedy of certiorari is available to Equitable Bank and Lavine despite the availability of an appeal.

7. Whether there are valid and exceptional circumstances that justify immediate resort to certiorari.

8. Whether the certiorari petitions of Equitable Bank and Lavine should be struck down for being anathema to the orderly administration of justice.

9. Whether the appeals of the other respondents should be allowed to proceed.

10. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petitions filed by PhilFire and First Lepanto.

11. Whether the execution pending appeal should be granted based on the admitted liabilities of the insurance companies.

12. Whether the appeals are merely dilatory and whether Lavine's financial distress justifies execution pending appeal.

13. • Whether the Special Order dated May 17, 2002 and the Writ of Execution dated May 20, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court are null and void.

RULING:

1. The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petitions for certiorari filed by Equitable Bank and Lavine since appeal was a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy from the trial court's decision.

2. The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of a judgment on the merits is appeal, even if there are errors in the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, certiorari is not the proper remedy in this case.

3. Equitable Bank failed to show any valid or extraordinary circumstance that would warrant immediate resort to certiorari. Allegations of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge and questionable rulings may not be corrected through certiorari.

4. The certiorari petitions of Equitable Bank and Lavine are struck down for being anathema to the orderly administration of justice.

5. The appeals of the other respondents are allowed to proceed.

6. The Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course and in granting the petitions filed by PhilFire and First Lepanto.

7. The execution pending appeal should not be granted based on the admitted liabilities of the insurance companies.

8. The appeals are not merely dilatory and Lavine's financial distress does not justify execution pending appeal.

9. • The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in declaring null and void the Special Order and Writ of Execution of the Regional Trial Court.

PRINCIPLES:

• Simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 cannot be allowed since one remedy would cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari. For certiorari to prosper, it must be shown that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• The remedy to reverse a judgment on the merits is appeal, even in cases where there are errors in the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

• Certiorari is not the proper remedy if there is an appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available.

• The remedy of certiorari may be allowed even with the availability of an appeal in exceptional cases where valid and compelling considerations warrant it or where rigid application of the rules would result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.

• Forum-shopping is prohibited and condemned, as it constitutes improper conduct and tends to degrade the administration of justice. It involves seeking another opinion in a different forum after an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum.

• Rules against forum-shopping seek to avoid the pernicious effect of filing multiple petitions dealing with the same subject matter, issues, and parties.

• Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good reasons.

• The fact that the losing party had also appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari proceedings for premature execution.

• Only judgments that have become final and executory may be executed, but discretionary execution of appealed judgments may be allowed under certain requisites.

• Admission of liabilities and willingness to deliver the proceeds to the proper party militate against execution pending appeal.

• The appeal is not considered dilatory unless it is determined by the appellate court.

• A juridical entity's precarious financial condition does not warrant immediate execution and does not outweigh the policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments.

• The principle of nullity of a special order and writ of execution can be invoked when they are issued without jurisdiction or in excess thereof.

• A writ of execution issued by a court without jurisdiction is void and may be set aside even after its satisfaction.