NE CHAN v. A MOTOR CO.

FACTS:

The case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed before the Supreme Court, seeking to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied for search warrants against the petitioners for alleged violation of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. The RTC Judge issued two search warrants, one against petitioner "Hon Ne Chan" and the other against petitioner "Yunji Zeng." The search warrants stated that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that motorcycles and related items, as well as documents, are in the possession and control of the respondents. The NBI conducted a search and seized various motorcycles and documents. Petitioners filed a motion to quash the search warrants, arguing that there was no probable cause and that the warrants were in the nature of general search warrants. The trial court granted the motion and ordered the return of the seized items. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Court of Appeals, in its decision, granted respondents' petition and set aside the trial court's orders.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether the search warrants were issued upon probable cause.

  2. Whether the application for search warrant met the requirement that probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

  3. Whether the trial court overstepped its boundaries in determining the existence of probable cause.

  4. Whether the search warrants in question violated the constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized.

  5. Whether the search warrants were issued in relation to no particular offense.

RULING:

  1. The Supreme Court held that the search warrants were issued upon probable cause. The court emphasized that in determining probable cause, a judge is duty-bound to personally examine under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may present. However, it is not necessary that the oath refers to the "truth of the facts" within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, as long as it convinces the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. In this case, although the first paragraph of the application for search warrant relied on information and belief, the succeeding paragraph stated that the NBI SI personally verified the report and found it to be a fact, thereby removing the basis of the application from mere hearsay and supporting the finding of probable cause by the examining judge.

  2. The court also ruled that the trial court overstepped its boundaries in determining the existence of probable cause. The trial court prematurely concluded that no unfair competition existed, which was not within its competence as its task was merely confined to the preliminary matter of determining probable cause.

  3. The search warrants did not violate the constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity. While the warrants included motorcycles bearing the generic name "WAVE," it is evident that the word "WAVE" is the model name of the motorcycles produced by the respondent Honda. Thus, any imitation unit in the possession of the petitioners and carrying the name "WAVE" is a fit object of the warrants. The name "Wave CX 110" is considered a species of units under the generic name "WAVE." Therefore, the warrants include Wave CX 110 and are not converted into a roving commission when it allows the officer to seize it.

  4. The search warrants were issued in relation to a particular offense, which is the alleged violation of Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293. The petitioners' contention that the search warrants were issued in relation to no particular offense is misguided and their reliance on the case of Savage v. Judge Taypin is incorrect. In this case, the cause of action arose out of the intrusion into the established goodwill of the respondents involving the motorcycle models "WAVE 110 S" and "WAVE 125 S."

PRINCIPLES:

  • The issuance of a search warrant requires probable cause, which must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person.

  • In determining probable cause, a judge must personally examine under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may present.

  • Probable cause refers to such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.

  • Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague, or doubtful basis of fact, or on mere suspicion or belief.

  • The determination of probable cause does not call for the same standard of proof required for a judgment of conviction after trial on the merits. It is concerned with probability, not absolute or moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent person, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.

  • A search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The requirement of reasonable particularity is meant to enable law enforcers serving the warrant to readily identify the properties to be seized and prevent them from seizing the wrong items. It is not required that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail.

  • One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

  • Penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or any equitable consideration. They must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.