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JOSE C. MIRANDA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The case involves the preventive suspension of petitioner Jose C. Miranda, the Mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, for alleged violations of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a complaint against Mayor Miranda for committing acts despite the suspension order, claiming that he committed the felony of usurpation of authority. Mayor Miranda argued that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good faith, and that he received a memorandum from the Department of Interior and Local Government instructing him to vacate his office, which he complied with. Special Prosecution Officer Coquia recommended the dismissal of the case based on Miranda's good faith, but the Chief Legal Counsel of the Ombudsman disagreed. The Ombudsman adopted the Chief Legal Counsel's recommendation and the case was re-raffled to another prosecutor, who filed an amended Information. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to suspend Mayor Miranda for 90 days, which he opposed, and he filed a petition to challenge the Sandiganbayan's orders of preventive suspension, arguing that the offense he was charged with did not fall within the grounds for suspension under the law.

The petitioner allegedly assumed the duties and functions of the Office of the Mayor during his suspension, creating disruption and chaos in the government and causing confusion among employees and the public. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the petitioner's acts constituted "fraud upon government" under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan also held that the suspension of a public officer is mandatory once the validity of the information has been determined. The petitioner appealed the Sandiganbayan's ruling.

The petitioner, who was charged with usurpation of authority and official functions, filed a motion to suspend himself pendente lite, which was granted by the Sandiganbayan. He filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the charge against him does not fall under the catchall provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion and upheld the suspension, finding that the petitioner's actions indirectly involved the city's funds and created chaos in the city government. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. He then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that there was no fraud and that he honestly believed he was no longer under preventive suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's ruling, holding that the conclusions were supported by the record and that the issue of fraud was essentially factual. The Court also rejected the petitioner's claim of honest belief.

In another case involving a different petitioner who was a barangay chairman, he received a memorandum directing him to vacate his position, but he initially refused to comply. He eventually did so, claiming that he immediately complied, but his own admission contradicted this statement. The petitioner relied on the defense of honest belief, which was previously rejected in a 1956 case.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether petitioner's refusal to leave his position despite the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez constitutes usurpation of public authority.

  2. Whether petitioner's excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension, that he followed the advice of his lawyer, is valid.

  3. Whether the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

  4. Whether the Amended Information sufficiently apprised the petitioner of the offense charged against him.

  5. Whether the Ombudsman's authority to preventively suspend local elective officials is limited by Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code.

  6. Whether the Local Government Code applies to cases of preventive suspension initiated by the Ombudsman.

  7. Whether the Ombudsman's imposition of a 6-month preventive suspension violates the Local Government Code.

  8. Whether the six-month preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

  9. Whether the preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman is governed by the Local Government Code or the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

  10. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Resolution of 4 February 2002, which preventively suspended the petitioner for 90 days.

  11. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or an amendment of the Ombudsman's enabling law by the legislature.

RULING:

  1. Yes, petitioner's refusal to leave his position despite the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez constitutes usurpation of public authority. Petitioner's own admission contradicts his assertion that he immediately complied with the memorandum. It is further established in the case of People v. Hilvano that there is no excuse for a public official to continue holding a position after being apprised of the lawful order to vacate the position.

  2. No, petitioner's excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension, that he followed the advice of his lawyer, is not valid. If petitioner and his counsel had respect for the rule of law, they should have challenged the validity of the suspension order in court instead of taking the law into their own hands.

  3. The petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The irregular procedure followed by the dissenting opinion in raising this issue motu proprio is improper and goes against the Rules of Court. It is the petitioner's responsibility to raise this objection in a motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars before entering his plea.

  4. The Amended Information sufficiently apprised the petitioner of the offense charged against him. It described the crime in intelligible terms with sufficient particularity to enable the petitioner to understand the offense and prepare his defense. The information charged the petitioner with assuming the duties and performing acts pertaining to the office of Mayor willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly under the pretense of official position, and it also stated specific acts that constitute usurpation of official functions.

  5. The issue of the Ombudsman's authority to preventively suspend local elective officials for a certain period of time is not relevant to the case at hand. The issue before the court is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petitioner for 90 days. The validity of the Ombudsman's order of preventive suspension for 6 months is not being questioned in this case.

  6. The Court ruled that the Local Government Code does not apply to cases of preventive suspension initiated by the Ombudsman. The Court stated that while there is a valid distinction between administrative complaints initiated under the Ombudsman Law and those under the Local Government Code, such distinction is not decisive in determining whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension.

  7. The Court held that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in imposing a 6-month preventive suspension. The Court noted that the purpose for which the suspension was imposed was already served as the required documents were obtained within 24 days after the imposition of the preventive suspension.

  8. The six-month preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides a unique set of safeguards and stricter requirements for the imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman, which differentiates it from preventive suspensions imposed by executive officials. These safeguards include fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office, classification as an impeachable officer, and a requirement that the evidence of guilt is strong and that the charges involve dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, warrant removal from the service, or prejudice the case filed against the respondent. (Garcia v. Mojica)

  9. The preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman is governed by the Ombudsman Act of 1989, not the Local Government Code. The Ombudsman is a constitutionally created office and is independent from the Executive branch, thus its power of preventive suspension is governed by its enabling law. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 explicitly provides for a six-month period of preventive suspension. (Garcia v. Mojica)

  10. The instant petition is dismissed for lack of showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing its Resolution of 4 February 2002, preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Usurpation of public authority is committed by a person who, not being elected or appointed to a public office, takes upon himself the performance of any of the acts of a public officer.

  • The defense of honest belief is not valid if the person was already apprised of the correct legal position and still refuses to comply.

  • A public official should challenge the validity of an order in court rather than taking the law into their own hands.

  • Objections to the sufficiency of the allegations in an information are waived if the accused does not file a motion to quash or a motion for bill of particulars before pleading.

  • The accused has the constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

  • The validity or sufficiency of allegations in an information is determined according to the provisions of Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

  • The test in determining the sufficiency of the information is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged.

  • The purpose of preventive suspension is to prevent the accused from hiding or destroying needed documents, or harassing and preventing witnesses who wish to appear against him. The period of preventive suspension should be reasonable and necessary for the investigating authority to make its legitimate case against the accused.

  • Preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman is not governed by the limits provided in the Local Government Code.

  • The Ombudsman has the power to impose a longer period of preventive suspension compared to mayors, governors, or the President to ensure impartial proceedings.

  • The Ombudsman's power to impose preventive suspension is justified when there is strong evidence of guilt and the charges involve dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty.

  • The purpose of preventive suspension is to ensure that the suspended official cannot influence witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and evidence.

  • The duration of preventive suspension should be reasonable based on the circumstances of the case.

  • The Ombudsman's independence is protected by the Constitution and is not subject to political pressure.

  • The Ombudsman, being a constitutionally created office, is insulated from political pressure and has unique safeguards to ensure its independence. (Garcia v. Mojica)

  • The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides stricter requirements for the imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman compared to executive officials. (Garcia v. Mojica)

  • The power of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman is governed by the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and not the Local Government Code. (Garcia v. Mojica)

  • Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not warranted when there is no showing that the lower court or tribunal gravely abused its discretion.