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VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL v. JOSE J. CAFE

FACTS:

The petitioner, Vivencio V. Jumamil, filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against the public respondents, Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte. The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution No. 7, Series of 1989 (Resolution No. 7), which appropriated funds for the construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market. Later, the petition was amended to include the passage of Resolution No. 49, Series of 1989 (Resolution No. 49), which also appropriated additional funds for the construction of additional stalls in the same public market. Prior to the passage of these resolutions, the respondent Mayor Cafe had entered into contracts with individuals who deposited P40,000 each for the construction of the stalls. The construction was completed, and the leases of the stalls were awarded through a public raffle limited to those who had made the deposits. The petition was further amended to include the 57 awardees of the stalls as private respondents. The petitioner alleged that the resolutions and leases were unconstitutional and discriminatory. The RTC dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioner to pay attorney's fees to the private respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. The constitutionality of the resolutions was never ruled upon by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The RTC dismissed the petition after the Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed in a similar case involving the same parties. The RTC adopted the ruling of the Court of Appeals in that case.

The petitioners were not parties to the agreement for the award of market stalls by the public respondents in the public market of Panabo, Davao. They claimed that as taxpayers, they had a legal interest in the controversy and brought an action for declaratory relief. However, the court ruled that one who is not a party to a contract cannot have the interest in it required for declaratory relief, as previously decided in the case of PLUM vs. Santos. Therefore, the petitioners were not entitled to bring an action for declaratory relief. The court dismissed the petition. The court also ordered the petitioners to pay attorney's fees to the 57 private respondents for unnecessarily dragging them into court. The petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that the requisites for an action for declaratory relief were not satisfied. The court also noted that the petitioners had agreed to be bound by the outcome of a previous case with the same facts and issues.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the parties were bound by the outcome in CA G.R. SP. No. 20424;

  2. Whether petitioner had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief;

  3. Whether Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional;

  4. Whether petitioner should be held liable for damages.

  5. Whether the petitioner has legal standing to question the validity of the ordinances and lease contracts.

  6. Whether the resolutions and lease contracts are discriminatory and unconstitutional.

  7. Whether the petitioner has locus standi to question the constitutionality of the enacted ordinances.

  8. Whether the parties are bound by the outcome in CA G.R. SP. No. 20424.

  9. Whether the petitioner should be held liable for damages.

RULING:

  1. The Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, dismissing the case on the ground of petitioner's lack of legal standing and the parties' agreement to be bound by the decision in CA G.R. SP. No. 20424. The Court held that petitioner did not have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of the resolutions because he did not suffer any wrong under their terms. Additionally, the Court emphasized that petitioner, who was not a party to the lease contracts, had no standing to file a petition for declaratory relief and seek judicial interpretation of the agreements. The Court also affirmed the finding that the issue was not the ordinances themselves but the award of the market stalls to the private respondents based on the contracts they individually executed with Mayor Cafe.

  2. The court held that the petitioner, as a taxpayer, has legal standing to question the validity of the ordinances and lease contracts. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. However, the petitioner failed to timely allege his interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a result of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts.

  3. The court held that the petitioner failed to prove that the resolutions and lease contracts are discriminatory and unconstitutional. There was a disputed fact regarding whether all interested individuals were invited to participate in investing their savings for the lease contracts. The petitioner should have clearly established that the ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not notified and given the opportunity to make their deposits. Moreover, there is a presumption of regularity of official duty and the policy of the court is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear showing to the contrary.

  4. The Supreme Court did not discuss the constitutionality of the enacted ordinances since the petitioner had no locus standi to question them.

  5. The parties are bound by the outcome in CA G.R. SP. No. 20424 since the petitioner had expressly agreed to be bound by the Supreme Court's decision in that case. Parties may commit to be bound by the results of another case, and courts may take judicial notice of a judgment in another case as long as the parties give their consent or do not object.

  6. The petitioner should not be held liable for damages. It is not sound public policy to penalize the exercise of the right to litigate in good faith, even if it is done erroneously. The alleged bad faith of the petitioner was not proven, and the special circumstances justifying the award of attorney's fees are not present in this case.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Declaratory relief is improper or unnecessary when the case is moot or when there is no actual controversy between parties.

  • A person challenging a governmental act must have standing, which requires a personal and substantial interest in the case that results in direct injury.

  • Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless certain requisites are satisfied, including that the person challenging the act has standing and that the issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case.

  • Legal standing or locus standi requires a party to have a personal and substantial interest in the case and to have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It cannot be based on a generalized grievance.

  • Unless a person's constitutional rights are adversely affected by a statute or ordinance, they have no legal standing to challenge it.

  • The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the central issue in the case for the court to consider it.

  • Taxpayers have legal standing to challenge the validity of ordinances and contracts involving public funds even if they are not parties to the contract.

  • Taxpayers suing as taxpayers must prove sufficient interest in preventing illegal expenditure of public funds.

  • The presumption of regularity of official duty applies in the absence of clear showing to the contrary.

  • The court avoids ruling on constitutional questions and presumes the acts of the political departments are valid.

  • Locus standi is the legal capacity to bring a case or the standing to sue.

  • The principle of separation of powers means that measures must first be carefully studied by the legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before they are enacted and approved.

  • Parties may commit to be bound by the results of another case.

  • Courts may take judicial notice of a judgment in another case as long as the parties give their consent or do not object.

  • It is not sound public policy to put a premium on the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, even if it is done erroneously.