FACTS:

On January 1, 1994, Adelina Borbe was in her house in Tabaco, Albay, watching over her sick child. In the early morning, she heard noise and saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos, and Antonio Cornel, Jr., congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut on fire. Instead of helping her, the four fled. Olipiano Berjuela, who was nearby, heard Adelina scream for help and saw the accused jumping over a fence. He was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos, and Antonio Cornel, Jr. as the culprits. On complaint of Adelina, the accused were charged with arson. The trial court found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson and sentenced them to an indeterminate penalty. The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that they should be found guilty only of simple arson instead of arson of an inhabited house. The CA affirmed the conviction and modified the penalty, finding the accused guilty of simple arson. Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising issues on the use of circumstantial evidence and the existence of conspiracy in the case.

ISSUES:

1. What is the legislative history of the body of laws on arson in the Philippines?

2. What are the penalties for different types of arson offenses and their corresponding aggravating circumstances?

3. What are the circumstances that constitute prima facie evidence of arson?

4. What is the punishment for conspiracy to commit arson?

5. What is the consequence of arson in relation to the confiscated property?

6. Whether the circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to prove the petitioners' guilt for the crime of arson.

7. Whether conspiracy was correctly appreciated by the trial and appellate courts.

8. Whether there was conspiracy among the accused

9. Whether the information sufficiently alleged the offense charged

10. Whether the applicable law for the crime of arson committed by the accused is Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code or Section 3, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree 1613.

11. Whether the accused should be held liable for simple arson or destructive arson.

12. Whether the accused should be charged with destructive arson or simple arson.

13. What is the proper penalty for the crime committed.

14. Whether or not Special Order No. 497, which promoted certain police officers, is valid.

15. Whether or not the Police Commission has the authority to promulgate and implement the said Special Order.

RULING:

1. The legislative history of the laws on arson in the Philippines can be traced back to the Revised Penal Code and subsequent amendments. President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1613 on March 7, 1979, which replaced the penal code provisions on arson. An amendment was later made through Presidential Decree No. 1744 on November 11, 1980, expanding the definition of destructive arson and allowing for the imposition of capital punishment on destructive arsonists.

2. The penalties for different types of arson offenses are as follows:

3. • Arson: Punished by prision mayor.
4. • Destructive Arson: Punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
5. • Other Cases of Arson: Punished by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
6. • Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson: The penalty for arson shall be imposed in its maximum period if committed with the intent to gain, for the benefit of another, if the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned, or if committed by a syndicate.
7. • Where Death Results from Arson: Punished by reclusion perpetua to death.

8. The circumstances that constitute prima facie evidence of arson are as follows:

9. • Simultaneous fire in more than one part of the building or establishment.
10. • Substantial amount of flammable substances or materials stored in the building.
11. • Presence of gasoline, kerosene, petroleum, or other flammable or combustible substances or materials soaked therewith or containers thereof, or any contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing in the ruins or premises of the burned building or property.
12. • Building or property insured for substantially more than its actual value.
13. • Occurrence of more than two fires in the same or other premises owned or controlled by the offender and/or insured.
14. • Withdrawal of a substantial portion of the insured effects from the premises shortly before the fire, except in the ordinary course of business.
15. • Demand for money or other valuable consideration made before the fire in exchange for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of other person or property of the victim.

16. Conspiracy to commit arson is punished by prision mayor in its minimum period.

17. The building which is the object of arson, including the land on which it is situated, shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner can prove that they have no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite exercising due diligence.

18. Yes. The circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to prove the petitioners' guilt for the crime of arson. The combination of circumstances, such as the noise heard by the complainant, the presence of the petitioners and their co-accused in front of the house, the fire that quickly ensued, and the flight of the petitioners and their cohorts, leads to the conclusion that the petitioners were the ones responsible for the burning of the hut.

19. Yes. Conspiracy was correctly appreciated by the trial and appellate courts. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rely on direct evidence and may instead be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them. In this case, the coordinated action of the petitioners and their co-accused supports the finding of conspiracy.

