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VILLASEÑOR AND MESA v. SANDIGANBAYAN ET AL.

FACTS:

On August 18, 2001, a fire broke out at the Quezon City Manor Hotel, resulting in the death of 74 people. Petitioners, who were officials of the City Engineering Office of Quezon City, were charged both criminally and administratively for their alleged negligence in connection with the hotel fire. They were facing criminal charges for multiple homicide through reckless imprudence and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In the administrative case, two separate orders were issued, suspending petitioners Villaseñor and Mesa for a period of six months. Respondent special prosecutor Louella Mae Oco-Pesquera filed a motion for suspension pendente lite of petitioners in the criminal case. Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing that their preventive suspension in the administrative case, based on the same set of facts, already covered any potential preventive suspension in the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for suspension and ordered the suspension of petitioners for a period of 90 days. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. They filed a petition for certiorari, raising the issue of whether the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering their suspension in the criminal case despite their previous administrative suspension based on the same facts and circumstances.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is mandatory.

  2. Whether the suspension of public officials during the pendency of criminal prosecution affects the administrative proceedings against them.

  3. Is preventive suspension a penalty or a preventive measure?

  4. Should the provision on preventive suspension be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused?

  5. What is the maximum duration of preventive suspension?

RULING:

  1. Yes, preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is mandatory. The law unequivocally provides that accused public officials "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that preventive suspension is mandatory and there are no exceptions to this requirement.

  2. No, the suspension of public officials during the pendency of criminal prosecution does not affect the administrative proceedings against them. Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. The remedies available against a public officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and duties are civil, criminal, and administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously, or successively. The defeat of any of these remedies does not preclude resort to other remedies. Administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.

  3. Preventive suspension is only a preventive measure and not a penalty. Its purpose is to prevent the accused from using his position and powers to influence witnesses or tamper with records. Once the investigation establishes the charges and the person is found guilty, then the penalty of suspension, removal, or dismissal may be imposed.

  4. The provision on preventive suspension is not a penal provision but a procedural one. Therefore, the strict construction rule does not apply.

  5. The maximum duration of preventive suspension is ninety (90) days, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 807, now Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is mandatory.

  • Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other.

  • Criminal actions will not preclude administrative proceedings, and vice-versa, insofar as the application of the law on preventive suspension is concerned.

  • Preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself but merely a measure of precaution to separate the charged employee from office during the investigation.

  • Preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preventive measure.

  • Procedural statutes are to be liberally construed, while penal statutes are strictly construed.

  • Preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days.