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EMMANUEL YMSON VELASCO v. JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES

FACTS:

The case involves multiple complaints filed by Emmanuel Ymson Velasco against Judge Adoracion G. Angeles. Complainant was the investigating prosecutor in a criminal complaint for child abuse filed against respondent by her grandniece. Complainant issued a Resolution recommending respondent's indictment. In response, respondent filed an administrative complaint against complainant, accusing him of various offenses.

The complaints in the present case are based on the contents of the petition for review filed by respondent, as well as her actions before and during the pendency of the case. The charges against respondent include misquoting complainant, using intemperate language in pleadings, committing acts of child abuse, visiting the Secretary of Justice while her case was pending, falsifying public documents, causing the execution of a false affidavit, assailing the dignity of a Supreme Court Justice, and utilizing RTC sheriffs to serve pleadings.

Complainant specifically alleges that respondent falsely and maliciously accused him of falsification and manifest partiality in the petition for review. Respondent admits modifying statements in the petition for review but justifies it as a means of pursuing her argument against complainant.

The complainant filed multiple complaints against the respondent, a judge, before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and the Office of the President. One of the complaints involved the alleged falsification of a document by the respondent. The copy submitted by the respondent as evidence in her administrative complaint against the complainant did not contain the signature or stamp mark of a public prosecutor. The complainant alleged that the respondent altered the markings on the document to hide that it was subscribed before him on a certain date.

Another complaint involved the respondent's use of intemperate language in her pleadings. The complainant accused the respondent of maliciously besmirching his reputation and mocking the judiciary's efforts to strengthen the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The complainant filed a petition for indirect contempt, accusing the respondent of using intemperate language and attacking the dignity and stature of the Supreme Court and a retired justice.

The complainant, Michael Vistan, filed an administrative complaint against the respondent, Judge Liza Marie R. Picardal-Tecson, for various acts of misconduct. One of the issues raised by the complainant was that the respondent failed to produce proof of the Supreme Court's dismissal of the administrative aspect of a child abuse case. The respondent, instead of providing a copy of the decision, made remarks implying that the complainant had inside information about the case due to his alleged connection with Justice Bellosillo.

Another complaint filed against the respondent was for violation of R.A. 7610, the Anti-Child Abuse Law. The complainant accused the respondent of forcing the victim, Mercedes, to sign a perjured affidavit and introduced it as evidence. The respondent denied the allegations and presented an affidavit from Mercedes claiming that she was treated well in the respondent's household.

The complainant presented various pieces of evidence to support the charges against the respondent, including a Joint Resolution recommending the respondent's indictment for violation of R.A. 7610. However, medical certificates of the alleged victims were not admitted due to lack of proof of authenticity.

Respondent submitted an affidavit to refute the allegations made by the alleged victims. Later on, the complainant presented a second affidavit from a witness supporting the allegations of the alleged victims. The complainant argued that the respondent coerced the witness, who was only nine years old at the time, to sign the first affidavit containing false information.

Respondent claimed that the allegations against her were hearsay and that the witness willingly signed the second affidavit expressing outrage against the alleged victims. Respondent also argued that the dismissal of a previous case indicated doubts about the veracity of the evidence presented by the complainant.

In addition to the charges related to child abuse, the complainant also accused respondent of visiting the office of the Secretary of Justice during office hours while her petition for review was pending before the DOJ. The complainant alleged that respondent personally met with the Secretary of Justice and that the Secretary subsequently issued a memorandum requesting action on respondent's case.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not the respondent coerced and forced the complainants to submit false affidavits, thus committing perjury.

  2. Whether or not the respondent improperly took advantage of her relationship with the Secretary of Justice to expedite the resolution of her pending petition for review.

  3. Whether or not the respondent maliciously accused the complainant of suppressing evidence in a case to the government's prejudice.

  4. Whether respondent is guilty of using intemperate language in her pleadings.

  5. Whether there was misquotation and deliberate assertion of falsehood on the part of respondent.

  6. Whether respondent should be held liable for alleging that complainant suppressed evidence.

  7. Whether the respondent's alteration of markings on an affidavit constitutes falsification of a public document.

  8. Whether there is substantial evidence to support the charge of violation of R.A. 7610 against Gaspar and Pacay.

  9. Whether respondent coerced or forced Mercedes to execute a false affidavit.

  10. Whether respondent's visit to Secretary Tuquero during office hours constitutes improper conduct.

  11. Whether the respondent is guilty of influencing the outcome of her complaint.

  12. Whether the respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

  13. Whether the respondent used her official position or professional relationship to influence her pending petition.

  14. Whether the respondent's use of office hours to visit the DOJ was justified.

  15. Whether the respondent caused sheriffs to serve her pleadings for her personal benefit.

  16. Whether the respondent's use of intemperate language is below the standard expected of an officer of the court.

  17. Whether the respondent Judge's use of intemperate language in her pleadings violated the standards expected of an officer of the court.