20. The Supreme Court held that conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the accused. Their joint purpose and design were shown by their coordinated actions before and after the commission of the crime. The acts of one became the act of all, and thus each of the accused was deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.

21. The Supreme Court ruled that the information failed to sufficiently allege that the house burned by the accused was an inhabited house or dwelling. The information only stated that the accused willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house, without specifying that it was an inhabited house or dwelling. This was a fatal defect in the information.

22. The applicable law for the crime of arson committed by the accused is Section 3, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree 1613. The Court held that the properties burned by the accused were specifically described as houses, which are contemplated as inhabited houses or dwellings under the said law. Therefore, the applicable law should be Section 3, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree 1613, and not Article 320, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

23. The accused should be held liable for simple arson. The Court explained that the acts committed by the accused do not appear to be heinous or represent a greater degree of perversity and viciousness compared to those acts punishable under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the offense to destructive arson. Therefore, the accused must be held guilty of simple arson penalized under Section 3, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.

24. The accused should be charged with simple arson. The distinction between destructive arson and simple arson lies in the degree of perversity or viciousness of the offender. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson. In this case, the accused was charged with intentionally burning the residential house of Roberto Separa, which subsequently spread and destroyed seven adjoining houses. Therefore, the crime committed falls under simple arson.

25. The penalty for simple arson is reclusion perpetua. Since there are no aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, the imposable penalty on the accused is reclusion perpetua. The court also applies the Indeterminate Sentence Law, with the maximum indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and the minimum of the indeterminate sentence being prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.

26. Yes, Special Order No. 497 promoting certain police officers is valid. The Supreme Court held that the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Chief Executive of the country, has the power to make appointments and promotions in the police force. The Court further ruled that the President's power to delegate extends to the Commanders of the Philippine National Police (PNP) as his alter ego.

27. Yes, the Police Commission has the authority to promulgate and implement Special Order No. 497. The Court emphasized that the Police Commission is mandated by law to administer and control the PNP, including its power to appoint, promote, and discipline its members. The Court also recognized that the Police Commission's power to issue special orders is necessary for the efficient administration and effective functioning of the PNP.

PRINCIPLES:

• The law on arson in the Philippines has undergone several amendments, with the most significant being Presidential Decree No. 1613 and Presidential Decree No. 1744.

• Different types of arson offenses carry varying penalties, depending on the circumstances and the property burned.

• Prima facie evidence of arson includes specific circumstances that suggest the intentional nature of the fire.

• Conspiracy to commit arson is a separate offense with its own prescribed penalty.

• Confiscation and escheat of the property may occur if the owner cannot prove non-involvement in the arson despite exercising due diligence.

• Conspiracy may be established by the coordinated actions and joint purpose of the accused.

• It is not necessary to show an explicit agreement or prior agreement for conspiracy to exist.

• Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence.

• Criminal undertakings are rarely documented by written agreements.

• The information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances to properly charge the accused.

• Rules of criminal procedure may be given retroactive application if they benefit the accused.

• Penal laws should be construed strictly against the government and literally in favor of the accused in case of ambiguity in their construction.

• The elements of arson under Section 3, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree 1613 are: (a) intentional burning, and (b) the intentional burning of an inhabited house or dwelling.

• Destructive arson is distinguished from simple arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the offender. Destructive arson constitutes heinous crimes with grievous, odious, and hateful offenses, while simple arson contemplates crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that are punishable with a lesser penalty.

• Acts falling under simple arson may be converted into destructive arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.

• Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of various structures, while Presidential Decree 1613 covers the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

• Simple arson is distinguished from destructive arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the offender.

• The applicable law for determining the penalty for arson is Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for simple arson.

• In case of ambiguity in the construction of penal laws, such laws shall be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.

• The description of the crime charged and the particular facts in the information are controlling, regardless of the title of the complaint or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law allegedly violated.

• The President's power to appoint and promote extends to the police force under his control as the Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive.

• The President may delegate his appointing and promoting authority to the Commanders of the Philippine National Police.

• The Police Commission is mandated by law to administer and control the PNP, including its power to appoint, promote, and discipline its members.

• The Police Commission has the authority to issue special orders for the efficient administration and effective functioning of the PNP.