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EDGAR Y. TEVES v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The case involves Edgar Y. Teves, the former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves who were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of violating Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charge against them stemmed from their alleged unlawful intervention, in his official capacity, in the issuance of a license for the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center, a business enterprise in which they have a pecuniary interest. The indictment stated that Edgar Y. Teves, as the Municipal Mayor, caused the issuance of the business permit to operate the cockpit in favor of one Daniel Teves, despite having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the said enterprise together with his wife Teresita Teves. The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners based on their possession of pecuniary interest in the business enterprise, supported by the fact that Teresita Teves was registered as the "owner/licensee" of the cockpit and the presumption of a conjugal partnership of gains since the husband and wife remained married until 1992. The Sandiganbayan absolved them of the charge of causing the issuance of the business permit. The petitioners appealed the decision, arguing that they were convicted of an offense different from the one they were charged with, thus violating their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.

The petitioners, Mayor Edgar and Teresita Teves, were charged with violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for their alleged direct financial or pecuniary interest in the operation of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Negros Oriental. The Sandiganbayan convicted them based on the presumption that Mayor Teves' interest in the cockpit, as the licensee in 1989, continued until 1992. It also presumed that the cockpit was the conjugal property of Mayor Teves and his wife, and that their pecuniary interest was direct. The Sandiganbayan also charged Teresita Teves as a co-conspirator in the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license for the cockpit. The petitioners contend that they were never informed that they were being charged with violation of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and that their alleged prohibited pecuniary interest in the cockpit was not proved. The Sandiganbayan insists that the uncontroverted documentary evidence shows the petitioners had direct pecuniary interest in the cockpit since 1983, and that the existence of that interest is a criminal offense under the LGC of 1991.

basis to hold Mayor Teves liable for the alleged illegal operation of the Valencia Cockpit in 1992. Moreover, the prosecution failed to present any evidence to support their claim that Mayor Teves intervened or participated in the issuance of the cockpit license. In fact, it was established that the license was issued by the Sangguniang Bayan and not by the mayor. Therefore, the accusation against Mayor Teves lacks merit and should be dismissed.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether Mayor Teves could have intervened or taken part in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time.

  2. Whether Mayor Teves had a pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit.

  3. Whether the offense charged in the information is included in the offense proved.

  4. Under what law should petitioner Edgar Teves be punished.

  5. Whether petitioner Teresita Teves should be acquitted.

  6. Whether or not petitioner Teresita Teves conspired with, or knowingly induced or caused, her husband to commit the violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

RULING:

  1. The Sandiganbayan correctly absolved Mayor Teves of the charge of causing the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, only the Sangguniang Bayan has the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. As the mayor is not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, he could not have intervened or taken part in the issuance of the license during the material time.

  2. The Sandiganbayan convicted Mayor Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, based on the finding that he had a pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit. Even if the ownership of the cockpit was transferred to Mayor Teves' wife, he still had a direct interest in it due to the presumption of conjugal partnership of gains. Therefore, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

  3. The offense charged in the information is included in the offense proved. The essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting the offense charged. Therefore, the variance doctrine applies, warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

  4. Petitioner Edgar Teves should be punished under the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), as the LGC specifically prohibits local officials from possessing pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit and prescribes the punishment for violation thereof. The LGC is paramount to the Anti-Graft Law, which penalizes possession of prohibited interest in a general manner.

  5. Petitioner Teresita Teves should be acquitted.

  6. Petitioner Teresita Teves is acquitted of the offense. The Court found no sufficient evidence that she conspired with, or knowingly induced or caused, her husband to commit the violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Only the Sangguniang Bayan has the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits under the Local Government Code of 1991.

  • The transfer of ownership of property does not necessarily divest a person of their direct interest in it, especially in the case of conjugal property under the presumption of conjugal partnership of gains.

  • Variance Doctrine - When there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

  • Specific vs General Provisions - Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute. The specific provision designed for a particular case or subject I would prevail over the general provision.

  • Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt.

  • Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together.

  • Community of criminal design must be reasonably strong enough to show conspiracy.

  • For a person to be liable for conspiracy, there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design.

  • Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed.

  • The overt act must consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators.

  • In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.

  • The burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that the accused is either responsible for its commission or has conspired with the malefactor.