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PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK v. SPS. PEDRITO BERMOY

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Savings Bank filed a complaint against respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy for estafa through falsification of a public document. The accused prepared, forged, and falsified a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and obtained a loan from Philippine Savings Bank using the forged document. The prosecution presented evidence during the trial, and the defense filed a demurrer to evidence claiming insufficiency of evidence and lack of proper identification of the accused. The trial court granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case. The prosecution sought reconsideration but was denied. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition. The petitioner argues that the identities of the accused were clearly established through the stipulation of facts. However, the acquittal of the accused cannot be reviewed as it would violate their constitutional right against double jeopardy.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the trial court committed an error by not ensuring that the accused signed the pre-trial order or agreement embodying the admissions of the respondent spouses.

  2. Whether the trial court's failure to require the accused to sign the pre-trial order is a ground for the dismissal of the case.

  3. Whether the trial court committed an error in not requiring the accused to sign the pre-trial order.

  4. Whether the matters stated in the pre-trial order should be considered as binding stipulations by the parties.

  5. Whether the accused were sufficiently identified during the trial by the witness of the prosecution.

  6. Whether double jeopardy had attached in the case.

  7. Whether the Court can inquire into the merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses because the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was void.

  8. Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disregarded evidence allegedly proving respondent spouses' identity.

RULING:

  1. The Court ruled that the trial court did not commit an error in failing to require the accused to sign the pre-trial order. Under Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is not required for the prosecution or the accused to sign the pre-trial order. The trial court's duty is to hold a pre-trial conference, issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated upon by the parties, and evidence marked. If there were any agreements or admissions made during the pre-trial conference, these should be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his or her counsel. However, the trial court is not obligated to remind the parties to sign the pre-trial order.

  2. The Court held that the trial court committed no error in not requiring the accused to sign the pre-trial order. The private prosecutor should have required any admission in writing and signed by the accused and their counsel as required by the rules.

  3. The Court found no merit in the argument that the matters stated in the pre-trial order should be considered as binding stipulations by the parties.

  4. The Court upheld the determination of the trial court that the accused were not sufficiently identified during the trial by the prosecution's witness.

  5. The Court held that double jeopardy had attached in the case based on the elements required in Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The Information against the accused was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, the court had jurisdiction over the case and the accused, the accused had been arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

  6. The Court cannot inquire into the merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses. The rule barring appeals from judgments of acquittal admits of an exception but is limited to cases where the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process or where the trial was a sham. In this case, there is no dispute that the prosecution was afforded its day in court and the proceedings were genuine. Any error committed by the trial court on the appreciation of evidence can only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. The judgment of the trial court, even if flawed, is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion and is therefore not null and void.

PRINCIPLES:

  • The trial court's failure to ensure that the accused signed the pre-trial order does not invalidate the agreements or admissions made during the pre-trial conference. It is the responsibility of the parties' counsels to require the accused to sign the pre-trial order. (Rule 118, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)

  • A dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence, based on insufficiency of evidence, amounts to an acquittal and invokes double jeopardy. (Paragraph 1, Section 7, Rule 117)

  • The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if the accused is charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, the accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after being convicted or acquitted, or the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case. (Section 2, Rule 122)

  • The courts are barred from reviewing an appeal seeking an inquiry into the merits of a dismissal or an order of acquittal, as it would violate the right to be free from double jeopardy.

  • An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The absolute nature of acquittals is important in the criminal justice system to protect the innocent against wrongful conviction.

  • The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is the need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability.

  • The defendant has an interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. Society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to prevent government oppression. The fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the state should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process.