  18. Whether the respondent's statements questioning the integrity of a Supreme Court Associate Justice warranted the finding of indirect contempt against her.

RULING:

  1. The Supreme Court found that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent coerced and forced the complainants to submit false affidavits. Thus, the respondent did not commit perjury.

  2. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent did not improperly take advantage of her relationship with the Secretary of Justice. The visit to the Secretary of Justice's office was unplanned and accidental.

  3. The Supreme Court held that the respondent maliciously accused the complainant of suppressing evidence in a case to the government's prejudice. The accusations were baseless and tarnished the complainant's reputation as a public prosecutor.

  4. The Court held that respondent is guilty of using intemperate language in her pleadings.

  5. The Court found no misquotation and deliberate assertion of falsehood on the part of respondent.

  6. The Court cannot hold respondent liable for alleging that complainant suppressed evidence as it was relevant to the cause of action in her administrative complaint against complainant and was based on conversations with a judge who had concerns over complainant's presentation of evidence.

  7. The charge of falsification is dismissed. The alteration of markings on the affidavit by the respondent does not change the meaning of the document or cause it to state a falsity. The markings were made merely for the purpose of identifying the affidavit as an attachment to the respondent's pleadings.

  8. The charge of violation of R.A. 7610 against Gaspar and Pacay is dismissed. Complainant failed to present substantial evidence supporting the charges, as the complainant was not involved in the investigation or prosecution of Gaspar and Pacay's case.

  9. There is no conclusive evidence that the affidavits executed by Mercedes are false. There is no proof that the respondent directly influenced or coerced Mercedes to sign the first affidavit. The execution of the first affidavit is presumed regular, and there is no evidence showing that the second affidavit executed by Oliva was false or executed under fear or compulsion.

  10. The respondent's visit to Secretary Tuquero during office hours does not constitute improper conduct. There is no evidence to support the claim that the visit was an attempt to influence the outcome of the respondent's pending petition for review.

  11. The Court found no evidence that the respondent is guilty of influencing the outcome of her complaint.

  12. The Court found no violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

  13. The Court found no basis to hold the respondent responsible for using her official position or professional relationship to influence her pending petition.

  14. The Court justified the respondent's use of office hours to visit the DOJ, considering that it only took several minutes and the Supreme Court complex is adjacent to the DOJ building.

  15. The Court accepted the respondent's explanation that she requested sheriffs Mariano and Salayon to serve her pleadings to the DOJ because they had official business in the area. The Court found no evidence to show that the respondent acted in manifest bad faith and caused undue injury.

  16. The Court acknowledged that the respondent used intemperate language in her pleadings, but found that her comments on the complainant's thesis did not suggest acts of corruption. However, the Court noted that the respondent's use of disrespectful language in her pleadings is below the standard expected of an officer of the court.

  17. The Court reprimanded the respondent Judge for her use of intemperate language in her pleadings. However, the Court did not agree that her actions warranted the finding of indirect contempt against her. The Court dismissed all the other charges against the respondent.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Perjury requires a showing that the accused knowingly and willfully made a false statement under oath or executed a false affidavit.

  • Taking advantage of a personal relationship with a government official does not automatically constitute improper conduct, unless there is evidence of abuse of such relationship.

  • Making baseless accusations that tarnish the reputation of another person may constitute malicious imputation of a crime or serious offense under the Revised Penal Code.

  • An act unrelated to a judge's discharge of judicial functions may give rise to administrative liability even when such act constitutes a violation of penal law.

  • The quantum of proof required for administrative liability is only substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

  • Criminal and civil cases are different from administrative matters, and the dismissal or conviction in one does not automatically warrant a finding of guilt or innocence in another.

  • Criminal and civil cases are different from administrative matters and must be disposed of according to the applicable facts and law.

  • Falsification of a public document requires an alteration or intercalation that changes the meaning of the document and causes it to state a falsity.

  • In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving the allegations by substantial evidence.

  • Charges based on mere speculation or second-hand information are not given credence in administrative complaints against a judge.

  • The execution of an affidavit enjoys the presumption of regularity in the absence of concrete proof to the contrary.

  • Coercion or force must be proven, and authority or moral ascendancy does not automatically imply coercion or force.

  • It is not necessary for judges to live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable for them to continue mingling in social intercourse and attending meetings of members of the bar, as long as it does not disrupt the dispensation of justice.

  • Filing a letter or motion for early resolution is a privilege of every party to a case.

  • Justifying the use of office hours for a short visit if related to official business.

  • The use of disrespectful language in pleadings is below the standard expected of an officer of the court.

  • A judge must behave in a manner that his or her conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny.

  • The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system.

  • The use of intemperate language in pleadings is below the standard expected of an officer of the court.

  • Questioning the integrity of an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court casts a shadow on the dignity and integrity of the Supreme Court as the highest court of the land.