View full case

PEOPLE v. CASIANO BUNTAG

FACTS:

Berno Georg Otte, a German national, stayed at the Alona Ville Beach Resort in Panglao, Bohol. On February 8, 1992, Otte had dinner at the resort's restaurant and spoke with the manager about the disco happening that night. At the disco, Isidro Mihangos and Benigno Guigue saw Otte. Around 2:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992, Mihangos and Guigue encountered Casiano Buntag and Diego Bongo, who attacked them. Mihangos and Guigue sought refuge at Guigue's uncle's house, leaving their bicycles behind. The police received a report about a dead man near the Alona Beach, confirmed to be Otte. Mihangos and Guigue told the police about their encounter with Buntag and Bongo. Bongo admitted taking Otte's key to Room No. 9 and hiding it. Buntag was later apprehended and admitted witnessing Bongo stabbing Otte after an altercation.

The autopsy report confirmed that Otte died from a stab wound. A criminal complaint for murder was filed against Buntag and Bongo. Buntag's sworn statement was attached to the records. Bongo confirmed Buntag's account in his counter-affidavit. After a preliminary investigation, the MCTC found probable cause for murder against both appellants. Buntag filed a motion to discharge himself as a prosecution witness, but it was denied. Both appellants pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the judge testified and identified the sworn statements and counter-affidavit. The prosecution presented evidence to prove the appellants' conspiracy, including the hunting knife, key to the resort room, and the sworn statements. The court admitted the evidence and denied the appellants' motion to acquit. The trial court found both appellants guilty of murder and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua, ordering them to pay moral damages to the victim's heirs.

The appellants appealed the decision and raised separate issues. They argued that the prosecution failed to prove their conspiracy and involvement in the killing, except for their sworn statements. Appellant Bongo claimed a violation of due process, but it was refuted by the records.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired to kill the victim and actually killed him.

  2. Whether the appellants are guilty of murder.

  3. Whether the appellants are liable for moral damages to the heirs of the victim.

  4. Whether the extrajudicial admissions made by the appellants are admissible as evidence against each other.

  5. Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

  6. Whether the appellants are guilty of murder or homicide.

  7. Whether the trial court erred in awarding moral damages and civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim.

RULING:

  1. The prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the appellants conspired to kill the victim and actually killed him. However, the court found that the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

  2. The appellants are guilty of murder. The court held that conspiracy can be inferred from the collective acts of the accused, and it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually committed the act. Furthermore, the crime charged may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and in this case, the combination of all the circumstances warranted a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

  3. The issue of whether the appellants are liable for moral damages to the heirs of the victim was not discussed in the partial digest.

  4. The extrajudicial admissions made by the appellants are admissible as evidence against each other. These admissions, made without collusion, are akin to interlocking extrajudicial confessions and are admissible as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of each appellant's participation in the crime. The contention that they were deprived of their right to cross-examine the other on their respective admissions against each other is rejected, as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined on their statements.

  5. The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The admissions made by the appellants in their respective statements, the presence of both appellants at the scene of the crime and their flight from the scene, the recovery of the hunting knife used to kill the victim at the crime scene, the medical findings corroborating the cause of the victim's death, and the failure of the appellants to report the incident to the police or seek medical assistance for the victim all point to their participation in the crime. The appellants' failure to present evidence to rebut these facts leaves the prosecution's evidence unrebutted.

  6. The appellants are guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, not murder. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The means, method, or manner of execution must be deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender, and there was no evidence to support this. Therefore, the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

  7. The trial court erred in awarding moral damages to the heirs of the victim since the prosecution failed to present any heir of the victim as a witness. The trial court also failed to award civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim. Therefore, the decision of the trial court is modified, and the appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim.

PRINCIPLES:

  • Conspiracy can be inferred from the collective acts of the accused and does not require direct proof.

  • Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if the circumstances are consistent with each other, consistent with the guilt of the accused, and inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence.

  • The extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is generally admissible only against that accused and not against other accused, unless the confessor repeats the confession in court during trial and the other accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine.

  • An admission in a criminal case is a statement of facts by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or criminal intent. It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which tend to establish the ultimate facts of guilt. A confession, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment in express terms of the accused's guilt of the crime charged.

  • Extrajudicial admissions, made without collusion, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against each other. They are akin to interlocking extrajudicial confessions and can show the probability of each appellant's participation in the crime.

  • Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt if it is strong, conclusive, and consistent with the guilt of the accused.

  • The prosecution has the burden to prove the crime charged and any qualifying circumstance attendant to it.

  • Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires the deliberate or conscious adoption of a means, method, or manner of execution that affords the victim no opportunity to defend himself.

  • The maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be in its medium period if there are no modifying circumstances.

  • Civil indemnity ex delicto should be awarded to the heirs of the victim.