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PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC. v. MAGDANGAL B. ELMA

FACTS:

This is an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus filed by petitioners. The action seeks to declare as null and void the concurrent appointments of respondent Magdangal B. Elma as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for being contrary to the Constitution. Respondent Ronaldo Zamora was sued in his official capacity as Executive Secretary. Respondent Elma was appointed as PCGG Chairman on 30 October 1998 and as CPLC on 11 January 1999. Petitioners argue that respondent Elma's concurrent appointments violate the provisions of the Constitution. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the prohibition against holding multiple positions only applies to heads of executive departments, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries. They also claim that there is no incompatibility between the two positions and that it is an accepted practice to appoint the CPLC among incumbent public officials. The resolution of this case had already been overtaken by supervening events, but the Court decides to resolve the case to provide guidance on the unresolved legal question of whether the PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold the position of CPLC.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether there is an incompatibility between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.

  2. Whether the appointments of the respondent as PCGG Chairman and CPLC violate the prohibition against holding multiple offices.

  3. Whether or not the prohibition on holding multiple offices under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies to the respondent.

  4. Whether or not the respondent's appointments as the PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional.

RULING:

  1. Yes, there is an incompatibility between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies, as well as reviewing investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies. Since the PCGG is an agency under the Executive Department, the actions of the PCGG Chairman, including those to be reviewed by the CPLC, create a conflict of interest and raise questions on impartiality.

  2. The prohibition against holding multiple offices is not violated in this case. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries from holding any other office or employment, does not apply to the PCGG Chairman or the CPLC, as they do not hold these specific positions. However, the respondent's appointments still need to comply with the standard of compatibility of officers under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Failing to meet this standard would render the appointments in violation of the Constitution.

  3. The court ruled that the prohibition on holding multiple offices under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to the respondent since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. However, even if the prohibition is not applicable, the court held that the respondent's appointments as the PCGG Chairman and CPLC are still unconstitutional due to the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Incompatibility between two offices exists when there is an inconsistency in the functions of the two offices, and one office has the right to interfere with the other. The key test is whether one office is subordinate to the other.

  • The prohibition against holding multiple offices under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies specifically to Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries.

  • The standard of compatibility of officers under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the concurrent appointments of a person to positions having incompatible duties and functions.

  • The language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple offices or employment.

  • There are only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office.

  • Additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions.

  • Ex-officio capacity denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.

  • The prohibition on holding multiple offices under Section 13, Article VII is not applicable to positions that are not Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, or assistant secretaries.

  • The appointments of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional due to the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices.